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ABSTRACT

EXPLOITING STRUCTURE IN COORDINATING
MULTIPLE DECISION MAKERS
SEPTEMBER 2011
HALA MOSTAFA
B.Sc., CAIRO UNIVERSITY, EGYPT
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Victor Lesser

This thesis is concerned with sequential decision making by multiple agents, whether
they are acting cooperatively to maximize team reward or selfishly trying to maximize their
individual rewards. The practical intractability of this general problem led to efforts in
identifying special cases that admit efficient computation, yet still represent a wide enough
range of problems. In our work, we identify the class of problems with structured interactions, where actions of one agent can have non-local effects on the transitions and/or
rewards of another agent. We addressed the following research questions: 1) How can
we compactly represent this class of problems? 2) How can we efficiently calculate agent
policies that maximize team reward (for cooperative agents) or achieve equilibrium (selfinterested agents)? 3) How can we exploit structured interactions to make reasoning about
communication offline tractable?

vi

For representing our class of problems, we developed a new decision-theoretic model,
Event-Driven Interactions with Complex Rewards (EDI-CR), that explicitly represents structured interactions. EDI-CR is a compact yet general representation capable of capturing
problems where the degree of coupling among agents ranges from complete independence
to complete dependence.
For calculating agent policies, we draw on several techniques from the field of mathematical optimization and adapt them to exploit the special structure in EDI-CR. We developed a Mixed Integer Linear Program formulation of EDI-CR with cooperative agents
that results in programs much more compact and faster to solve than formulations ignoring
structure. We also investigated the use of homotopy methods as an optimization technique,
as well as formulation of self-interested EDI-CR as a system of non-linear equations.
We looked at the issue of communication in both cooperative and self-interested settings. For the cooperative setting, we developed heuristics that assess the impact of potential communication points and add the ones with highest impact to the agents’ decision
problems. Our heuristics successfully pick communication points that improve team reward while keeping problem size manageable. Also, by controlling the amount of communication introduced by a heuristic, our approach allows us to control the tradeoff between
solution quality and problem size.
For self-interested agents, we look at an example setting where communication is an
integral part of problem solving, but where the self-interested agents have a reason to be
reticent (e.g. privacy concerns). We formulate this problem as a game of incomplete information and present a general algorithm for calculating approximate equilibrium profile in
this class of games.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Overview

In the early days of artificial intelligence, one of the main concerns was to develop an
agent - decision maker - that makes optimal decisions in response to changes in a closed
environment that does not contain any other agents. However, agents are increasingly being
deployed in environments containing other agents, whether software agents or physical
situated agents like robots. Our decision maker therefore affects these other agents and is
affected by them. As a result, it can no longer reason about its decisions in isolation; it
must consider other decision makers and their effects on the environment and each other.
This relatively new requirement fueled the need for ways to represent and reason about the
challenging problem of multi-agent decision making. Adding a sequential aspect, whereby
agents take sequences of decisions over time, further complicates the problem.
In this thesis, we are concerned with problems in multi-agent sequential decision making in which agents operate in an environment fraught with uncertainty and make sequences
of decisions with long- and short-term stochastic effects. We focus on situations where
there is some degree of independence among the agents’ sub-problems. Specifically, we
focus on situations where structured interactions among agents arise due to (relatively few)
actions having non-local effects on rewards and transitions of other agents. In addition to
being a characteristic of many real-world problems (e.g. in sensor networks and robotics),
this loose coupling of the agents’ decision processes gives us traction over what would
otherwise be an intractable problem. Indeed, identifying and exploiting special structure is
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a widely used approach to dealing with the prohibitive complexity of the general problem
where agents’ decision processes are very tightly coupled.
In our work, we address situations with both cooperative and self-interested agents. For
each of these, we investigate three main issues:
1. Representation: because existing decision- and game-theoretic models are inadequate for representing multi-agent sequential problems with structured interactions,
we developed a new model that can capture the characteristics of our problems without giving up expressive power.
2. Solution: we use available optimization packages to calculate optimal (for cooperative agents) or equilibrium (for self-interested agents) courses of actions. Depending
on the formulation and the solver, the solution can be an approximation of the optimal/equilibrium policy. To use optimization techniques, we developed mathematical
formulations that exploit the special structure of our problems to reduce the number
of variables involved, resulting in formulations that are faster to solve.
3. Communication: we develop heuristics that make it tractable to reason about communication offline. This kind of reasoning is notorious for its difficulty, mainly due
to the explosion in the size of the problem that results from considering when to
communicate and what. By analyzing interactions among agents, we are able to include communication possibilities only where the agents are likely to benefit from
them. The resulting problem is much smaller than a problem with communication
available everywhere, but still includes enough communication to reach the level of
coordination necessary for a high quality solution.
In the following sections, we give a brief background of the research areas we touch
upon in our work, followed by a list of the contributions made in this thesis and the thesis
outline.
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1.2

Multi-Agent Sequential Decision Making

In this section, we give a high-level description of multi-agent sequential decision making (MSDM) and briefly describe the general models developed for this problem. We then
discuss some models that attempt to circumvent the high complexity by focusing on special cases of the general problem. Finally, we discuss the issue of communication among
decision makers in terms of how it is represented and reasoned about.
1.2.1 MSDM: Process and domains
In MSDM, there is a number of decision makers, each with a set of actions. The actions
affect the environment in which the agents are deployed and can directly affect other agents
as well. Actions are taken over a number of steps, or decision epochs, which may be finite
or infinite. The goal ranges from being a single over-arching goal for the entire set of
agents, to being defined per agent, with different agents striving to achieve different goals.
MSDM, in its most general sense, is a problem complicated by the following factors:
• Multiple decision makers. The fact that there are multiple agents that affect the same
environment means that no agent can reason about its decisions in isolation from the
others. Additionally, realistic situations usually involve restrictions on sensing and
communication, so no one agent has a full view of the problem during execution.
It then becomes important to make sure that a decision that looks good to an agent
locally is also a good decision globally.
• Uncertainty. Real-life situations are rife with uncertainty, whether it is sensing uncertainty that prevents an agent from knowing exactly where it is in its environment,
or action uncertainty where actions do not always have the intended outcomes. Consequently, an agent cannot just follow a linear plan. The plan needs to tell the agent
what to do in every situation it can face. Another consequence of reasoning under uncertainty is that even if there is a centralized entity that produced plans for all agents
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offline and each agent knows the plans of all others, during execution each agent is
unsure about where the others are and what they will do.
• Sequences of actions. An action at one stage affects the set of available actions at
all subsequent stages. As a result, an agent cannot be myopic and just choose the
action that looks best immediately, it needs to reason about the long-term effects of
an action. As the number of decision epochs increases, an agent’s decision problem
becomes more difficult.
• Non-local effects. As mentioned earlier, an agent’s action can affect other agents in
the environment, and an agent may not be free to communicate details of its progress
to others (due to communication costs or availability). Therefore, to reason about its
own decisions and prospects in the future, an agent needs to keep track of where it
believes the others to be and thus what they will do in the future. This requirement
greatly complicates an agent’s reasoning process.
Recent years have witnessed a surge in research on multi-agent decision making. Selfinterested agents in competitive situations are mostly of interest to game theoreticians and
economists, fueled by rapid developments in areas like online auctions and agent negotiation. This branch of research is concerned with both optimal (and near-optimal) decisionmaking in competitive settings and with designing mechanisms to ensure that the agents do
not game the system or reach undesirable equilibria [27]. Research on cooperative agents is
of interest to the Artificial Intelligence community, whether working with embodied agents
(e.g. robots, planetary rovers) or disembodied ones (e.g. meeting schedulers [76], agentcoordinated human teams [79], wireless sensor networks [78]).
1.2.2
1.2.2.1

General models
Cooperative agents

There is a large body of literature on models for representing MSDM problems. For the
cases where agents are cooperative, researchers have leveraged the success of the Markov
4

Decision Process (MDP) as a single-agent decision-theoretic model. A number of multiagent variants of MDP have been proposed, among the earliest and most general of which
are the Decentralized Partially Observable MDP (DEC-POMDP) and Decentralized MDP
(DEC-MDP) [15]. Each of these models is defined by the set of world states and agent
actions, the rewards associated with taking each action in each state, and the transition
function for the actions. These models assume that an agent cannot find out the world state
with certainty, but does receive an observation correlated with the state it is in. The models
differ in that whereas DEC-MDP assumes that pooling the observations of all agents is
enough to determine the world state, DEC-POMDP does not. The Multi-agent Team Decision Problem (MTDP) [70] is a model whose equivalence to DEC-POMDP was proved,
under the perfect recall assumption [75]. Perfect recall means that a state can only be
reached by a unique sequence of actions. Another model is the Multi-agent MDP [23]
which assumes a global state fully observable to all agents. However, this is a very strong
assumption that renders the model unrealistic.
The goal in cooperative settings is to calculate a set of policies, one per agent, that maximize the total reward of all agents. Depending on the problem, the quantity to maximize
can be the sum of rewards over the finite horizon of the problem, or in the case of infinite
horizons, the average or discounted reward.
1.2.2.2 Self-interested agents
The field of game theory focuses on situations where self-interested players/agents
make decisions that affect each other and affect a common environment. Each agent tries
to respond make decisions in a way that maximizes its own reward given strategies of the
other agents. Games can be divided along several axes. Perfect recall (vs. imperfect recall) games involve players who never forget actions, whether theirs or others’, once they
observe them. In games of incomplete information (vs. perfect information), a player does
not know what moves have already been played by other players, resulting in uncertainty
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about the current state of the world and multiple game situations being indistinguishable
to that player. Games can also be classified by the number of stages (decision-making
points) they contain; 1-stage games involve only one stage of decision making while in
sequential games, players take moves after observing moves of chance (e.g., a roll of a die)
and moves of the other players. The most general representation for this kind of games is
as normal form Games (NFGs). Sequential games can be represented as extensive form
games (EFGs) where there are multiple stages, each of which is a game. Actions taken at
a stage affect the game that will be played at the next stage, thereby making it necessary to
think about long-term consequences of actions.
A strategy profile is a set of strategies, one per player. A strategy prescribes a probability distribution over actions to take in each possible situation. The goal in competitive
settings is typically to calculate an equilibrium strategy profile; one from which no player
is motivated to deviate. An equilibrium tells the designer of a system of agents what the
system will converge to in the long run. But some equilibria are more desirable than others; equilibria can vary in their stability and the social welfare they achieve, among other
things.
There are different kinds of equilibria, the most basic of which is the Nash equilibrium.
For sequential games, however, the Nash equilibrium may not be rational because it may
involve a player responding to an incredible threat from its opponent; i.e. a move that
seems like a threat but is really not so because it would not make sense for the other to
make. Shortcomings of the Nash equilibrium are addressed by solution concepts known
as equilibrium refinements. For example, subgame perfect equilibria is a solution concept
developed for characterizing equilibria in sequential games.
Without making any assumptions about the game, it is computationally expensive to
calculate a Nash equilibrium even for a two-player NFG. The Lemke-Howson algorithm [53],
one of the best known, has exponential running time on some instances. Even answering
questions concerning the best equilibrium (according to some criterion), or whether a given
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pure strategy is possible under some equilibrium, is an NP-hard problem [34]. Furthermore, Conitzer and Sandholm show inapproximability results; not even an equilibrium that
is approximately optimal can be found in polynomial time [30].
In addition to EFG, another very general representation for self-interested agents is
Partially Observable Stochastic Games (POSG) [41], which are defined exactly like DECPOMDPs, but with a reward function per agent rather than one reward function for the
entire team. An agent’s reward function, however, is still in terms of joint states and actions,
so no independence assumptions are made.
1.2.3 Specialized models
The previous sub-section clearly shows that without making any assumptions about the
underlying structure of a problem, calculating the optimal policy (in the case of cooperative
agents), or an equilibrium profile (for self-interested agents), is computationally very demanding. One way of dealing with this prohibitive complexity is identifying sub-classes of
the general problem that are more tractable to solve, but still of practical interest. Different
models cater to problems with different kinds of structure Some of these have inherently
lower complexity, while others, in spite of being in the same complexity class as the more
general models, are easier to solve in practice.
One way in which the general models are specialized is by assuming that interactions
among agents have a certain structure whereby the agents are largely independent except
for some actions that have non-local effects (e.g. Transition-Independent DEC-MDP [14],
Event-Driven Interaction DEC-MDP [12]), or some states where rewards and transitions
depend on actions of all agents (e.g. Interaction-driven Markov game [82], Distributed
POMDPs with Coordination Locales [87]). This kind of structured interaction arises in
domains like robotic search and rescue where robots typically have different goals and
ways of accomplishing them, but they still affect other robots when doing certain actions.
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Rather than making assumptions about how agents interact, another way of specializing
the general models is to make assumptions about which agents interact. Typically, real life
situations exhibit some kind of locality of interaction where an agent only interacts with
a subset of other agents. This has been leveraged in models like Networked Distributed
POMDP [67]. Locality of interaction arises in domains like distributed sensor networks
where each sensor interacts with only a limited number of neighboring sensors.
The above models are for cooperative agents, but similar approaches have been taken
with game theoretic models. Locality of interaction is again an important characteristic in
many situations and has been exploited in graphical games and variants thereof [48, 52, 19,
47]. Various kinds of conditional independence among agents’ decisions have given rise to
models descending from Influence Diagrams [51, 46].
From this brief survey of the state of the art in models for representing MSDM problems with special structure, it is clear that there is currently no decision- or game-theoretic
model that can cleanly represent the kind of problems we are interested in; problems where
agents are largely independent and interaction arises because some actions have non-local
effects on the rewards and transitions of other agents. Without a model that specifically
caters to such situations, they can only be represented in extensive form or using DECPOMDP, leading to problem instances that are much larger than they need to be. Besides
being representationally inefficient, such representations obscure the structured interaction
among agents, making it hard to exploit to efficiently find an equilibrium or an optimal
policy.
1.2.4 Communication
As we tackle more complex problems requiring tighter coordination, we cannot ignore
the possibility of, and oftentimes need for, communication among the decision makers,
even self-interested ones. Communication allows the agents to coordinate their actions
and overcome uncertainties in action outcomes and the environment. For example, robots
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conducting a rescue operation need to coordinate in the face of uncertainty regarding action
durations and success, even if the initial plan is common knowledge.
The concern about complexity discussed earlier is exacerbated when communication
is brought into the picture. Reasoning about communication results in an explosion in the
size of the state space and the number of decisions that need to be made (e.g. who should
an agent communicate with, how often, and what should the content of the message be).
We use the term computational cost to refer to the cost of solving the larger and harder
problem we get when communication is involved. There have been numerous efforts to
address this kind of cost. One approach is to reason about communication online. This has
the advantage that at any given state, the agent only has to reason about states reachable
from that state, thereby reducing the overall computational effort. Typically, during offline reasoning about domain actions, the agents either assume they will always be able to
communicate [96, 71] or will never be able to communicate [13]. For these offline assumptions, online reasoning then decides where communication can be skipped or introduced,
respectively. The problem with this kind of reasoning is that communication decisions
made this way are typically myopic (involving limited lookahead into the future) and are
usually made under further assumptions regarding the availability of communication in the
future [38, 13], resulting in the possibility of over- or under-communication.
The research that has agents reasoning about communication offline takes different approaches to reducing the computational cost. Instead of simultaneously computing domain
action and communication policies, the agents can optimize the communication policy and
action policy iteratively with respect to each other [80]. This has the disadvantage of possibly converging to sub-optimal policies, as when, for example, the agents avoid doing an
action that needs communication because communication for this action is not part of the
communication policy, and the communication policy does not include this desirable communication because the action is not part of the action policy. The only way around this
circularity is to reason about domain and communication actions in an integrated fashion.
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Note that this does not rule out decomposition-based approaches; it just mandates that the
sub-problems of finding communication and action policies should provide feedback to
each other in a systematic way that does not miss the global optimal.
Another approach that was developed for general DEC-POMDPs requires agents to
communicate at least every K time steps, thereby only considering messages that encode
observation histories up to length K. Since in DEC-POMDP a policy is a mapping from
observation histories to actions, this approach makes policy computation less intractable.
However, this approach does not weigh the costs and benefits of communication, so the
agents can potentially communicate when they do not need to, or be unable to communicate
when they do.
The various independence assumptions that form the bases of the special decisiontheoretic models discussed earlier make reasoning about communication a prime candidate for approaches that benefit from these assumptions. If agents are not tightly coupled,
their need for communication is very different from agents in a DEC-POMDP, for example. However, so far, there has been no work that tries to make offline reasoning about
communication tractable by exploiting the special character of a given special model.
1.2.5

Solution approaches

One of the concerns raised against decision-theoretic models is their need for an accurate and, often, very detailed model of the environment. This concern is addressed by approaches that learn the environment model , as in multi-agent reinforcement learning [99],
as well as algorithms that can reason over approximately-specified models. Another, more
important, concern is the very high complexity of the problem of calculating optimal policies (the general DEC-POMDP and DEC-MDP models are NEXP-complete [15]).
One family of algorithms that attempt to overcome this complexity is the Joint Equilibriumbased Search For Policies (JESP) family. JESP-style algorithms solve general DEC-POMDPs
by iteratively optimizing one agent’s policy with respect to all other policies until no fur-
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ther improvement in rewards is possible [65]. This approach reaches a local optimum,
and if the best policy calculated so far is always retained, the algorithm is guaranteed to
terminate. The JESP approach has been implemented in a dynamic programming algorithm (DP-JESP) and has been improved to increase parallelism by exploiting locality of
interaction [67, 49].
Another large family of algorithms for DEC-POMDPs is based on the Dynamic Programming (DP) optimal algorithm proposed by Hansen et. al [41] . The Memory-Bounded
Dynamic Programming (MBDP) algorithm started a line of work that attempts to make
DP tractable by keeping track of a limited number of policy trees [74]. Improved MBDP
(IMBDP) is motivated by the fact that only a small set of observations is possible for a
given belief state and action choice [73]. IMBDP therefore only retains the most likely
observations, thereby preventing the exponential growth of tree size with the number of
observations. MBDP with Observation Compression (MBDP-OC) [26] addresses the same
concern but in a more informed way.
Ideas from solving single-agent models have sometimes been borrowed for multi-agent
planning. For example, Point-based dynamic programming for DEC-POMDPs [85] is a
mix of the traditional DP approach and point-based approximations that have been used for
single agent POMDPs. Solutions to a relaxed version of the original probelm (for example,
a version with full observability or with free communication) can be used as heuristics for
approximating the value of the best joint action (e.g., the MDP heuristic is used in MBDP).
Oftentimes, a proposed model is accompanied by an algorithm that solves this particular
model by capitalizing on the special features in it (e.g. the OC-DEC-MDP model has
an accompanying algorithm [17] and the Coverage Set Algorithm [14] was developed to
solve TI-DEC-MDP and EDI-DEC-MDP, later generalized and improved in the Multiagent Planning Bilinear Program algorithm [69]).
Exploiting problem structure for efficient representation and computation, together with
the use of heuristic approaches, is making it possible to scale up to tens, and sometimes
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hundreds, of agents. However, this ability to scale up comes at the expense of significant
restrictions on the nature and amount of interactions among agents. Moreover, the fact that
algorithms exploit the character of their respective models typically makes them of little
use when trying to solve a new model.
Studying state of the art algorithms for sequential decision making, we found only very
few approaches that rely on optimization techniques [9, 69, 95, 8] although the availability
of industrial-grade optimization packages make this an attractive approach. Using optimization is a direction we will take for most of the work presented in this thesis.

1.3

Contributions

1.3.1 Problem statement
In our work, we have identified an interesting class of problems where the decision
processes of multiple agents are tied together by interactions stemming from actions that
have non-local effects. Our study of this class of problems addresses the following research
questions:
1. How can we represent problems where agents are largely independent except for
some structured interactions among them? The representation should exploit the
loose coupling and avoid unnecessary verbosity, but still be able to cope with problems where interaction is arbitrarily strong.
2. Can we leverage available optimization packages and solvers? Industrial-grade packages whose performance has been optimized over many years and uses are now
widely available. Can we formulate our problem of calculating a set of policies with
maximum reward or stability in a way such that we can use these solvers? Moreover,
can we exploit structured interactions to develop “good” formulations for which the
available industrial-grade solvers not just work, but work efficiently?
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3. Can we exploit structured interactions to make reasoning about communication offline tractable? In the kind of problems we address, the agents are not very tightly
coupled, so they do not need to communicate all the details of their progress. Intuitively, there are only a few situations where the agents need to communicate. Can
we analyze agent interactions to guess what these situations are and make communication available only at these points, thus eliminating most of the computational
overhead associated with reasoning about communication? This would allow us to
reason about domain and communication actions in an integrated yet efficient manner.
1.3.2 List of contributions
The contributions of this thesis are in the area of multi-agent decision making in settings
where agents are largely independent except for some structured interactions among their
decision processes. I considered both cooperative and self-interested decision makers. I
studied the problems of representing situations with structured interactions, formulating
and solving the decision making problem as an optimization problem, and reasoning about
communication. The following is a list of my contributions:
• Representation for cooperative and self-interested agents: I developed EventDriven Interaction with Complex Rewards (EDI-CR), a decision-theoretic model for
representing structured transition and reward interactions. EDI-CR has the same
expressive power as DEC-MDP with factored state and local observability.
• Solving cooperative EDI-CR using optimization techniques: I exploited structured interaction to develop a compact Mixed Integer Linear Program formulation of
EDI-CR instances. I also formulated the problem of policy calculation as a continuum of problems with varying strengths of agent interactions and studied the use of
homotopy methods to solve this continuum.
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• Solving self-interested EDI-CR using optimization techniques: For an existing
formulation of calculating equilibrium as a bilinear program, I studied the effect of
changing the amount of agent interaction on the size of the formulation and the speed
of solving it. As an alternative solution approach, I investigated an existing formulation of finding equilibria as a system of nonlinear equations and the possibility of
adapting and using it to solve self-interested EDI-CR.
• Communication among cooperative agents: I exploited the structure explicitly
represented by EDI-CR to make offline reasoning about communication tractable.
I devised heuristics that strategically choose communication decision points to add
to zero-communication version of the problem. The resulting problem achieves the
benefits of better coordination through communication at a small fraction of the computational cost typically incurred when planning for communication.
• Communication among self-interested agents: I studied the problem of self-interested
agents deciding whether to communicate information when doing so is necessary to
accomplish a collective task, but incurs individual costs. I modeled this situation as a
sequential game of incomplete information and developed a hill-climbing approach
to find an approximate Nash equilibrium.
All the empirical evaluation for the above contributions was done using the Mars rovers
domain. In this domain, rovers are tasked with collecting data from Mars. The rovers can
be cooperative or self-interested, depending on which approach is being evaluated. Each
rovers has a set of sites that it can collect data from and needs to decide which sites to
visit and in what order. Collected pieces of data can be redundant, complementary, or
independent of each other. In addition, a visit to a given site by one rover can make another
rover’s visit to another site easier or harder. More details about this domain are given in
Section 2.2.1.3.
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1.4

Thesis Outline

The body of this thesis is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, we survey general
decision- and game-theoretic models for representing multi-agent sequential decision making, both for cooperative and self-interested agents. We then focus on problems with structured agent interactions, detailing the characteristics of such problems and presenting some
motivating examples of them. We present our new model, Event-Driven Interaction with
Complex Rewards (EDI-CR), that we developed to fill a gap in existing decision- and gametheoretic models. We conclude the chapter with a brief survey of specialized models and
compare them to our new model, where appropriate.
In Chapter 3, we try to leverage the power of available industrial grade optimization
packages in solving instances of EDI-CR with cooperative. To this end, we presents two
formulations for our problems; as a mixed integer linear program and as a system of nonlinear equations. We start the chapter with existing mathematical formulations of a more
general class of problems. We then show how we exploit the special character of our
problems to develop compact formulations that are easier to solve, both for the cases with
2 and more than 2 agents. The chapter ends with an overview of homotopy methods and an
investigation of their use to solve EDI-CR instances.
The issue of communication among cooperative (resp. self-interested) decision makers
is investigated in Chapter 4 (resp. Chapter 5). For cooperative agents, we start the chapter
with a survey of ways of representing and reasoning about communication in decisiontheoretic models. We then analyze the computational costs of reasoning about communication and present our approach for addressing this kind of cost. We present heuristics for
limiting communication in the uni- and bi-directional interaction cases. We give experimental results showing the efficiency of our heuristics in limiting the computational cost
while still allowing for high-quality solutions.
Chapter 5 addresses the issue of communication among self-interested agents in the
context of a problem from the field of database management. In the view maintenance
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problem, database managers need to disclose information to keep a database view up to date
(collecting a reward for doing so), but incur individual costs for disclosing information. We
formulate the view maintenance problem as a game of incomplete information and present
an anytime hill-climbing algorithm for solving this kind of games.
Chapter 6 deals with the problem of calculating equilibrium profiles for instances of
EDI-CR involving self-interested agents. We investigate the effect of changing the amount
of interaction among agents on the size of EDI-CR instances formulated as bilinear programs and the speed of solving these programs. We vary the amount of interaction by varying the amount of communication the agents can have. The chapter ends with a discussion
of continuation methods and their use for solving the problem of calculating equilibrium
profiles in general 1- and multi-stage games, then discuss their possible use for EDI-CR
instances.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes our contributions and discusses possible directions for
future work.
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CHAPTER 2
REPRESENTATION FOR STRUCTURED AGENT
INTERACTIONS

Finding the right representation for a problem is the first step towards solving it. A
suitable representation should be able to express the particularities of the kind of problems
it aims to model. An explicit representation of the special structure of the problem makes
it easier to design efficient solution algorithms that exploit this special structure. On the
other hand, the representation should not be so tailored to the problem as to give up all
generality. Ideally, it should be able to represent a wide spectrum of problems, with the
benefits of using it depending on how close a given problem is to the class of problems
targeted by the representation.
Another concern in discussing the merits of a representation is compactness. Again,
we can use the special character of the problem to avoid duplicate or unnecessarily verbose
specifications. However, this compactness should not be all lost when we start to actually
operate on the representation. If a compact representation does not come with an algorithm
that manipulates it directly, without having to first expand it or ‘roll it out’ , then the actual
benefit of the representation is questionable.
When it comes to multi-agent sequential decision making, a large number of decisionand game-theoretic models have been proposed in the literature. In addition to general
models, numerous specializations were proposed, together with their associated solution
algorithms, in an attempt to circumvent the high complexity of solving the general models.
However, there is currently no decision- or game-theoretic model that can cleanly represent
the kind of problems we are interested in; problems where agents are largely independent
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and interaction arises because some actions have non-local effects on the rewards and transitions of other agents.
We propose a new model, Event-Driven Interactions with Complex Rewards (EDI-CR),
that allows us to better exploit structured interactions among the sub-problems of different
agents. EDI-CR is a compact yet general representation, capable of capturing problems
where the degree of coupling among agents ranges from complete independence, as in
MDPs, to complete dependence, as in decentralized MDPs.
We begin in Section 2.1 by on overview of some of the most general models. In Section 2.2, we give some motivating examples that demonstrate the need for a new model.
We then present EDI-CR and discuss its expressive power. In Section 2.3, we give a survey of specializations of the general representations and compare them to EDI-CR, where
appropriate.

2.1

General Representations

In this section, we overview general decision- and game-theoretic models for representing sequential multi-agent decision-making under uncertainty.
2.1.1 Cooperative agents: DEC-POMDPs and DEC-MDPs
2.1.1.1 DEC-POMDP
Being very useful in the single-agent case, decision-theoretic models and tools are proving similarly useful when there are multiple decision-makers involved. The family of models based on the Markov Decision Process (MDP) is large and still growing. One of the
most general models in the literature is the Decentralized Partially Observable MDP (DECPOMDP) proposed by Bernstein et al. [15]. DEC-POMDP is a model suitable for domains
where the agents do not know the global state with certainty, but do receive observations
from which they can form some belief over what the global state is.
Definition 1 An n-agent DEC-POMDP is a tuple < A, S, A, P, R, Ω, O > where
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• A is the set of n agents
• S is a finite set of world states, with a distinguished initial state s0
• A = A1 × A2 × ... × An is a finite set of joint actions. Ai is the set of actions that
can be taken by agent i
• P : S × A × S → [0, 1] is the transition function. P (s0 |s, a) is the probability of the
outcome state s0 when the joint action a is taken in state s
• R : S × A × S → R is the reward function. R(s, a, s0 ) is the reward obtained from
taking joint action a in state s and transitioning to state s0
• Ω = Ω1 ×Ω2 ×...×Ωn is a finite set of joint observations. Ωi is the set of observations
of agent i
• O : S × A × Ω → [0, 1] is the observation function. O(s0 , a, o) is the probability of
agents 1 through n seeing observations o1 through on after joint action a transitions
to s0
• Joint partial observability: the n-tuple of observations made by the agents together
does not (necessarily) fully determine the current state
DEC-POMDP is a very general model in that it does not make any assumptions about
the nature of interaction among the different agents. But it is this same lack of assumptions
that makes DEC-POMDPs very difficult to solve (NEXP-Complete [15]). It is not possible
to break down the joint problem into smaller sub-problems because every aspect of the
problem dynamics tightly couples the sub-problems of individual agents. Rewards, transitions and observations are all defined over joint actions and states. An added difficulty
is presented by the property of joint partial observability; even if the agents could piece
together all their local observations, they would still be unable to determine the global state
with certainty.
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2.1.1.2

DEC-MDP

One way of simplifying the DEC-POMDP model is to assume joint full observability,
rather than the general joint partial observability, whereby the set of observations together
do identify the current world state. This results in the Decentralized MDP model.
Definition 2 A decentralized Markov decision process (Dec-MDP) is a Dec-POMDP that
is jointly fully observable, i.e. there is a mapping J that identifies the global state from the
observations of all agents. J : Ω1 × ... × Ωn → S such that O(s, a, o1 ..on ) > 0 if and only
if J(o1 ..on ) = s.
The difference between the DEC-MDP and the DEC-POMDP becomes obvious if we
allow free communication among the agents; a DEC-MDP with free communication reduces to an MDP whereas a DEC-POMDP reduces to a POMDP.
In both DEC-POMDP and DEC-MDP, because an agent does not observe the global
state, it can only derive a belief over the global state from the observation history it has
seen so far. An agent’s policy therefore maps each belief state to a probability distribution
over actions. Because there is always a deterministic optimal policy, we can take a policy to
be mapping from belief states to actions. The change from partial to full joint observability
does not affect the theoretical complexity of the model; both DEC-POMDPs and DECMDPs are NEXP-complete [15].
Having replaced the joint partial observability assumption with full observability, the
next logical step in limiting the generality of DEC-POMDPs in return for tractability is to
attack one or more of the ties linking different agents together; the reward, transition and
observation functions. The first step in doing so is to consider a factored state space where
we designate each agent’s part of the state individually. Note that this does not mean an
agent’s part of the state is entirely under its control.
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Definition 3 A factored, n-agent DEC-MDP is a DEC-MDP where the world state can be
factored into n + 1 components S = S0 × S1 × ... × Sn where S0 are the external features
and Si is the set of features belonging to agent i.
Note that a factored state space does not mean each agent has full control over its state; an
agent’s state can be affected by actions of other agents. Consequently, an agent’s optimal
decision depends on the current uncontrollable features s0 and the history of its local features. As with DEC-POMDP, instead of keeping track of history, an agent can form a belief
state, in which case the policy is again a mapping from belief states to actions.
For a factored DEC-MDP, we can consider further sub-classes with independence in
one or more of the following aspects: rewards, transitions and observations. Basically,
independence in an aspect means that for an agent i, the aspect in question is not affected
by the actions of other agents, and only depends on the state and action of i. We will see
some models featuring different kinds of independence in Section 2.3.1.
2.1.2 Self-interested agents: EFG
Extensive form game (EFG) is a general representation for self-interested multi-agent
decision making that is close to factored DEC-MDPs with observable local states. EFG is a
tree capturing the order in which agents take actions, what they know when they take each
action, and the probabilistic outcomes of actions.
Definition 4 An EFG is a tuple < I, V, E, P, H, u, p > where:
• I is the set of players
• The pair (V, E) is a finite directed tree with nodes V and edges E and Z is the set of
terminal nodes
• P layer : V \ Z → I determines which player moves at each decision node. P layer
induces a partition over V \ Z and P layeri = {x ∈ V \ Z|P layer(x) = i} is the
set of nodes at which player i moves
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• H = {H0 , ..., Hn } is the set of information sets, one for each player. H is a partition
over P layeri . The information set of a node x is denoted as h(x)
• Ai (h) is the set of actions available at information set h belonging to agent i
• ui : Z → R is agent i’s utility function defined over the set of terminal nodes. For
x ∈ Z, ui (x) is the payoff to player i if the game ends at node x
• p is the transition probability of chance moves
In a game with imperfect information, an agent does not know with certainty the state of
the other agent (and thus the game played by the agents at any particular stage), but does
have a probability distribution over it, much like the concept of belief in DEC-POMDP. In
such games, an information set can contain more than one node, which the agent cannot
tell apart. A policy should therefore make the same decision across all nodes belonging
to the same information set (similar to a DEC-POMDP policy that maps belief states to
actions). In situations with self-interested agents, the goal is usually to find some kind
of equilibrium set of policies, one per agent, where no one agent is motivated to deviate
from its prescribed policy. This equilibrium state is often desirable so that the designer can
make statements about the long-term state of the multi-agent system. But a game can have
multiple equilibria, and sometimes the goal is to calculate the equilibrium that maximizes
social utility or some other quantity of interest. Unlike the case with cooperative agents, we
are not guaranteed to find a deterministic equilibrium, and therefore a policy is a mapping
from information sets to probability distributions over actions.
Representing a game as an EFG is justified when modeling tightly coupled games where
indeed all actions participate in determining the game’s next state and agents’ individual
rewards. However, this representation is overly verbose in the case of loosely coupled
games with relatively few structured interactions.
In addition to EFG, another very general representation for self-interested agents is
Partially Observable Stochastic Games (POSG) [41], which are defined exactly like DEC22

POMDPs, but with a reward function per agent rather than one reward function for the
entire team. An agent’s reward function, however, is still in terms of joint states and actions,
so no independence assumptions are made. Hansen et. all write that a finite-horizon POSG
can be viewed as a type of extensive game with imperfect information [41].

2.2

New Model: EDI-CR

In this section, we propose a new model, Event-Driven Interactions with Complex Rewards (EDI-CR), that allows us to better exploit structure in interactions among the subproblems of different agents. Our model explicitly captures interactions among agents and
their effects, and thus makes it easier to reason about them than using general models. It is
also more general than existing structured models. First, we give some motivating examples that demonstrate the need for a new model. We then present EDI-CR and discuss its
expressiveness compared to DEC-MDPs with observable local state.
2.2.1 Motivating examples
2.2.1.1 Robotic rescue
Consider a robotic team dealing with a building on fire. One agent is in charge of
putting out the fire, another locates and evacuates survivors and a third delivers first aid to
the injured. Most of an agent’s actions affect only itself; the first agent’s decision of how
to attack the fire and what kind of extinguisher to use mainly affect its own progress in
fire fighting. Likewise, the paramedic agent’s choice of the kind of first aid care to give to
the injured mainly affects its own progress towards getting them out of critical conditions.
However, the fire-fighting agent’s decision of when to secure a given area affects how easy
it will be for the rescue agent to locate survivors in that area. Competitions like RoboCup
Rescue [1] involve developing intelligent agents that are given the capabilities of the main
actors in a disaster response scenario.
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2.2.1.2

Cleaning robots

Consider a set of cleaning robots which, between them, manage the cleanliness of a
building. Each robot is responsible for a set of halls, but corridors are joint responsibility
and the robots can get extra reward if they correctly coordinate their cleaning of this shared
space. Other interactions stem from sharing the waste bins and potentially getting into
each other’s way in shared areas like corridors and elevators. Another source of interaction
among the robots is that if one robot needs to move a heavy piece of furniture, it would be
easier to do if it gets help from another robot.
2.2.1.3 Modified Mars rovers
Consider a variant of the Mars rovers domain (used in [14]) where there are multiple
rovers, each with a set of sites to visit. Probabilistically, visiting a site can be slow or fast
and each outcome has an associated probability, duration and reward. In addition, each
site has an earliest start time before which it cannot be visited. A site can also have a list
of pre-requisites; sites that must be visited before the one in question. There is transition
dependence in that a rover’s visiting a site can affect the outcome probability of another
rover visiting some other site. For example, if rover j visits a certain site before rover i,
j can take some measurements which make processing some other site easier for agent i.
Reward interaction takes the form of additional reward (for complementary sites) or penalty
(for redundant sites) collected when the rovers visit certain combinations of sites. For an
agent j, a critical action is visiting a site that affects i’s outcome or is associated with
additional reward. Clearly, the degree of coupling of the agents’ sub-problems depends on
the number of transition and reward interactions.
The decision problem for each agent is what subset of sites it should visit and in what
order. Note that this is different from the decision problem addressed by Becker [14] where
the order of the sites is fixed and agents can only choose to visit a site or skip it, which
significantly reduces the size of the problem. The local state of an agent is composed
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of the sequence of actions done so far (in chronological order), together with the resulting
outcomes (fast or slow). There is no need to explicitly store the current time in a state, since
it can be calculated by adding up the durations of the particular action outcomes obtained.
Communication can be introduced into this setting to better coordinate the agents and
reduce the uncertainty caused by probabilistic action outcomes. One communication language, for example, can be to exchange local states, leaving the agents fully coordinated.
Another language can exchange only certain aspects of the local state (e.g., the last action
done). For the chosen communication language and an associated communication cost
function, the decision problem becomes choosing the subset of sites to visit and their order, in addition to deciding what pieces of information to communicate during execution in
order to maximize the difference between rewards and communication costs.
2.2.2 Problem characteristics
The above examples share some fundamental characteristics:
• Each agent has its own local state and actions (e.g. the cleaning robots have different
locations and different grabbing actions) and actions have probabilistic outcomes.
• Agents are generally unaware of each other’s states and actions, unless some form of
communication (whether deliberate or part of the setting) is specified.
• Most of an agent’s action outcomes and rewards are independent of the other agent.
• Interactions among agents are relatively few, compared to the number of actions
they can take. They are also structured, meaning that an action can affect the other
agent in a specific way. In a reward interaction, a certain action of an agent affects
the reward of a certain actions of the other agent. Transition interactions are where
certain actions of an agent affect the outcome probabilities of certain actions of the
other.
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• Interactions are not only between actions taken at the same time. An action can be
affected by something that happened in the past (e.g. a robot dumping a large object
in a given bin will affect the outcome of another robot’s use of the bin at any later
point in time). The fact that the affecting action happened is not necessarily encoded
in an agent’s state.
Traditionally, the examples we described would be represented in extensive form or
using DEC-POMDP, depending on whether the agents are cooperative. This requires specifying an agent’s rewards and next state for each of its actions and the other agents’ actions.
Clearly, this representations is overly verbose, since in most cases, the rewards and new
states are independent of the actions of other agents. Ignoring this fact results in instances
that are much larger than they need to be. Besides being representationally inefficient, such
a representation obscures the structured interaction among agents, making it hard to exploit
to efficiently find an equilibrium or an optimal policy.
2.2.3

EDI-CR: The model

Event-Driven Interactions with Complex Rewards (EDI-CR) is a hybrid of the TransitionIndependent DEC-MDP (TI-DEC-MDP) [14] and the Event-Driven Interaction (EDI-DECMDP) [12] models, discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.1. The state space is factored
and an agent can fully observe its local state, but not the states of others. From TI-DECMDP, EDI-CR inherits complex rewards where in addition to local reward functions, certain combinations of actions have an additional cost/reward. From EDI-DEC-MDP, EDICR inherits structured transition dependence where in addition to local transition functions,
certain actions of an agent can affect the transitions of another.
Definition 5 An n-agent EDI-CR is a tuple < A, S, A, P1..n , R1..n , ρ, τ, T > where:
• A is the set of n agents
• S = S1 × S2 × ... × Sn is the set of factored world states
26

• A = A1 × A2 × ... × An is the set of joint actions
• Pi : Si × Ai × Si → [0, 1] is i’s local transition function
• Ri : Si × Ai × Si → R is i’s local reward function
• ρ = {< (sk1 , ak1 ), ..., (skm , akm ), rk >k=1..|ρ| } is the set of reward interactions. Each
interaction involves any subset of agents and lists the state-action pairs and the reward/penalty when the agents take these actions in these states.
• τ = {< (sk1 , ak1 ), ..., (skm , akm ), pk >k=1..|τ | } is the set of transition interactions.
The k th entry specifies the new transition probability pk of the state-action pair of the
affected agent km when agents k1 to km−1 do the specified state-action pairs before
km makes its transition.
Depending on the problem, it may be more natural to drop the states from the specification of entries in ρ and τ . For example, if a domain has outcomes associated with actions,
and a transition dependence means that action ai affects the probability distribution over
action aj ’s outcomes, a compact and natural way to represent this is to have an entry in τ
that specifies the new probability distribution over aj ’s outcome, regardless of the particular
states of agents i and j.
EDI-CR can capture a wider range of problems than either of its parents. It provides us
with a model that is more general than either TI-DEC-MDP or EDI-DEC-MDP but still has
inherent structure that can be exploited in a tractable solution algorithm. The complexity of
EDI-CR is clearly NEXP; EDI-CR is a subset of full-fledged DEC-MDP, which is NEXP,
and a superset of EDI-DEC-MDP, which is also NEXP.
2.2.4 EDI-CR vs. factored DEC-MDP
We discuss the expressiveness of EDI-CR by considering how an EDI-CR instance can
be mapped to an instance of factored DEC-MDP with observable local state and vice versa.
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In the definition of EDI-CR, note that ρ and τ do not stipulate that agents involved
in a given entry do the specified actions at the same time to get the additional reward or
affect another agent, i.e. we can associate a reward with a joint action whose individual
components are done at different times. This kind of reward (referred to as extended reward structure in [69]) is more general than a DEC-MDP’s reward function which defines
rewards for transitions made simultaneously by all agents. Capturing the semantics of EDICR’s reward and transition functions in a DEC-MDP would require the DEC-MDP’s state
to remember all previous state-action pairs, resulting in a state space exponentially larger
than that of the EDI-CR’s instance. Also, in DEC-MDP, the reward and transition functions are defined over joint states and actions, which makes the number of entries they have
exponentially larger than that of the individual functions in EDI-CR.
We now show how an EDI-CR instance < S1..n , A1..n , P1..n , R1..n , ρ, τ, T > is mapped
to a DEC-MDP instance < Ŝ1..n , A1..n , P D , RD , T >. We assume that a given state cannot
be encountered multiple times during a given execution, which is true if the agents know
what stage they are at (e.g. when the state includes time). The need for the assumption will
become apparent in the course of the mapping:
• A1..n and T are the same
• Ŝi = Si ×

ST −1
t=0

(Si × Ai )t . The DEC-MDP’s individual state spaces are the EDI-CR

spaces fitted with state and action histories. We use ŝi .current to refer to the current
state stored in ŝi , without the history.
• Every entry RD (ŝ1 ...ŝn , a1 ...an ) is calculated as follows: we add up the individual
P
rewards i Ri (ŝi .current, ai ). We then account for any additional rewards: we add
the reward of the k th entry in ρ if the state-action pairs in this entry are present in
(ŝ1 ...ŝn , a1 ...an ). However, we only do this if ∃i s.t. (ski , aki ) = (ŝi .current, ai ), i.e.,
one of the state-action pairs in the ρ entry has just been finished. This, together with
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the assumption that a state is encountered at most once during an execution, avoids
giving out reward for the same entry multiple times.
• Every entry P D (ŝ1 ...ŝn , a1 ...an , ŝ01 ...ŝ0n ) = v is calculated as follows: if, for some
i, the history in ŝ0i is inconsistent with the state-action pair (ŝi , ai ), then v = 0.
Otherwise, the distribution over i’s next state is obtained from the k th entry in τ if the
state-action pairs of the affecting agents in k match the histories in (ŝ1 ...ŝn , a1 ...an ).
Otherwise, the distribution given by Pi is used. The individual distributions are then
multiplied to give a distribution over the joint state.
It is worth noting that if the solution algorithm we are using to calculate a policy for
the DEC-MDP operates on entire histories of actions of all agents, we may not need to
factor the transition and reward interactions given by τ and ρ into the DEC-MDP transition
and reward functions, in which case the DEC-MDP state does not need to keep track of
all transitions made so far. For example, an algorithm operating on the sequence form
representation of a policy (see Section 3.1) can calculate the joint reward of a given tuple
of histories and the transition probability of each agent’s history given the others.
An instance of a factored DEC-MDP can be mapped to an EDI-CR instance without an
exponential increase in size. This is done as follows:
• S1..n , A1..n and T are the same
• ∀iRi (si , ai ) = 0 for all actions and states, i.e. individual rewards are not used
• Every entry RD (s1 ..sn , a1 ..an ) = v has a corresponding entry < n, (s1 , a1 ), ..., (sn , an ), v >
in ρ.
• Local transition functions Pi can be set to anything. They will not be used.
• Every entry P D (s1 ..sn , a1 ..an , s01 ..s0n ) has n corresponding entries in τ , the ith of
which is < (sj , aj )j6=i , (si , ai ), pi > where pi is obtained by marginalizing the next
state distribution given by P D to obtain a distribution over i’s local state only.
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2.3

Survey Of Special Representations

In this section we give a brief survey of some of the models proposed in the decisiontheory and game-theory literature. These models attempt to circumvent the high complexity
of solving the general models by focusing on special cases of the general problem.
2.3.1 Cooperative agents
In this subsection, we discuss some of the many specializations of DEC-POMDPs, the
special structure they aim to exploit and, where appropriate, how they differ from our model
EDI-CR.
2.3.1.1 TI-DEC-MDP
Transition-Independent DEC-MDP is a special case of factored DEC-MDP with independent transitions and observable local states [14]. The only interaction among the
agents’ sub-problems is through the reward function. Agents have their individual reward
functions defined over their local states and actions, but, in addition, there is a complex
reward structure whereby certain combinations of actions have an additional cost/reward.
First, we re-state some definitions related to this model.
Definition 6 A factored, n-agent DEC-MDP is transition independent if the joint transition
function P can be separated into n separate transition functions P1 , .., Pn such that

P (s0i |(s0 ...sn ), (a1 ...an ), (s00 ...s0i−1 , s0i+1 ...s0n )) =




P0 (s00 |s0 )

i=0



Pi (s0i |ŝi , ai , s00 )

1≤i≤n

For agent i, ŝi ∈ Si × S0 is the local state. The external features S0 are included because
they do affect the agent. Transition independence means that the new local state of each
agent depends only on its previous local state, its local action, and the external features.
External features change based only on the previous external features. The probability of
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the new joint state is therefore just the product of the probabilities of the new individual
local states.
Definition 7 A factored, n-agent DEC-MDP is observation independent if the joint observation function O can be separated into n separate observation functions O1 , .., On where,
for any local observation oi ∈ Ωi

O(oi |(s00 ...s0n ), (a1 ...an ), (o1 ...oi−1 , oi+1 ...on )) = Oi (oi |ŝ0i , ai )

That is, the observation an agent sees depends only on its local state, the external state, and
the agent’s action.
Definition 8 A factored, n-agent DEC-MDP is locally fully observable if ∀oi ∃ŝi : P (ŝi |oi ) =
1.
When a DEC-MDP has both local full observability and observation independence, we
can get rid of O and Ω in the definition, and in this case the policies become mappings from
local states, rather than observation histories, to actions.
The complex reward structure in TI-DEC-MDP is defined in terms of events; occurrences of (si , ai , s0i ) tuples in agent i’s history. The reward structure can be viewed as a list
of constraints that describe how interactions among the agents’ local trajectories through
the state space (which are determined by their policies and chance outcomes) affect the
global value of the system. A constraint specifies a set of events, one for each involved
agent, together with the additional reward obtained by the team if each agent satisfies his
part of the constraint, which happens if the agent’s event occurs somewhere in its history.
The complexity of TI-DEC-MDP is analyzed in [5] where it is proved that solving
DEC-MDPs with independent transitions and observations and a joint reward structure is
NP-Complete.
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2.3.1.2

EDI-DEC-MDP

Event-driven interaction DEC-MDP (EDI-DEC-MDP) is another sub-class of factored
DEC-MDP that has observable local states and reward independence but has transition dependence [12]. The latter is, however, structured, with certain actions in one agent affecting
the transition probabilities of certain actions of another agent; i.e., they affect the probability distribution over the next states obtained after doing the affected action. For example,
an action done by agent j can facilitate an action done by i (making it finish faster), thereby
increasing the probability of transitioning to a next state with an earlier timestamp.
As in TI-DEC-MDP, the notion of events is used; a dependency consists of an event
of the affecting agent j and a set of unique state-action pairs of the affected agent i. If
the event happens in j’s history, then if i later encounters one of the specified state-action
pairs, i’s transition probability for this pair is affected. This effect is encoded in a modified
version of i’s transition function, which takes the form Pi (ŝ0i |ŝi , ai , bŝi ai ). For an affected
state-action pair of agent i, the Boolean variable bŝi ai is true if the dependency affecting
this pair is satisfied and false if it is not satisfied or there is no related dependency.
Note how this model assumes that when an agent takes an action that can be influenced
by a dependency, it finds out whether or not that dependency was satisfied, which explains
why bŝi ai is part of the transition function. This forces us to to include the dependency
history in an agent’s local state to ensure the Markov property. Intuitively, when agent i
learns the status of a dependency, it changes its belief about the state of agent j and its j’s
probability of doing future dependencies. This, in turn, affects i’s transition probability,
and so i needs to remember the status of each dependency each time an affected action
is attempted. In the worst case, i’s state needs to store the last time a dependency was
not satisfied as well as the first time it discovered it was satisfied. For the affecting agent,
the state stores the time at which it satisfies each dependency. In some cases, it may not be
necessary to store these pieces of information for every single dependency if the satisfaction
of a dependency implies the satisfaction of all earlier dependencies related to the same
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interrelation. For more on the difference between a dependency and an interrelation, please
see [10].
From the above, it is clear that EDI-CR treats transition dependencies differently from
EDI-DEC-MDP in that an affected agent does not automatically know when/whether it was
actually affected, as opposed to EDI-DEC-MDP where affecting an agent is accompanied
by a kind of implicit “communication” (for it does transmit information about the dependency) However, the behavior of EDI-DEC-MDP can be mimicked in EDI-CR by having a
state space with additional pieces of information for the boolean variables and timestamps,
and an appropriate definition of the transition dependencies in τ . We therefore leave it to
the modeler to decide whether he wants this kind of communication, and unlike Becker’s
work, make it possible to have a truly zero-communication setting.
Becker points out that EDI-DEC-MDP has an upper-bound deterministic complexity
that is exponential in the size of the state space and doubly exponential in the number of
defined interactions (which suggests non-deterministic exponential time complexity as an
upper bound). The complexity is more formally analyzed in [5] where it is proved to be
NEXP-Complete.
2.3.1.3 IDMG
Interaction-driven Markov game (IDMG) [82] is a sub-class of factored DEC-MDP
with observable local states. It aims to describe problems in which interaction among
agents is a local phenomenon specific to a set of interaction states where the agents are
coupled through their reward and transition functions. A set of interaction states consists
of adjacent joint states (in terms of transition probabilities).
Definition 9 An 2-agent IDMG is a tuple (M1 , M2 , {i MI , i = 1..n}) where M1 and
M2 are the 2 independent MDPs of the 2 agents and each i MI is an interaction game; a
two-agent, fully cooperative Markov game i MI = (i XI , A,i PI ,i rI ) where
• i XI set of interaction states of game i
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• A is the set of joint actions
• i PI is a transition probability function for states in i XI and joint actions
• i rI is the joint interaction reward function defined over states in i XI and joint actions
A motivating example is where two mobile robots have to navigate in a common environment, each trying to reach its own goal state and the actions of one robot do not affect the
movement of the other. The robots’ problems are independent except for the fact that there
is a single door in the environment and in states close to the door, the actions of a robot
affect the rewards or transition of the other (e.g. trying to pass through the door at the same
time incurs a penalty for all participants).
The IDMG model assumes that each interaction game describes a situation where the
agents should coordinate. In the corresponding interaction states, each agent explicitly
communicates all information useful to the decision process, where communication is assumed to be unlimited and noise-free. Therefore IDMG assumes that agents can observe
their local states in the parts of the state space where they do not interact, and can observe
the global state in the interaction states.
Clearly, IDMG caters to problems with a different kind of structure than the ones addressed by EDI-CR. In IDMG, we cannot (easily) represent situations where the action of
one agent affects the transition/reward of another agent wherever it takes an affected action.
That is because in IDMG, the agents are assumed to be tightly coupled in the interaction
states, so all of an agent’s actions taken in those states affect the other agent. Conversely,
if the size of the union of all sets of interaction states is large, representing an IDMG using
EDI-CR would result in large sets of reward and transition interactions ρ and τ , which is
logical because in this case, we are modeling a situation close to an unstructured DECMDP.
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Another difference is that in EDI-CR, we do not assume free, involuntary communication as in IDMG. This kind of communication is necessary in solving IDMG because the
solution method assumes knowledge of the joint state during each Markov game.
2.3.1.4

DPCL

Distributed POMDPs with Coordination Locales (DPCL) [87] is a sub-class of DECPOMDPs where agents act independently except in certain coordination locales, somewhat
like the interaction states in IDMG. DPCL does not assume transition or reward independence, but assumes observation independence. Again, the agents’ decision processes are
expressed in terms of local transition, reward and observation functions, with interactions
expressed as coordination locales (CLs) that are either same-time or future-time coordination locales. As explained in [88], same-time CLs represent situations where the effect of
simultaneous execution of actions by a subset of agents cannot be described by the local
transition and reward functions of these agents. Future-time CLs identify situations where
actions of one agent impact actions of others in the future.
DPCL differs from IDMG is that the latter assumes observable local state while the
former does not. Also, IDMG assumes free communication in the interaction states, while
DPCL does not.
2.3.1.5 ND-POMDP
Networked Distributed POMDP is a sub-class of DEC-POMDP with factored state that
aims to exploit locality of interactions [67]. ND-POMDP is motivated by domains such
as distributed sensor nets where the sensors need to decide which direction to scan in. To
track a target and obtain associated reward, two sensors with overlapping scanning areas
must coordinate by scanning the same area simultaneously. The target’s movement is uncertain and unaffected by the sensors. Based on the area it is scanning, each sensor receives
observations that can have false positives and false negatives. This domain has locality of
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interaction because each sensor interacts with only a limited number of neighboring sensors.

In ND-POMDP, agents have independent transition and observation functions, but have
P
reward interactions. The reward function is defined as R(s, a) = l Rl (sl1 , sl2 , .., slk , su , al1 , al2 , .., alk )
where each l can refer to any subset of agents and su is the part of the state that is not under
an agent’s control (e.g. the position of the target in the wireless sensor example). Therefore,
we can decompose the set of agents into subsets, where an agent’s reward only depends on
agents belonging to its subset(s). The reward function induces an interaction graph where
agents are nodes and edges connect agents in the same l.
Besides the fact that ND-POMDP assumes transition independence and EDI-CR does
not, the difference between these two models is that in the former, agents belonging to the
same subset l are assumed to have very tight reward interaction; there is a single reward
function per subset, and it is defined over joint actions and states of agents in the subset.
This can be seen as a coarse-grained kind of independence where agents either have reward
interactions involving all their actions or none at all. EDI-CR captures a more fine-grained
kind of interaction where specific actions affect, or are affected by, what another agent does.
However, we can still represent ND-POMDP instances using EDI-CR: the set of transition
interactions τ will be empty while the set of reward interactions ρ will have one entry for
each entry in each Rl function.
2.3.1.6

TD-POMDP

Transition-Decoupled POMDP [94] is another sub-class of DEC-POMDPs with factored state space. In TD-POMDP, agent i’s state < ui , li , ni > has 3 kinds of features:
• ui : features uncontrollable by any agent
• li : features under agent i’s control
• ni : features controlled by some other agent j but whose values impact i’s local transitions (such features would then appear as locally controlled features of agent j)
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The reward function is the sum of local rewards defined over local states and actions.
Because of the decomposition of an agent’s state into the above 3 sets of features, agent i’s
local transition function can be written as
t+1 t
t+1 t
t+1 t
t
t
P (st+1
i |s , a) = P (ui |ui ).P (li |si , ai ).P (ni |s − li , a6=i )

Non-locally controlled features allow for reward and transition interactions among agents.
However there are two points to note. First, in TD-POMDP an agent cannot affect another’s
transition probability immediately because if i affects j, i’s action will first set a non-local
feature in nj then, in the next time step, j’s transitions can start getting affected by this
feature in nj . The second point is that reward interaction is modeled as a kind of transition
interaction. Again, an agent can set a feature in another’s state (transition dependence), and
the reward of the latter can depend on whether this feature was set.
The approach for solving TD-POMDP, like the Coverage Set Algorithm for solving
TI-DEC-MDP on which it is based, aims to consider fewer points in the policy space by
realizing that due to the loose coupling of agents’ processes, many policies of one agent
have the same effect on another agent. This can be seen as grouping or binning policies.
In Chapter 3, we use the idea of binning to obtain compact mathematical formulations of
EDI-CR that can be solved efficiently. In our case, we bin sequences of actions of one
agent that have the same effect on a given sequence of actions of another agent.
The work on TD-POMDP was published in 2010, and has some differences from EDICR (published in 2009). Although both models address loosely-coupled decision processes, EDI-CR assumes observable local states, while TD-POMDP does not. Another
difference is that EDI-CR specifies interactions as first class entities, listing in the sets ρ and
τ the effects an agent’s action has on the reward/transitions of other agents. On the other
hand, TD-POMDP models interactions through the non-local features. Besides disallowing
immediate effects, another consequence of this representation is that a problem with only
reward, but no transition, interactions will appear in TD-POMDP as a problem with tran37

sition interactions. In general, reasoning about transition interactions is considerably more
difficult than reasoning about reward interactions alone; Transition Independent DEC-MDP
(2.3.1.1) is NP-Complete whereas Event Driven Interaction-DEC-MDP (2.3.1.2) is NEXPComplete. We therefore feel that modeling reward interactions as transition interactions
may add unnecessary complexity.
2.3.2 Self-interested agents
There have been several efforts to exploit special structure in games to achieve representational and computational savings. Most of the special models in the literature are
restricted to 1-stage games and have the goal of scaling up with the number of agents,
rather than the number of actions per agent [48, 47, 52, 19, 89]. In this section, we briefly
review some of the game-theoretic representations that exploit special structures that would
otherwise be obscured in an EFG.
2.3.2.1 MAID
Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) [51, 21] are representations that have their
origins in influence diagrams [45]. Like all alternatives to EFG, MAIDs try to explicitly
capture a structural property of a game that would otherwise be obscured in extensive form.
In the case of MAIDs, this property is that not all decision variables in a game are interdependent.
A MAID defines a directed acyclic graph in which nodes correspond to random variables of three types. For each agent i, there is a set of
• Decision variables, Di , whose domains are available actions and are represented as
rectangles
• Chance variables, χi , whose values are chosen by nature and are represented as ovals
• Utility variables, Ui , which represent the agent’s payoffs and are drawn as diamonds
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Figure 2.1. Multi-Agent Influence Diagram representation of the Tree Killer problem [51]

Figure 2.1 shows an example MAID. A conditional probability table (CPT) specifies the
conditional probability of a node’s variable given an instantiation of its parents, P (x|P ax ).
A strategy profile for agent i is a set of decision rules, one for each node in Di . A decision rule specifies the probability of making a certain decision given values of its parents.
It simply sets the CPTs of decision nodes. To represent perfect recall (an agent does not
“forget” decisions it made in the past), all earlier decisions and their parents are among the
parents of a later decision node.
Initial work on MAIDs looked at using the MAID representation as a guide for decomposing a game into interacting fragments, and provided an algorithm that finds equilibria
for these smaller games in a way that is guaranteed to produce a global equilibrium for
the entire game [51]. Specifically, Koller and Milch construct from MAID a strategic relevance graph in which the maximal strongly connected components are found and a tree is
build whose nodes are these components. The components are then ordered topologically
and solved in this order by changing each component back to a game tree and solving it
using McKelvey and McLennan’s algorithm [56].
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Later work on MAIDs addresses the issue that for most realistic games, the relevance
graph consists of a single strongly connected component, in which case the above algorithm
degenerates into converting the game back to the original tree. Blum et. al. address this by
exploiting finer-grained structure in MAIDs to improve the efficiency of a certain family of
algorithms called continuation algorithms [21].
2.3.2.2

TAGG

Temporal action graph games (TAGG) is a graphical representation of imperfect-information
extensive form games that can be much more compact than MAIDs for games with certain special structures; namely anonymity and context-specific utility independencies [46].
TAGGs are an extension of action graph games (AGGs) to represent games taking place
over multiple stages. Both representations can model anonymity, where a player’s payoffs
depend on how many players took a certain action, rather than exactly who these players
are. AGGs and TAGGs represent a game as a graph where nodes are actions and an agent’s
utility depends only on the node it chose and the action counts on the neighbors of the
chosen node. We can therefore specify a utility function for each action node that maps the
set of configurations over the node’s neighbors to a utility value. Clearly, this structure can
be exploited for computational savings.
In TAGGs, Jiang et. al. [46] extend AGGs with chance and decision nodes like the
ones in MAID. In addition, they introduce time-dependent counters in action nodes that
keep track of how many times the given action has been chosen up to a given time point.
The utility functions are also made time-dependent; UAt specifies the utility of action A at
each time step t. An agent can therefore receive payoffs for taking an action soon after it
does so and later on. Play can be seen as a sequence of AGGs played over time. At each
time step t, players with decisions at time t participate in a simultaneous-move AGG on
the set of action nodes, whose action counts are initialized to be the counts at t − 1.
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To define an agent’s expected utility, Jiang et. al. create the induced Bayesian Network
(induced BN) of the TAGG. This BN has the TAGG’s decision and chance variables in
addition to 1) an action count variable for each action and each time step; 2)a utility variable for each time-dependent utility function UAt and each A and t and 3) decision-payoff
variables representing the utilities of decisions received at each of their payoff time points.
Decision-payoff variables are essentially multiplexers that choose which utility function to
use based on which action was taken. An agent’s expected payoff from a strategy profile
σ is then the sum of the expected values of all its decision-payoff variables in the induced
BN, where the CPTs of decision variables are dictated by σ.
The work also introduces the notion of an induced MAID, which is the same as the
induced BN except that decision and utility variables in the latter are decision and utility
nodes in the former. Jiang et. al show that a TAGG can be exponentially more compact
than the corresponding induced MAID. However, one criticism that we have of this work
is that it compares the size of a TAGG to that of a naiive MAID representation, one whose
nodes have a much larger in-degree than they need to. Even though the paper later uses
obvious structures in the CPTs of the induced BN/MAID to yield a representation with
much smaller CPTs (e.g. the CPTs for action counts are counting functions that can benefit
from intermediate values), the reduction in size is measured relative to the large naiive
MAID, rather than the more compact one. In fact, the paper shows that simple manipulation
of the MAID nodes and creation of intermediate ones results in a MAID whose size is only
polynomial in the size of the TAGG.
In addition to proposing a new representation, Jiang et. al propose ways in which they
can speed up the calculation of expected utility (EU) by exploiting the special structure
in their representation. Calculation of EU is essentially doing inference to determine the
marginal probability distributions over utility variables. Instead of using general BN inference techniques, Jiang et. al exploit the structure in the induced BN to speed up the calculation. For example, the induced BN has many ’counter’ nodes whose CPTs are structured
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counting functions. Another exploitable characteristic of the induced BN is that variables
in it can be grouped by time step. This grouping, together with the introduction of some
dummy variables that results in a BN satisfying the Markov property, allows Jiang et. al to
perform efficient variable elimination.
From the above, it is clear that in order to do any processing on a TAGG we need
to first construct the corresponding BN/MAID. For calculating the expected payoffs, the
authors operate on the BN, and for calculating Nash equilibria, they apply existing MAID
algorithms to the MAID. In our opinion, these facts put the purpose of having a TAGG
representation in question, since it is never actually used.
2.3.2.3 Succinct EFG
For some games, the game trees expressed in extensive form are too large to be stored
in memory explicitly. To overcome this, Dudik and Gordon propose an implicit representation called succinct EFG [32]. A representation is succinct if it has enough information to
support certain queries that make it possible to simulate play in a game through sampling,
thus avoiding the need to explicitly represent all possible paths through a game. As such,
MAIDs are themselves examples of succinct EFGs. One drawback of MAIDs is that they
cannot represent context-specific independence (e.g. allowing different decision nodes to
have different available actions). The second problem is that MAID algorithms rely on
clique tree representations which can have high space and time complexities. Dudik and
Gordon propose an algorithm that finds an extension of correlated equilibria to sequential
games, with the advantage that it allows control over characteristics of the target equilibrium, e.g., we can ask for an equilibrium with high social welfare.
2.3.2.4

Other representations

A number of representations have been proposed in the literature for efficiently representing 1-stage games exhibiting special structure. For example, graphical games [48],
Game nets (G-nets) [52] and action-graph games [19] address games whose special struc42

ture is the locality of interactions among agents, i.e. an agent is only affected by a a subset
of other agents whose size is small relative to the total number of agents. Some approaches
specifically address games with a certain kind of interaction graph (e.g. a tree [47]).
The work on poker (e.g. [35]) tries to exploit structure in sequential games. This line
of work is primarily concerned with the issue of scaling to larger games and provides
automatic abstractions that produce much smaller games whose solutions can be converted
to solutions of the original games. The problem is that with the assumptions they make, it
is not clear that the techniques developed in this line of work can be used in general.
The work of Eitan et. al [7] is similar to ours in that it exploits structure in the form of
transition and/or reward independence. They consider a zero-sum stochastic game in which
each player has a constrained Markov Decision Process whose transitions depend only on
this player’s actions. A player’s reward, however, depends on the states and actions of both
players. We differ in that we assume that some transitions can depend on the other player’s
actions, whereas in their case, the transitions are independent.

2.4

Summary

In this chapter, we presented a brief overview of some general models of multi-agent
sequential decision making, both decision- and game-theoretic. We provided some motivating examples that demonstrate the need for a new model for situations where the decision
processes of the agents are largely independent, yet there are some reward and transition
interactions among them. We also gave a brief survey of some of the specialized models
proposed in the decision-theory and game-theory literature.
We presented our new decision-theoretic model, EDI-CR, for representing structured
transition and reward interactions. EDI-CR specifies the decision problem of each agent
then lists the ways in which one agent can affect the processes of others. Although there
are existing models that take the same approach to representation, none of them address
situations with fine-grained dependencies that we are interested in. EDI-CR can represent
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problems ranging from complete independence (a group of MDPs) to complete dependence
(a DEC-MDP with observable local state). The representational savings obtained from
using EDI-CR depend on the number of interactions among agents.
In the next chapters, we see how we can calculate policies for EDI-CR.
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CHAPTER 3
DECISION-THEORETIC MODELS AND OPTIMIZATION

In this chapter, we discuss the use of optimization techniques to compute policies for
EDI-CR multi-agent decision problems involving cooperative agents.
For settings involving cooperative agents, finding the optimal joint policy can be formulated as an optimization problem. The objective is to maximize the expected rewards of
the agent team subject to constraints guaranteeing that a feasible solution to the optimization problem represents a set of legal policies. The formulation should also factor in the
interactions among agents and their effects.
There are existing mathematical formulations, both for general and specialized models. However, when applied to EDI-CR, these formulations are too verbose and/or lack
global optimality guarantees. We propose mathematical formulations that exploit the special structure in EDI-CR to achieve compactness (i.e. reduce the number of variables in the
formulation) and efficient computation. For the 2-agent case, our formulation is exact and
its solution is guaranteed to be optimal. For cases with more than 2 agents, our formulation
involves a relaxation of the original problem, and thus optimality of the resulting solution
is not guaranteed.
We begin by explaining the policy representation that will be used in all the formulations in this chapter, followed by a brief discussion of existing formulations in Section 3.2.
We then present our Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) formulations for EDI-CR and
give experimental results in Section 3.3. Finally, we discuss our formulation of finding
the optimal policy as a system of non-linear equations and the possible use of homotopy
methods as an alternative optimization technique in Section 3.4.
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3.1

Sequence Form Policy Representation

We use a policy representation that was independently, and later jointly, devised by
Koller et. al [50] and von Stengel [83] to represent games. It has been used in settings with
self-interested [61] and cooperative agents [8]. In the context of game trees, the idea behind
this representation is that a policy can be characterized by the probability distribution it
induces over the leaves of the tree. If two policies induce the same distribution, then they
result in the same reward.
For models with local observability, a sequence of agent i, s1 .a1 ..st .at , consists of i’s
actions and local states. Following the nomenclature of Aras and Dutech [8], we use the
term history instead of sequence. Concatenating a state s and action a to a history h produces a new history (h.s.a) that is called an extension of history h. A history containing T
(the problem’s time horizon) actions is a terminal history. For agent i, the set of all histories is denoted by Hi , terminal histories by Zi , and non-terminal histories by Ni . A joint
history h ∈ H is a tuple containing one history per agent.
An agent’s policy induces a probability distribution over its histories. The realization
weight of a history s1 .a1 ..st .at under a policy is the probability that the policy assigns to
taking actions a1..t given that the states s1..t are encountered. A history’s realization weight
therefore does not include chance outcome probabilities. We will have separate terms that
reflect these probabilities. The vector of all realization weights will be denoted as x and
the weight of history hi by x(hi ).
A pure policy deterministically chooses one action at each decision making point. In
cooperative settings there is at least one optimal pure joint policy, so we restrict our attention to pure policies. But even a pure policy will have multiple terminal histories with
non-zero weights, because it must specify an action to take at each state reachable under
the policy. Because we do not include transition probabilities in a history’s weight, the
realization weight can only be 0 or 1. The set of i’s terminal histories with weight 1 under
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Table 3.1. Symbols used in the mathematical formulations
Symbol
H
Z
N
σi
kσi k
Qi
Q−i
x(hi )
i, j, k
g

Meaning
Set of all histories
Set of terminal histories
Set of non-terminal histories
Support set of agent i
Support size of agent i
Quantity belonging to agent i
Joint quantity of all agents but i
Realization weight of i’s history hi
Specific agents
An arbitrary agent

a policy is called support set, denoted by σi , and its size is the support size kσi k. Table 3.1
summarizes the symbols we use in this chapter.

3.2

Existing Mathematical Formulations Of DEC-MDPs

In this section, we review existing mathematical formulations of a DEC-MDP with
local observability as a Non-Linear Program and as a Mixed Integer Linear Program. We
will adapt some of the ideas behind these formulations for EDI-CR in the next section.
3.2.1 DEC-MDP NLP
The formulation of DEC-MDP with local observability as a Non-Linear Program (NLP)
is given in Table 3.2. In the objective function, R(h) = β(h)r(h) is the expected reward of
terminal joint history h, where β(h) is the probability of encountering the joint states in h
given the actions in h

β(h) =

T
−1
Y

P (st+1 |st , at )

t=1

r(h) is the sum of rewards of states and actions along the history. The constraints in the
NLP are called policy constraints and guarantee that a solution to the NLP represents a
legal policy where the sum of an agent’s action probabilities in any state is 1. The first
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Table 3.2. DEC-MDP as an NLP

max

X

R(h)

x(hg )

g∈A

h∈Z

X

s.t.

Y

x(sg0 .a) = 1

g∈A

a∈Ag

X

x(hg .s.a) = x(hg ) g ∈ A, s ∈ Sg , hg ∈ Ng

a∈Ag

x ∈ [0, 1]

set of constraints in Table 3.2 ensures that for any agent, the sum of action probabilities at
its start state is 1. The second set of constraints in Table 3.2 ensures that the realization
weights of a history’s extensions add up to that history’s weight.
The problem with the NLP formulation is that it results in a non-concave objective
function for which no methods guarantee finding a globally optimal solution.
3.2.2 DEC-MDP MILP
Aras and Dutech [8] developed a formulation for DEC-POMDPs as a MILP, thereby
guaranteeing that a locally optimal solution is also globally optimal. We modify their
formulation for the case of DEC-MDP with local observability. For ease of explanation,
Table 3.3 is for the case with only 2 agents i and j. Because the difficulty of solving a
MILP increases with the number of integer variables, Aras only restricts weights of terminal histories to be integer (in fact binary). The constraints force the other variables to be
integers as well.
As in the NLP formulation, R(h, h0 ) in the objective function (3.1) already accounts
for the transition probabilities of both agents, so realization weights are either 0 or 1.
To linearize the objective function, Aras introduces a compound variable zhi ,hj for each
pair of terminal histories. The variable is related to the existing x variables by the identity

zhi ,hj = x(hi )x(hj )
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Table 3.3. DEC-MDP as a MILP
X

max

R(hi , hj )zhi ,hj

(3.1)

hi ∈Zi ,hj ∈Zj

s.t.

policy constraints and
X
zhg ,h−g = x(hg )kσ−g k g ∈ A, hg ∈ Zg (3.2)
h−g ∈Z−g

X

zhi ,hj = kσi kkσj k

(3.3)

hi ∈Zi ,hj ∈Zj

x, z ∈ [0, 1] x(hg ) ∈ {0, 1} g ∈ A, hg ∈ Zg

The question now is how to enforce the identity using a set of linear constraints. To do this,
Aras uses combinatorics (knowing kσi k and kσj k) and treats the z variables as counters.
Constraint (3.2) guarantees that if hg is part of some agent g’s support set (x(h) = 1),
enough compound variables involving hg are set to 1, otherwise all compound variables
involving hg should be 0. Constraint (3.3) limits the number of compound variables that
can be simultaneously set to 1.

3.3

MILP Formulation Of EDI-CR

In this section, we propose a compact Mixed Integer Linear Program formulation of
EDI-CR instances [62]. The key insight we use is that due to structured interactions, most
action sequences of a group of agents have the same effect on a given agent. This allows us
to treat these sequences similarly and use fewer variables in the formulation. We present
experiments showing that our formulation is more compact and leads to faster solution
times and better solutions than formulations ignoring the structure of interactions. We
begin with a formulation for 2-agents then generalize to one for 3 or more agents.
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3.3.1 Formulation of 2-agent EDI-CR
3.3.1.1

Binning histories

For the 2-agent case, the NLP in Table 3.2 is a Quadratic Program (QP) whose objective
function has the form xT Qx where Q is the reward matrix. Q(hi , hj ) = R(hi , hj ) if hi and
hj are terminal histories, and is 0 otherwise. The MILP in Table 3.3 “flattens” this matrix,
multiplying each matrix entry by a compound variable created for that entry. This approach
makes sense for DEC-MDPs, because agents’ decision processes are tightly coupled and
the rewards/transitions of one agent strongly depend on the actions taken by another. For a
given history hi , R(hi , hj ) can vary widely depending on hj , and a given row or column in
Q contains many distinct values, thus justifying the need for a variable per entry in Q.
The situation can be very different in the presence of structured interactions. An agent is
only affected by the those actions of another agent that are involved in reward and transition
interactions in ρ and τ . So for a given hi , the rewards and transition along hi do not depend
on the exact actions in the history of another agent. Suppose τ specifies that action a3 of
agent j affects the transition probability of a7 of i. Now if hi involves doing a7 at time 6,
all histories hj that do a3 before time 6 have the same effect on hi ’s transitions.
In the matrix view of the objective function, because in EDI-CR agents have their local
reward functions, we can express Q as the sum of reward matrices of the 2 agents Qi + Qj .
Note that this does not assume that rewards are independent; each entry in these matrices
can depend on the histories of both agents. The rows (resp. columns) in Qi (resp. Qj ) will
contain many duplicate entries, reflecting the fact that an agent is oblivious to many details
of the other agent’s history.
The main idea in our formulation is that for a history hg , we group all histories of the
other agent that have the same effect on the transitions and rewards in hg into a single bin.
For each history hg of some agent g, the set of bins it induces, Bhg , is a partition over the
set of terminal histories of the other agent.
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Table 3.4. 2-agent EDI-CR as a MILP

max

X

Rg (hg , bhg )zhg ,b

g ∈ A, hg ∈ Zg ,

s.t. policy constraints and
X
zhg ,b = x(hg )

g ∈ A, hg ∈ Zg

b∈Bhg

b∈Bhg

zhg ,b ≤

X

β(h−g |hg )x(h−g ) g ∈ A, hg ∈ Zg , b ∈ Bhg

h−g ∈b

x, z ∈ [0, 1] x(hg ) ∈ {0, 1}

g ∈ A, hg ∈ Zg

Instead of creating a variable for every pair of terminal histories, we introduce a single
variable zhg ,b for every history hg and every bin b ∈ Bhg associated with it. In the matrix view, we create a variable for each distinct entry in Qi and Qj . Because structured
interaction results in many duplicate entries, binning can significantly reduce the number
of compound variables we introduce. Our MILP for EDI-CR is given in Table 3.4.
In the objective function, we fold into Rg (hg , b) those quantities of hg that are oblivious to which history in b is played, namely hg ’s transition probabilities and rewards. We
therefore have
Rg (hg , b) = rg (hg |b)β(hg |b)

The factors on the right can be calculated using any history h−g ∈ b
rg (hg |b) =

T −1
X

Rg (st , at , st+1 ) + rρ (hg , h−g )/2

t=1

where rρ (h, hj ) represents rewards (if any) that depend on actions of both agents, as specified in ρ. Dividing by 2 avoids double counting reward interactions. The transition probability is given by
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β(h|b) =

T
−1
Y

Pτ (st+1 |st , at , {a01 ..a0t })

t=1

Pτ depends on the local transition function Pg and, for transitions involved in τ , actions in
h−g done up to time t, {a01 ..a0t }.
We fold into zhg ,b quantities that depend on the particular h−g in the bin, namely the
transition probabilities along h−g , given history hg (β(h−g |hg )). The identity defining a
compound variable is therefore

zhg ,b = x(hg )

X

β(h−g |hg )x(h−g )

(3.4)

h−g ∈b

zhg ,b is therefore the probability that g plays hg , multiplied by the probability that the other
agent plays a history in b.
The effect of the number of interactions on the size of the formulation is clear. As the
number of interactions increases, we need more bins (thus more compound variables), since
each bin represents a unique way in which an agent affects another. In the extreme case of a
general DEC-MDP, an agent’s history needs a separate bin for each of the other’s histories,
essentially creating a compound variable for every pair of histories as in the DEC-MDP
MILP.
3.3.1.2 Enforcing the identity
We need to enforce identity (3.4) by linear constraints. This is more challenging than
in the DEC-MDP case where the binary nature of the compound variables allows the use of
combinatorics to devise the constraints. In our formulation, the compound variables are no
longer binary, and we must resort to other properties of, and relations among, the variables
to derive constraints equivalent to the identity.
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Summing both sides of (3.4) over all bins of hg gives
X

zhg ,b = x(hg )

b∈Bhg

X X

β(h−g |hg )x(h−g )

b∈Bhg h−g ∈b

Since Bhg partitions Z−g , the double sum reduces to a sum over all histories of the other
agent, giving
X

zhg ,b = x(hg )

X

β(h−g |hg )x(h−g )

(3.5)

h−g ∈Z−g

b∈Bhg

A legal policy prescribes an action at each state reachable by a non-terminal history
whose realization weight is non-zero. As a result, histories in the support set cover all
possible transitions of actions along their parents. This means that the sum of probabilities
P
of transitions along histories in the support set must be 1, i.e., h−g ∈σ−g β(h−g |hg ) = 1. It
follows that
X

β(h−g |hg )x(h−g ) = 1

(3.6)

h−g ∈Z−g

because only the xs of histories in σ−g are 1, so the left side is the sum of their corresponding βs. From (3.5) and (3.6), we have the following set of constraints, one per terminal
history of each agent
X

zhg ,b = x(hg )

(3.7)

b∈Bhg

This constraint simply guarantees that if hg is not part of the support, all the compound
variables involving hg and its bins should be 0. If hg is part of the support, it guarantees
there is enough contribution from the compound variables associated with all bins of hg .
However, the above constraint does not prevent one compound variable from taking
too high a value at the expense of another. We can use identity (3.4) itself as a source of
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upper bounds on compound variables. Because in (3.4) x(hg ) is either 0 or 1, we have the
following set of constraints, one per history per bin associated with this history:

zhg ,b ≤

X

β(h−g |hg )x(h−g )

(3.8)

h−g ∈b

Together, constraints (3.7) and (3.8) strictly enforce the identity. One advantage of our
constraints over the combinatorics-based constraints in the DEC-MDP formulation is that
ours do not involve the size of the support set, which Aras calculates from the parameters
of the problem by assuming that the number of states a state-action pair transitions to
is constant. But in settings where this number depends on the particular action taken,
determining the support size requires carefully looking at an agent’s decision tree and the
paths in it, which is non-trivial for large problems.
As for the number of constraints, the set of constraints in (3.7) has the same size as
the constraints in the DEC-MDP MILP; there is one constraint per terminal history of each
agent. The difference is that we have fewer terms in the summation on the left hand side
than in the DEC-MDP MILP.
The set in (3.8), however, is larger, because it has a constraint for each bin of each
terminal history of each agent, as opposed to a constraint for each terminal history. So, for
example, if from the perspective of each history of each agent all the histories of the other
agents fall into 1 of 3 bins, our formulation will have 3 times as many constraints of type
(3.8) as there are in the DEC-MDP MILP. But as will be seen in Section 3.3.3, this does
not prevent us from obtaining computational advantage over the DEC-MDP formulation.
3.3.2 MILP for 3 or more agents
The idea of binning histories extends beyond 2 agents. With n agents, an agent’s bins
contains history tuples, where each tuple consists of histories of the n − 1 other agents. The
compound variable associated with a history hg and one of its bins b is given by the identity
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X

Y

h−g ∈b

hf ∈h−g

zhg ,b = x(hg )

β(hf |h, h−g )x(hf )

(3.9)

As in the 2-agent case, the set of bins associated with hg is a partition over Z−g , so we can
use constraint (3.7). The greater challenge is devising linear constraints that impose upper
bounds on the z variables, similar to constraint (3.8). With 2-agents, we simply obtained
linear constraints by dropping the leading x in the identity. But with 3 or more agents,
doing so would result in a non-linear constraint.
In the following, we use properties of legal policies and structured interactions to derive 2 sets of linear constraints (in addition to constraint (3.7)) that attempt, but are not
guaranteed, to enforce the identity. Note that even if the identity is violated, any solution
to the MILP still forms a legal set of policies, since the legality is guaranteed by the policy
constraints.
For ease of exposition, we show the derivation of the constraints associated with a
history hi of agent i when A contains three agents i, j and k.
If we assume that an action of agent i can be affected by at most one other agent, we
can decompose b into a bin for each affecting agent, bj and bk (b = bj × bk ). Dropping the
leading x in (3.9) and using the decomposition of b to break down the summation gives

zhi ,b ≤

X
hj ∈bj

x(hj )

X

x(hk )β(hj |hi , hk )β(hk |hi , hj )

(3.10)

hk ∈bk

We can obtain two linear upper bounds from the above by setting all x(hj ) (resp. x(hk )) to
1. But these bounds would be too loose; for a feasible solution < xs , zs > to the MILP, zs
can be very different from the z calculated by applying the identity to xs . In other words,
the solver has too much freedom to violate the identity and set some zs higher than the
identity allows if this improves the value of the objective function. The reward reported by
the solver (the value of the objective function at zs ) is therefore higher than the true reward
obtained when the agents follow the policies prescribed by xs . The solver is optimizing a
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relaxed version of the problem whose optimal solution does not necessarily correspond to
an optimal of the original problem. We need to tighten the upper bound so that the relaxed
problem corresponds more faithfully to the original problem.
Consider the coefficient of some x(hj ) in the non-linearized constraint (3.10):
X

x(hk )β(hj |hi , hk )β(hk |hi , hj )

(3.11)

hk ∈bk

Setting all x(hk ) = 1∀hk ∈ bk allows this coefficient to be higher than it can be under a
legal policy. Regarding the coefficient as a sum over the contributions of each hk ∈ bk ,
we can decrease the coefficient by limiting the contributions of the hk s. To do this, we
decompose the sum in (3.11) into a series of sums over bins of k’s histories constructed
from the perspective of j’s history hj . We denote the bins of k’s histories induced by hj as
S
bhj k ( bhj k = bk ). Because j’s transition probability is the same under all hk in the same
bin, we can factor this probability out. The coefficient can then be re-written as
X

X

β(hj |hi , bhj k )

bhj k

x(hk )β(hk |hi , hj )

hk ∈bhj k

Now we can use the same reasoning behind constraint (3.7) to replace the second summation involving x(hk ) with an upper bound on it
¹ X

º
β(hk |hi , hj )

(3.12)

hk ∈bhj k

where bxc denotes min(x,1). We can therefore bound the factor multiplying each β(hj |hi , bhj k )
to be at most 1. The coefficient of x(hj ) is restricted to be
X
bhj k

¹ X
º
β(hj |hi , bhj k )
β(hk |hi , hj )
hk ∈bhj k
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We can obtain a coefficient for each x(hk ) in a similar fashion. Using these restricted
coefficients, and the fact that a coefficient cannot exceed 1, we approximately enforce identity (3.9) using constraint (3.7) and the following bounds

zhi ,b ≤
zhi ,b

X

¹X
¹ X
ºº
x(hj )
β(hj |hi , bhj k )
β(hk |hi , hj )

hj ∈bj

bhj k

hk ∈bhj k

hk ∈bk

bhk j

hj ∈bhk j

¹X
¹ X
ºº
X
≤
x(hk )
β(hk |hi , bhk j )
β(hj |hi , hk )

(3.13)

The quest for tight linear relaxations for non-linear functions is common in the optimization literature. A trilinear term of the form xyz where x, y and z are between 0 and 1
can be replaced by a new variable w and the following set of constraints:

w≤x
w≤y

(3.14)

w≤z
w ≥x+y+z−2
The above is a a linear relaxation of the term’s convex envelope and guarantees that w is
within a certain amount of the product xyz [55]. Although these constraints are somewhat
similar to the constraints our formulation generates for the 3-agent case, there is a problem
in using them directly. The identity (3.9) does not define zhg ,b ‘cleanly’ as just the product
of 3 variables; there are summations and constants involved. Using the upper bounds in
(3.12) to obtain a clean trilinear term would interfere with the last inequality in (3.14)
because the right-hand side may no longer be a lower bound on z.
Even if we could use the above linear relaxation, there is no guarantee that it is tighter
than the relaxation we developed using properties of legal policies.
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The idea of further binning histories within a given bin to bound the values of coefficients can be used with any number of agents. For n agents, this would result in n − 1
upper bounds per z variable1 .
3.3.3

Experimental results

We now present experimental results of our two formulations applied to the Mars rovers
problem in Section 2.2.1.3.
3.3.3.1

Results of 2-agent formulations

We compare 3 formulations of EDI-CR instances: 1) the NLP formulation in Table 3.2,
but restricted to 2 agents, 2) the DEC-MDP MILP formulation in Table 3.3 and 3) the
EDI-CR MILP formulation in Table 3.4. All 3 formulations were solved using IBM ILOG
Cplex [2] under the default parameters; the first using Cplex Mixed Integer QP solver, and
the other two using Cplex MILP solver. We experimented with 22 instances of the modified
Mars rovers problem. The number of interactions ranges from 4 to 7.
We note that the time to generate the 3 formulations is almost the same; constructing the
bins and objective function for the EDI-CR MILP is not more expensive than constructing
the reward matrix for the QP or the objective function for the DEC-MDP MILP. In all 3
cases, we iterate over every pair of histories of the 2 agents to calculate their rewards and
probabilities.
Optimality: First, we look at the behavior of the 3 formulations with respect to optimality. Note that even after obtaining a solution that we know is optimal (by comparing to
a known optimal solution), Cplex may spend a long time verifying optimality. We therefore
have 5 possible outcomes of a run:
1. Optimal solution found and verified
1

Higher order terms can be relaxed by repeated application of relaxations of lower order terms [24].
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Table 3.5. Optimality of 2-agent formulations
QP
1) Optimal, Verified
2) Optimal, Not verified
3) Local optimal
4) Suboptimal
5) No solution

5
9
5
3
0

DEC-MDP
MILP
9
5
6
2

EDI-CR
MILP
17
x
5-x
0

2. Optimal solution found but not verified before time out2
3. Locally optimal solution found (only possible in solving the QP)
4. Optimal solution not found before time out, but a suboptimal solution was found
5. No solution found before time out
Of the 22 instances, Table 3.5 compares how many fall in each category for each formulation. Because a MILP solver would never report solution that is only locally optimal,
the corresponding entries are marked by ’-’. Our formulation resulted in a provably optimal solution in 17/22 instances. In the remaining instances, we obtained higher rewards
than the other formulations, but cannot say with certainty that our solution was optimal,
so each of the remaining 5 instances falls into category 2 or 4. QP and DEC-MDP MILP
were equally good at finding optimal solutions, although DEC-MDP MILP was better at
verifying optimality. The table shows that the non-concavity of the QP can often lead the
solver to just report a locally optimal solution. It also shows that in some cases, the number
of compound variables introduced in the DEC-MILP is too large to allow the solver to find
any solution before time out (row 5).
Formulation size: Next, we look at the size of the MILP with and without exploiting
structured interactions. We break down our 22 instances into 3 groups G1, G2 and G3
containing 5, 9 and 8 instances, respectively. Table 3.6 shows the number of terminal
2

Time out is 60 seconds for small instances and 600 seconds for larger ones.
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Table 3.6. Size of 2-agent formulations
G1
G2
G3

Zi
81
162
941

Zj
46
112
781

zEDI
254
608
3,793

zDEC
3,762
18,062
596,950

CEDI
381
882
5,515

CDEC
127
274
1,722

histories for each agent |Zi | and |Zj |, the number of compound variables introduced in
the DEC-MDP formulation|z|DEC and our EDI-CR formulation |z|EDI , and the number of
constraints (besides the policy constraints). Results were averaged over instances in each
group. Clearly, the DEC-MDP formulation introduces many more compound variables
than our formulation which only create as many variables as needed to distinguish between
bins induced by a given history. The difference in the number of variables becomes more
pronounced as the problem size increases. Although our formulation has more constraints
than the DEC-MDP MILP, we next show that the increased number of constraints is offset
by the large reduction in the number of variables, resulting in MILPs that are overall easier
to solve.
Solution time: Table 3.7 shows the results of comparing both the time needed to find
the optimal solution (reported as ‘Find’), and the time needed to verify that the solution is
indeed optimal (reported as ‘Verify’). The times are in seconds, averaged over instances
in each group. For groups where some solutions were not found/verified within reasonable
time, the number of instances over which the averaging was done is indicated in brackets.
In general, solving the EDI-CR MILP formulation is significantly faster than solving the
other 2 formulations. There is also a large difference in the time needed to verify optimality.
In the Small group, only 3 instances could be solved provably optimally within 60 seconds
using the DEC-MDP MILP and QP formulations. In the Medium group, the differences in
time to verify optimality among the different formulations is even more pronounced. In the
Large group, Cplex found solutions for all the instances of the EDI-CR MILP formulation,
but could not verify optimality. A solution with the same quality could not be found with
any of the other formulations.
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Table 3.7. Solution time (in seconds) of 2-agent formulations

G1
G2
G3

Find
EDI
0.29
0.59
83

Find
DEC
8.68
10.72
N/A

Find
QP
0.57
6.4
N/A

Verify
EDI
0.12(3)
0.35(6)
N/A

Verify
DEC
3.5(3)
21.6(6)
N/A

Verify
QP
0.58(3)
> 60
N/A

Table 3.8. Comparison of 3-agent formulations (size)
G1
G2
G3
G4
3.3.3.2

Zi
116
163
285
263

Zj
114
170
184
267

Zk
102
220
158
654

zEDI
507
898
1265
1567

Results of 3-agent formulations

The 3-agent case exacerbates the problem of the DEC-MDP MILP formulation which
introduces hundreds of thousands to several millions variables in our test cases. Because
Cplex was unable to solve (and usually even load) the DEC-MDP MILP of our instances,
we omit this formulation from further discussion.
We compare the NLP in Table 3.2, solved using Knitro [3], and EDI-CR 3-agent MILP
from Section 3.3.2 solved using Cplex [2] under the default parameters. Left to automatically determine the most suitable algorithm, Knitro chose the active-set algorithm. We
used 25 instances of the Mars Rovers problem broken down into 4 groups G1 to G4 containing increasingly larger instances. G1 contains 10 instances and each of the other groups
contains 5 instances. The number of interactions ranges from 4 to 10.
Table 3.9. Comparison of 3-agent formulations (time in seconds)

G1
G2
G3
G4

Reward
Calculation
192
1296
2063
3376

Dom.
Removal
78
353
802
480

Binning

MILP

NLP

6.6
56.2
119
478

1.2
7.22
38
72

27.4
284.9
588
1800
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MILP
Total
278
1712
3022
4406

NLP
Total
297.7
1933
3453
5656

Table 3.10. Comparison of 3-agent formulations (reward as % of maximum)
G1
G2
G3
G4

MILP
88
85.7
88.7
88.6

NLP
86
88.3
87.2
43.6

Tables 3.8,3.9 and 3.10 summarize our experimental results averaged over instances
in each group. Table 3.8 shows the sizes of the instances we tested on and the number
of compound variables our formulation creates. The number of non-policy constraints
introduced by our formulation can be calculated as |Zi | + |Zj | + |Zg | + 2|z|. The first 3
terms are due to constraint (3.7) and the last term is due to the upper bounds in (3.13). It is
important to note that the constraint matrix, although large, is fairly sparse; the constraint
of a terminal history only involves the zs of this history’s bins, and the constraint of a zh,b
only involves histories in b of 1 affecting agent. As will be shown presently, Cplex solves
EDI-CR MILPs in very little time.
To generate both the MILP and NLP, we need to calculate rewards for each triplet
< hi , hj , hk > (time indicated in column ‘Reward Calculation’) and remove dominated
histories up front (indicated in column ‘Dom. Removal’)3 , overhead that was insignificant
in the 2-agent case. Column ‘Bin’ shows the time to construct bins and calculate their associated constraint matrices for the MILP. Although this step is rather expensive, it results
in a MILP that is solved at least an order of magnitude faster than the NLP. Actual solution times taken by Cplex are given in columns ‘MILP’ and ‘NLP’. We also give the total
time to generate and solve the MILP (reward calculation + dominated histories removal +
bin construction + solver time) in column ‘MILP Total’ and for NLP (reward calculation +
dominated histories removal + solver time) in ‘NLP Total’ We note that the dominated histories removal step can be sped up by optimizing our implementation of it. Even with our
3

Without this pre-processing step (details in [8]) none of the formulation would fit in memory. The
reported numbers are those of undominated histories.
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current implementation, the time to solve the NLP far exceeds the bin constraints construction time and the MILP solving time combined. The difference becomes more pronounced
with larger instances. Indeed, for instances in G4, we timed out Knitro and reported the
reward it obtained after 30 minutes.
Finally, Table 3.10 compares the rewards obtained by the policies from the NLP and
MILP solutions. As explained in Section 3.3.2, our MILP is a relaxation of the original
problem where some zs can be higher than their values under identity (3.9). The solution
reported by the MILP is therefore an over-estimate of the optimal reward. The table shows
the reward of the MILP and NLP policies as a percentage of this over-estimate. For smaller
instances, MILP and NLP give comparable rewards, but on larger ones, Knitro is unable to
produce good policies within 30 minutes.
Whereas we do not know of a way to improve the quality of the NLP solution, that of
the MILP can be improved by having a more faithful correspondence between the MILP
and the original problem, i.e. making the upper bounds on zs tighter and/or obtaining lower
bounds on z. This would result in a space of feasible solutions that better resembles that
of the original problem, and would prevent the solver from pursuing solutions that appear
to be good, but are sub-optimal in the original space. This represents an interested area for
future research.
3.3.4 Related work
Formulating decision problems as mathematical programs has been done by other researchers, with the aim of making use of available industrial-grade solvers like Cplex. Aras
and Dutech proposed two MILP formulations for general DEC-POMDPs [8]. One of these
formulations was given in Table 3.3. The other uses game-theoretic concepts to linearize
the objective function. This latter formulation is out-performed by the one we reviewed
and built upon.
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Petrik and Zilberstein [69] developed formulations of decision problems of cooperative
and self-interested agents as separable bilinear programs and presented an algorithm for
solving this class of programs. The QP discussed in this paper is itself a bilinear program,
because realization weights of one agent are only multiplied by weights of the other agent,
so the objective function is linear if the weights of one agent are fixed. Our previous work
on the EDI-CR model [60] used the bilinear formulation and solution algorithm.
Aras et. al [9] give a mathematical formulation for a special case of DEC-POMDP
called Network Distributed POMDP [67] (ND-POMDP) where agents have independent
transition and observation functions, but have reward interactions. In ND-POMDP, we can
decompose the set of agents into subsets, where an agent’s reward only depends on agents
belonging to its subset(s). Because they only consider problems where each subset contains
2 agents (i.e. binary interactions), Aras et. al were able to formulate this problem as a QP.
They present a linearization of the QP to a compact MILP that avoids having a compound
variable for each joint terminal history. However, they report that the compactness of their
formulation does not translate to savings in the time needed to solve the resulting MILP,
compared to a simple formulation with one variable per joint history. One explanation they
provide is that the compact MILP has a constraint matrix that is not sparse, making it hard
for Cplex to deal with it efficiently.
Besides the fact that ND-POMDP assumes transition independence and EDI-CR does
not, the difference between these two models is that in the former, agents belonging to the
same subset are assumed to have very tight reward interaction; there is a single reward
function per subset, and it is defined over joint actions and states of agents in the subset.
We can see this as a coarse-grained kind of independence where agents either have reward
interactions involving all their actions or none at all. EDI-CR captures a more fine-grained
kind of interaction where specific actions affect, or are affected by, what another agent does.
As a result of this difference, formulations of ND-POMDP would not be very useful, if at
all, when directly applied to EDI-CR, since they cannot capture and exploit fine-grained
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interactions. The general ideas and techniques for linearizing a high order expression can,
however, be useful across models and formulations.
Another MILP formulation of Transition-Independent DEC-MDP [14] is given by Wu
and Durfee [95]. Their formulation is approximate and is the result of discretization and
piecewise linear approximation of non-linear constraints. This work therefore finds exact, optimal solutions to an inexact model. The errors introduced by the discretization and
linearization can be controlled at the expense of introducing more variables into the formulation. Because Transition-Independent DEC-MDP is a sub-class of EDI-CR, we cannot
use its MILP formulation for our model.
One way of decomposing a large mathematical program that encodes the decision problems of all agents is to break down this problem into 1) a search for optimal commitments
regarding each agent’s outgoing influences and 2) a search for optimal local policies that
respect the commitments decided upon. This is the approach taken by Witwicki et. al [92].
For a given set of commitments, they add constraints to the traditional Linear Program
formulation of MDPs to guarantee that a feasible policy respects the commitments. Each
agent can then solve its linear program separately.

3.4

Solving EDI-CR Using Homotopy Methods

In this section, we explore a different way of solving EDI-CR instances, and more
generally, DEC-MDPs. In previous sections, we formulated the problem of finding the
optimal policy as a mathematical program. We now show a different way of approaching
the same problem. We formulate the problem of finding the optimal policy as a system of
nonlinear equations and discuss the use of homotopy methods for solving this system.
We start by giving a background on homotopy methods then discuss the use of homotopy for EDI-CR and DEC-MDPs.
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3.4.1 Introduction to homotopy
Continuation methods have been widely used in numerical analysis to solve systems
of nonlinear equations F (x) = 0. The system of equations can encode a constrainted or
unconstrained optimization problem, a problem of finding the zeros of a function, finding
the fixed point of a function, or tracking the curve of a function. The words continuation
and homotopy are often used interchangeably, but there are subtle distinctions between
them (which are beyond the scope of this thesis). Probability-one homotopy methods [90,
29, 91] are variants of homotopy methods that guarantee the convergence to a solution with
probability 1.
The Encyclopedia of Optimization [33] defines homotopy as a continuous map from
the interval [0,1] into a function space, where the continuity is with respect to the topology
of the function space. A homotopy ρ(λ) continuously deforms the function ρ(0) = g into
the function ρ(1) = f as λ goes from 0 to 1. In this case, f and g are said to be homotopic.
It is then clear how continuation methods got their name; they move along a continuum
between solving an easy variant of the original problem g and solving the original problem
f itself. Essentially, these methods find a solution to the easy variant, then try to calculate
the change that needs to be made to the previous solution to make it solve a new problem
that is a little closer to the original problem, eventually terminating with a solution to the
original problem.
We start by giving some notation used by Watson in [90] and will be used in this section.
Let E n denote n-dimensional Euclidean space and E m×n the set of real m × n matrices.
∂f
∂f
The gradient of a differentiable function f : E n → E is the row vector ( ∂x
(x), ..., ∂x
(x)).
n
1

The Jacobian matrix of F : E n → E m is




 ∇F1 (x)

..
∇F (x) = 
.


∇Fm (x)
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A homotopy map ρ is a mapping ρ : E m × [0, 1) × E n → E n . Simply put, ρ is a system
of n functions operating on vectors x ∈ E n . The functions are parameterized by a vector
a ∈ E m and the homotopy parameter λ ∈ [0, 1). The shorthand ρa (λ, x) denotes ρ(a, λ, x).
Definition 10 A map is said to be transversal to 0 if its Jacobian ∇ρ has full rank on
ρ−1 (0).
The following Lemma from [90] states the conditions ρ must meet to guarantee convergence to a solution of the original problem.
Lemma 1 Suppose that ρ is transversal to 0 and for each a ∈ E m the system ρa (0, x) = 0
has a unique nonsingular solution x(0) . Then for almost all a ∈ E m there is a smooth
zero curve γ ⊂ [0, 1) × E n of ρa (λ, x), emanating from (0, x(0) ), along which the Jacobian
matrix ∇ρa (λ, x) has rank n. γ does not intersect itself or any other zero curves of ρa , does
not bifurcate, has finite arc length and either goes to infinity or reaches the hyperplane
λ = 1 at point (1, x∗ ). If rank ∇ρa (λ, x) = n, then γ has finite arc length.
The zero curve γ traces the change in the solution x as λ changes. For a given point
(λ̂, x̂) on γ, we have that ρa (λ̂, x̂) = 0. In other words, x̂ is the solution to the system
of equations when it is deformed by λ̂. x(0) is therefore the solution to the initial system
of equations and x∗ is the solution to the original system. The condition on the Jacobian
∇ρa (λ, x) guarantees that there is only one way to proceed along the zero curve, thus
avoiding bifurcation.
The lemma summarizes the improvement of probability one homotopy methods over
the original continuation methods which can fail to terminate because the curve can spiral,
return to λ = 0 or bifurcate, among other problems.
The high-level steps involved in solving a problem using homotopy methods are:
1. Formulate the problem as a system of n equations in n unknowns f (x) = 0.
2. Construct a homotopy map ρ(λ, x) satisfying the conditions of the homotopy method.
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Figure 3.1. An example zero curve of a homotopy map. The x-axis is λ and the y-axis is
x.

3. Track the zero curve of ρ from the point (0, x(0) ) to (1, x∗ ).
There are several ways of constructing the homotopy map ρ, and choosing the map that
will perform best is more of an art than an exact science.
3.4.1.1 Natural vs. ‘artificial’ parameter λ
Sometimes λ is a physical parameter in the original function f and we are interested
in how the solution of the deformed f (x; λ) changes as we change this physical parameter,
i.e., we are interested in the solution behavior as we change the natural parameter. But
it may also be the case that λ is an artificial parameter that just allows us to transition
smoothly from g to f , and solutions to ρ(λ, x) = 0 have no physical meaning for λ < 1.
One commonly used artificial parameter map is just a convex combination of the functions
g and f , which gives rise to the ‘canonical’ map

ρ(λ, x) = λf (x) + (1 − λ)g(x)

(3.15)

Note that unlike in continuation methods, in homotopy methods λ is not necessarily
monotonically increasing, as in Figure 3.1. The progress along γ is therefore not expressed
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in terms of λ, but in terms of arc length. Let p denote the function that maps arc length,
denoted by s, to a point on γ, i.e.

p(s) = (λ(s), x(s))

3.4.1.2 Tracking the zero curve
Tracking the γ curve is a complicated matter that has been the subject of research in
numerical analysis. HOMPACK90 [91] is a software package for this kind of tracking
that has been used widely. For the rest of this section, we will be referring to a tracking
technique implemented in HOMPACK90 called the normal flow algorithm. This algorithm
has 3 phases repeated until λ reaches 1:
1. Prediction: For an estimate h of the optimal step size (in arc length) to take along
γ, and given 2 previous points on γ, P 1 = (λ(s1 ), x(s1 )) and P 2 = (λ(s2 ), x(s2 )),
predict the next point on the curve, Z (0) = p(s2 + h). The prediction is done using
Hermite cubic interpolation. The predicted point will typically not be on the γ curve.
2. Correction: Starting from the predicted point Z (0) , apply the following Newton corrector iteration until convergence (i.e. the change in Z is small enough)

Z (k+1) = Z (k) − [∇ρa (Z (k) )]† ρa (Z (k) )

where [∇ρa (Z (k) )]† is the Moore-Penrose inverse of the Jacobian of ρ at Z (k) . The
goal of the corrector is to bring back the predicted point to the zero curve. When
the corrector iteration converges, the Z from the last iteration is accepted as the next
point on γ.
3. Step size estimation: this phase calculates an estimate h of the optimal size of the
next step taken on the zero curve. A large step size makes faster progress along the
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curve, but may result in very inaccurate prediction that then requires many corrector
iterations to bring back to the zero curve. A smaller step size results in accurate
predictions but requires many iterations of the 3 phases. The details of this step are
such that h increases if the corrector phase needed a few iterations to converge and
decreases otherwise. Basically, if the previous prediction step resulted in a point far
off γ, the algorithm becomes more ‘cautious’ and takes a smaller step in the future.
3.4.2 Homotopy for linearly constrained optimization
Consider the following optimization problem where A ∈ E m×n and b ∈ E m
Maximize f (x)
subject to

(3.16)

g(x) = Ax − b ≤ 0

The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for this problem are
(∇f (x))T + AT u = 0
u≥0
Ax − b ≤ 0
u(Ax − b) = 0
where u are the Lagrange dual variables for inequality constraints. The last 3 constraints
are called complementarity constraints. They can be expressed as a system of nonlinear
equations K(u, x) = 0 defined by
Ki (u, x) = −|bi − Ai x − ui |3 + (bi − Ai x)3 + u3i

1≤i≤m

A simple map for the above optimization problem is



T

T




0

 x−x 
 (∇f (x)) + A u 
ρa (λ, x, u) = λ 

 + (1 − λ) 
u − u0
K(u, x)
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(3.17)

where a = (x0 , u0 ). However, the above map can result in an unbounded zero curve. The
fix suggested by Watson [90] is to replace the constraint in (3.16) by

Ax − b − (1 − λ)b0 ≤ 0

Basically, the above is a relaxation of the original constraints that allows Ax−b to be greater
than 0 if the constant b0 is non-zero. Consequently, K is now a function of λ, x, u, b0 . A
similar relaxation is introduced to allow K(λ, x, u) to be greater than 0 if a parameter c0 is
positive. As a result of these changes, the original λK(x, u) + (1 − λ)(u − u0 ) is replaced
by

Ki (λ, x, u, b0 , c0 ) = −|(1 − λ)b0i + bi − Ai x − ui |3 + ((1 − λ)b0i + bi − Ai x)3 + u3i − (1 − λ)c0i

and the map becomes




T
T
0
 λ[(∇f (x)) + A u] + (1 − λ)(x − x ) 
ρa (λ, x, u) = 

0 0
K(λ, x, u, b , c )

(3.18)

where a = (x0 , b0 , c0 ).
Watson [90] discussed the use of maps like the one above when the optimization problem (3.16) is non-convex, in which case the KKT conditions are satisfied by stationary,
as well as optimal, points. Nonetheless, Watson states that we can still use maps like the
one above because for the convergence proofs he gives, convexity is a sufficient, but not
necessary condition.
3.4.3

Solving DEC-MDPs using homotopy

Solving a 2-agent DEC-MDP can be formulated as solving the following bilinear program [69]
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Maximize f (x) = xTi Cxj
subject to

Ai xi = bi

(3.19)

Aj xj = bj
xi , x j ≥ 0
xi and xj are the policies of the 2 agents and the matrix C encodes the rewards that depend
on actions of both agents. The constraints guarantee that xi and xj represent legal policies.
Clearly, if it was not for the bilinear term xTi Cxj , the problem would degenerate into
2 independent optimization probelms that can be easily solved. This simple observation
suggests homotopy methods as a way of moving from a solution of the easy independent
problems (MDPs) to a solution of the original coupled problem (DEC-MDP).
The canonical map (3.15) does not involve the homotopy parameter λ in the function f .
But in our case, we would like to do just that. We would like to involve λ in the objective
function of (3.19) to transition from a problem that does not care about interactions to
one that takes all interactions into consideration. Involving λ in the problem is a called
embedding, a technique that has been used to solve problem which could not be solved
using the standard map (e.g., the Mixed Complementarity Problem [4]).
Using embedding, we want to optimize the following family of objective functions

f (x, λ) = (1 − λ)xTi ri + λxTi Cxj + (1 − λ)xTj rj

(3.20)

where ri and rj are the rewards from the agents’ individual MDPs. Note that because the
agents affect each other, the transition and reward functions of one agent’s MDP are underspecified in the absence of any assumptions about what the other agent will do. So in order
to construct an MDP for agent i, for example, we assumed that agent j will act in a way
that is best for i. At λ = 0, the policies that maximize the above objective function are the
optimal policies of the individual MDPs.
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Moving λ from 0 to 1 increases the importance of the bilinear term and therefore requires the solver to consider the other agent’s actions when optimizing one agent’s problem.
In other words, the problem smoothly transitions from complete independence to a problem
with tighter interactions that requires more coordination.
We experimented with several maps that encode our optimization problem as a system
of equations that is 0 at the optimal policy. We started with a map similar to (3.18) but
adapted to deal with the equality constraints representing the policy constraints in (3.19).



T

T

 (∇f (x, λ)) − u + E v 



0 0
ρa (λ, x, u, v) = 
K(λ,
x,
u,
b
,
c
)




Ex − b


(3.21)



 Ai 0 
where E = 
 is the constraint matrix of the policy constraints in (3.19),
0 Aj
and b = [bi ; bj ]. ∇g(x) = −I. In the above, ρa : RN + 1 → RN where N = 2(|Hi | +
|Hj |) + |Coni | + |Conj | and Con is the number of constraints. The top part of the map has
an equation per history per agent and K has an equation for each non-negativity constraints.
The bottom part has an equality per policy constraint.
The problem with the above map is that it results in a Jacobian ∇ρ that is of deficient
rank at λ = 0; some xs will have identical columns in ∇ρ. To see how this can happen,
consider 2 terminal histories of agent i, h1 and h2 . If these histories are extensions of the
same parent history, the variables of their corresponding realization weights, xh1 and xh2 ,
will have identical columns in the constraint matrix Ai ; having no children, they are both
involved in only the one constraint with the parent history. For variables in xi , the relevant
sub-matrix of ∇ρ is (dimensions indicated):
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∂ρ
=
∂xi 







At λ = 0,

∂K1..|Hi |
∂xi


0

|Hi |×|Hi |

λC T

|Hj |×|Hi |

∂K1..|Hi |
∂xi

|Hi |×|Hi |

0

|Hj |×|Hi |

Ai

|Coni |×|Hi |

0

|Conj |×|Hi |
















N ×|Hi |

= 0 and the columns belonging to xh1 and xh2 become identical,

violating the requirement of ρ being transversal to 0 in Lemma (1).
To remedy the above problem, we need to have a term in the first part of the map that
involves x and results in distinct columns in ∇ρ. One way of doing this is to use the
following map



T

T

0

 (∇f (x, λ)) − u + E v + (1 − λ)G(x − x ) 



ρa (λ, x, u, v) = 
K(λ, x, u, b0 , c0 )




Ex − b

(3.22)

where a = (x0 , b0 , c0 ) and x0 = [x0i ; x0j ] is the solutions to the 2 independent MDPs. G
is a diagonal matrix that can be used for scaling, but here we just set it to I.
In our discussion so far, we have not used anything that is specific to EDI-CR; the optimization problem in (3.19) represents a general DEC-MDP and the above map is therefore
valid for general DEC-MDPs. What makes homotopy methods particularly suited to solving EDI-CR instances is that in the latter, interaction among agents is relatively sparse.
Consequently, the starting point representing solutions to the MDPs under the assumption
of independence should be a good point. In a general DEC-MDP, the solution of the actual coupled problem may be completely different from the solution to the easy variant. In
EDI-CR, we hope that the solution of the MDPs is fairly close to the solution of the original
problem.
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3.4.4 Challenges in using homotopy
We have encoded the above map in the homotopy software package HOMPACK [91].
We tried to solve simple instances of EDI-CR but faced many challenges in doing so, which
we discuss below. This discussion contains some very technical material, but we feel that it
is important to document these technicalities so that future researchers interested in using
homotopy methods in general, and HOMPACK in particular, can learn from our experience.
We hope the following discussion can serve as a kind of trouble-shooting guide, suggesting
possible culprits in the homotopy code and framework if the approach does not work out
of the box.
The first challenge was to get familiar with and understand the HOMPACK code, which
is in FORTRAN90 and does not come with very clear documentation. To start using HOMPACK, the user must first implement routines that encode her homotopy map and its Jacobian. When the simple problems were taking too long to converge, we also needed to
understand the detailed linear algebra routines enough to find out which routines were responsible for this and modify some of their internal parameters.
3.4.4.1 Sparse linear algebra
Because our problems involve more than a few hundred variables, we needed to use
the sparse version of the linear algebra routines (for example, in one problem the Jacobian
has 63,000 elements, only 2585 of which are non-zero). A major challenge in using HOMPACK concerns the stability of the sparse linear solver. The same problem was reported by
Borkovsky et. al [22] who cautioned
“Both Layne Watson (the principal author of HOMPACK90) and Ken Judd (an
authority on numerical methods in economics) acknowledge that the GMRES
method can and does fail for some problems. There is no guidance as to which
problems are susceptible, but we strongly suspect problems with extremely
sparse Jacobians.”
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We spent a lot of time trying to squeeze all the structural zeros out of our system of equations, thereby reducing the size of the Jacobian of ρ, which strongly affects the efficiency
of the homotopy method. On the other hand, Borkovsky recommends reducing the size and
sparsity of the Jacobian by eliminating variables. It is not clear whether we should strive
for more or less sparsity, but if we are to take Borkovsky’s advice, we need to completely
re-formulate the problem to use fewer variables.
Upon deeper inspection, we found that one routine that was taking very long to converge is called during the corrector phase. Part of the corrector phase in the normal flow
algorithm (detailed in Section 3.4.1) involves solving a system of linear equations to calculate the kernel of the Jacobian ∇ρ. This is done using the Generalized minimal residual
method (GMRES, [72]). GMRES is a Krylov subspace method; i.e. it approximates the
solution of the system of equations by the vector in a Krylov subspace with minimal residual. In iteration i, GMRES considers the ith Krylov subspace. For a matrix of rank m, the
mth subspace is the entire space and GMRES arrives at the exact solution, but the idea is
that after a few iterations, the solution obtained from the k < m subspace is a good approximation. GMRES is often used with restarts; in GMRES(k),after the k th (inner) iteration,
accumulated data are cleared and the intermediate results are used as the initial data for
the next k iterations. These outer iterations continue until convergence. The difficulty is in
choosing an appropriate value for k. If k is too small, GMRES(k) may be slow to converge,
or fail to converge entirely. A larger k involves excessive work (and uses more storage).
In our experiments, we had to increase k from its default value, a recommendation
that was also made in [22]. We also increased the tolerance associated with the test for
convergence.
Another reason the GMRES routine was terminating with an error flag is that at some
point, the system it was solving was ill-conditioned. For a reason we could not find out,
GMRES was operating on a matrix with a very large condition number. We found a flag in
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the code (called STRONG VERSION) which if set to False, stops GMRES from complaining about large condition numbers. The root of the problem, however, is still unknown.
3.4.4.2 Small steps in prediction
As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, when the corrector phase of one iteration takes many
iterations to converge to a point on the γ curve, the step size h of the next iteration is
reduced. The predicted point in the new iteration depends both on h and on the previous 2
points on the curve and their tangents. One problem we faced was that the λ of a new point
was almost the same as that of the previous point, i.e. the predictor phase takes very small
steps along the λ dimension. In one case, the rate of change of λ with respect to the arc
length s was calculated to be 0.00695, which means there is virtually no progress. Given
that the predictor phase is what actually moves us along the γ curve, the algorithm as a
whole was not making much progress beyond the initial point.
We tried to force the algorithm to be less cautious by not penalizing h very much when
the corrector phase took a long time to converge. But the result was that the next prediction
did take a large step, but ended up so far from the curve that correction took even longer.
So it seems that caution is indeed justified, which suggests that the curve is highly winding.
The questions is whether this is a problem with the particular homotopy map we used, or a
more fundamental problem with using homotopy methods to solve our kind of problems.
3.4.4.3 Possible alternatives
As a final remark regarding our attempts with the homotopy method, we would like to
stress that even though homotopy methods did not work out-of-the-box for solving EDI-CR
instances, we believe there is a lot of potential to the general idea of gradually transitioning
from an easy to a hard problem, especially for EDI-CR where loose coupling usually implies that a solution obtained assuming total independence may be somewhat close to that
of the original problem that takes all interactions into consideration.
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We mentioned that one easy problem to start with is to ignore all interactions and pretened the agents’ problems are completely separate. But other possibilities exist. We can
ignore some interactions while taking others into considerations. The choice of which interactions to initially ignore is itself an interesting research question. We can also change
the fashion in which we transition from the easy to the hard problem. We discuss this and
other possible directions for future work in Section 7.2.

3.5 Summary
This chapter presented ways in which EDI-CR instances can be mathematically formulated so that we can leverage available optimization packages. The first formulation we
give is as a MILP, both for 2-agent and more than 2 agent cases. We base our formulation
on the insight that most action histories of a group of agents have the same effect on a given
agent, thereby allowing us to treat these histories similarly and use fewer variables in the
formulation. We compare our formulation to 2 others: a nonlinear program and a formulation devised for tightly coupled DEC-MDP. The first is expensive to solve and can result in
sub-optimal solutions. The second has the problem of resulting in programs of prohibitive
size.
Experiments show that our MILP is more compact and leads to faster solution times
and generally better solutions than formulations ignoring the structure of interactions. Our
formulation therefore allows us to solve larger problems which would otherwise be intractable.
This chapter also presented our formulation of finding the optimal policy as a system
of non-linear equations. We discussed the use of homotopy methods as an alternative optimization technique and the challenges we faced in doing so.
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CHAPTER 4
COMMUNICATION IN COOPERATIVE EDI-CR

In this chapter, we return to settings with cooperative agents and discuss the important issue of communication in problems with structured interactions. As we tackle more
complex problems requiring tighter coordination, we cannot ignore the possibility of, and
oftentimes need for, communication among the decision makers. Even when agents know
each other’s initial policies, uncertainty about action outcomes can create ambiguity about
what states the other agents are in and, consequently, what they will do in the future. This
ambiguity introduces the need for coordination during the execution of a distributed policy.
Communication raises a host of interesting and challenging problems which we believe can
particularly benefit from consideration in the structured interaction setting.
In Chapter 3, we discussed how the problem of finding optimal policies for a set of
cooperative agents can be formulated and solved as an optimization problem. The same
solution approaches can be used when the problem involves communication, as well as
domain, actions. But the main impediment to reasoning about communication offline is the
very large problems sizes that result from following each domain action with a communication action. Even if such problems can be represented, they are usually too large to solve.
Our approach to making offline planning for communication tractable [60] is to construct
a smaller problem whose optimal action and communication policies are the same as, or
close to, those of the original problem.
We start this chapter with a survey of work on communication in decision theoretic
models. In Section 4.2, we discuss the different kinds of communication costs and provide
an analysis that highlights the potential gains of restricting the number of points where
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agents can communicate. Section 4.3 presents our heuristics for limiting the amount of
communication in situations with uni-directional transition interactions. Experimental results are given in Section 4.4. We extend our work to settings with bi-directional interactions in Section 4.5, using Bayesian networks to calculate belief estimates.
In spite of several attempts to get around the complexity of offline reasoning, ours is
the first work to focus on making it more tractable by restricting the problem size in a way
that has little or no effect on solution quality, thereby making it possible to reason about
long-term consequences of communication without incurring the prohibitive costs typically
associated with doing so.

4.1

Related work: Communication in Decision Theoretic Models

In this section we compare and discuss some of the work that has been done on communication in decision theoretic models. We try to highlight the similarities and differences
among the different works in a way that makes it easier to understand how they stand in
relation to each other. The following are the criteria we use for comparison:
• Reasoning time: reasoning about communication can be done offline or online.
• Observability: models vary in what they assume an agent can observe. Observability ranges from joint partial observability where combining all agents’ partial views
does not tell the agents the global state, to locally observable states.
• Independence assumptions: transition independence (T.I.) and/or observation independence (O.I.).
• Communication language: at one end of the spectrum, the agents can be verbose
and exchange their entire states (or their observation histories in case of partial observability) after each action. Where the interaction among agents is limited, a summarization of an agent’s state often goes a long way. For example, in TI-DEC-MDP,
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a fair degree of coordination can be obtained by exchanging a single bit of information about each shared task indicating whether it was done or not [14]. Another
language can be the language of probabilities of doing actions that affect the other
agent. For example, an agent can inform another of the probability of doing a certain
critical action in the future, with drastic changes in this probability triggering communication [96]. Generally, an agent can communicate any information that helps
the recipients refine their beliefs over what the sender will do/has done.
• Initial centralized policy: can make different assumptions about whether and how
much communication will be available during execution.
• Calculating the value of communication: refers to how an agent assesses the worth
of a communication action. One approach considers the effect of communication
myopically, i.e., considering only the immediate effects of communication without
regard to the long-term effects. Another approach considers the expected value of
the state resulting from communication. A different class of approaches does not
calculate a value for a communication action. Rather, communication is triggered
when a certain condition is met, e.g., when the actions taken by the team of agents
would change if they communicate.
• Digesting messages: different approaches react to receiving a message differently.
Some approaches make the agents re-plan in the light of the newly-received information. Others use received information to refine beliefs. If the communicated information is complete enough, the agents can purge the histories of observations they have
seen so far and proceed from a known global state. If there is partial observability,
the agents can still purge their histories, but they will start from a new belief over the
global state. For approaches where communication happens if a certain condition is
satisfied, one round of communication can trigger a second round and so on until the
most recent communication results in a state that does not invite further communi-
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cation. If communication was planned for offline, the recipient simply follows the
path dictated by his state and the received information. In this case, the effect of the
message is “pre-compiled” in the agent’s plan.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 compare some related work, as well as our suggested work, along the
above criteria. The following paragraphs give more details.
Reasoning about communication at execution time has been approached in a variety of
ways. Becker et. al [13, 11] assume at planning time that communication is not possible
and obtain a 0-communication policy. During execution, their agents myopically calculate the value of synchronizing their states based on 1-step problem dynamics. Because
the approach is online, therefore restricted to reachable states, and the model is transitionindependent, the calculation is fast and simple. However, the communication decisions in
this case are only optimal assuming further communication is not possible, which sometimes results in over-communication. Improvements on the value-of-communication calculation which vary the degree of myopia of an agent, as well as take the other agent into
consideration, are given in [11]. However, as the agent becomes less myopic, the computational cost of calculating the value of communication increases because the agent needs
to look further ahead when deciding whether to communicate.
The work of Xuan [97] moves in the opposite direction, assuming free communication
at planning time and deciding where it is possible to skip communication during execution
by considering the utility of communication. Roth et. al [71] tackle Dec-POMDPs and also
assume free communication at planning time, thereby obtaining a single-agent POMDP
whose policy is then used as an approximate solution for the Dec-POMDP. During execution, an agent communicates its observation history if doing so benefits team performance.
So the decision to communicate does not consider a cost for communication. Upon receiving an observation history, an agent prunes beliefs that disagree with the received histories,
as a result of which it may find that communicating its own history is useful, thereby triggering a new round of communication.
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Goldman and Zilberstein [38] introduce the Dec-POMDP-Com model that explicitly
represents communication actions and messages.1 The setting considered throughout that
work is a goal-oriented one where agents are trying to meet in a grid. Two approaches are
presented; one involves agents communicating upon reaching sub-goals, thereby setting
new goals. The other involves agents act myopically optimizing the choice of when to send
a message, assuming no additional communication is possible.
To get around the complexity of offline reasoning, Communicative JESP [65] requires
agents to communicate at least every K time steps, thereby only considering messages that
encode observation histories up to length K. However, this restriction means agents communicate not to improve performance but to make policy computation tractable. They do,
however, address the general Dec-POMDP case and make no independence assumptions.
The work of Spaan [80] also does offline reasoning and is close to ours in that both
works treat communication actions as just another kind of actions and have messages appear to the recipient as observations. Their work, however, deals with DEC-POMDPs while
our agents are assumed to observe their local states. The major difference is that their work
optimizes the communication policy and action policy iteratively with respect to each other,
whereas we solve for the optimal policy (containing both domain and communication actions) as a whole. We suspect that Spaan’s iterative mutual improvement of action and
communication policies is an attempt to avoid the complexity of optimizing both policies
simultaneously. As will be detailed in Sections4.3 and 4.5, we propose heuristics to reduce
the size of the problem, thereby allowing us to do the desired simultaneous optimization.
Another work that reasons about communication offline is that of Beynier et. al [18]
where communication is added to the Opportunity Cost DEC-MDP (OC-DEC-MDP) model
that was originally proposed in [17]. OC-DEC-MDP handles temporal and precedence
constraints on agent tasks with complexity polynomial in |S|. It has local full observability
1

Shen et. al[77] proved that this explicit representation does not increase the expressiveness of the model;
communication actions are just special types of actions and messages are special types of observations.

83

Table 4.1. Related work
Becker IAT’05 [13]

Nair et al.
AAMAS’04 [66]

Spaan et al.
AAMAS’06 [80]

Reasoning
time

Online

Offline

Offline

Language

Local state

History of observations
since last sync

No explicitly defined
language

Independence
assumptions

T.I. and O.I.

None

Observability

Local full obs.

Joint partial obs.

Domain T.I. and O.I.
Messages modeled as
observations so communication introduces
dependence
Joint partial obs.

Centralized
policy

Assumes no
communication

Assume synchronizing
is possible. One variant
enforces a sync every k
time units

Mutual optimization of
action and communication policies w.r.t. each
other until convergence

Solution
Method

Coverage Set
Algorithm (CSA) for
centralized policy

JESP-like iterations

JESP-like iterations to
optimize domain policy w.r.t communication policy. Heuristics
for calculating communication policy.

VoC

Myopically calculated
online based on expected increase in utility after doing 1 sync
given belief over other
agent’s state

Value of a sync calculated offline as an expected value over the
belief states that can result from the sync

Information content of
a message measured by
entropy over the external uncontrolled state
s0

Re-run CSA from new
global state

Discard
observation
history and adopt new
belief state.
Further
reactions are compiled
into policy

Update belief over s0

Digesting
messages

and observation independence. The task graph (where tasks are nodes and arcs are predecessor relations) is acyclic. Each task has a time window and a reward. The time and
resources taken by a task’s execution are probabilistic. Each agent i individually constructs
its MDP. The agents start from some initial set of policies from which they calculate the
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Table 4.2. Related work (cont.)
Roth et al.
AAMAS’05 [71]

Goldman et al.
AAMAS’03 [37]

This work

Reasoning
time

Online

Online

Offline

Language

History of observations

Local state

Independence
assumptions

None

Observability

Joint partial obs.

Centralized
policy

Assumes free communication which transforms problem to 1
large POMDP

Solution
Method

VoC

Digesting
messages

Q-POMDP
heuristic
approximates best joint
action for the large
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opportunity cost (OC) of their actions, given the policies of other agents. From these OCs,
each agent then calculates a policy that considers both its local rewards and the effects of
its actions on the team’s rewards (as mirrored by the OCs). The agents then have a new
set of policies which they can use for the next iteration. This whole process rests on the
assumption that the task graph of each agent is linear (the task execution order is fixed),
otherwise the effects of changing the starting time of a task would not propagate properly.
Also, this assumption allows the state to only store the last executed task rather than all
tasks and their outcomes.
The OC-DEC-MDP model is yet another sub-class of general DEC-MPDs that overlaps
with ours. Both models have local full observability and transition dependence. However,
whereas OC-DEC-MDP models only a specific kind of transition dependence (precedence
constraints), we model arbitrary (and more general) transition dependence. We also have
reward interactions, which are not in OC-DEC-MDP while the latter has resource constraints, which are not in our model.
Communicative OC-DEC-MDP allows an agent to communicate the end time of a previous successfully executed task. So both our communication models and that of Beynier
use the same communication language. The latter, however, can deal with non-instantaneous
communication with probabilistic cost. Planning for communication is done offline where
the benefit of a communication action (increasing recipient’s expected utility) is weighed
against its cost (time delay and resources consumed). However, there is still a decoupling
between agents’ MDPs because the effect of communication on the other agent is calculated only from the sender’s perspective given the recipient’s policy during the last iteration,
again aided by the fairly simple task graph.
The above work uses a kind of decoupling where each agent solves his MDP individually given the last known policy of other agents. This decoupling greatly facilitates the
process of coordination. A different kind of decoupling is seen in the work of Witwicki et
al. [92] where they decouple agents’ execution by first deciding on a set of commitments
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and then having each agent plan for itself assuming these commitments will be respected.
The first phase, searching the commitment space, is done using a heuristic algorithm while
the second phase is done using linear programming to force the committing agent to respect
the commitments. This work therefore coordinates agents using up-front commitments
rather than communication, which has the advantage of reducing the size of the policy
space. The downside is that if a commitment fails to be met, there is no way to alert the
dependent agent. An extension of this work iteratively increases the number of parameters
associated with a commitment, thus allowing agents to model each other more accurately
at the expense of a larger problem size [93]. However, this is only done in the context of
a sub-class of Becker’s Event-Driven Interaction DEC-MDPs where the agent interaction
graph is acyclic and, other than time and commitment-related flags, there are no commonly
observed state features.
Another work that uses commitments for coordination is that of Xuan et. al [96]. They
identify sources of uncertainty inherent in commitments and discuss ways to incorporate
them into the modeling of commitments, as well as mechanisms to handle these uncertainties, such as contingency analysis. The search for what commitments each agent should
make is done through a negotiation process. This work has the advantage that it does not
assume that commitments are fixed; it admits the possibility of commitment changes (e.g.
failure).
Whereas decoupling, whether of the first or second kind shown above, makes problem
solving easier, it is prone to converging to a local optimum and failing to find the global
optimum that would be achieved if both sub-problems (in the first case, problems of both
agents, and in the second, finding commitments and policies) were solved simultaneously.
Another difference in modeling communication relates to whether it is modeled implicitly or explicitly. In the former, one agent’s actions affect observations seen by another
agent. In explicit modeling, communication is a first-class action and a message vocabulary
is part of the model. It has been shown for least one model that adding explicit communi-
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cation does not increase the expressiveness of a model; Shen et. al show that DEC-MDPCom as introduced in [38] is equivalent to DEC-MDP [77]. However, it is sometimes done
for the sake of clarity. Another reason for explicitly modeling communication is that it
makes it easier to delineate communication-related issues and parameters and add more sophistication to the model (e.g. complex communication cost, communication delay, noisy
communication channels and dropped messages [81]).

4.2

Communication Costs

In this section, we discuss the different kinds of communication costs, with a focus on
the computational cost introduced when we reason about communication. We then analyze
the effect of limiting communication on problem size.
The first, and more obvious, kind of communication costs are operational costs due to
things like transmission cost, cost in reduced battery life in the case of sensors transmitting
data and privacy loss in adversarial settings or where the communication channel is not
secured, to name a few examples. A modeler would typically assign such costs a quantitative value that is commensurate with whatever unit is used for rewards, thus allowing an
agent to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the effect of communicating this or that piece of
communication on the team’s overall reward. This is the kind of cost that has garnered the
most attention in the literature (e.g., [13, 11]).
The second kind of cost is the computational cost associated with reasoning about communication. This cost is in terms of the increase in problem size (and the computational
effort of solving it) and the size of the resulting policies. The action space increases with
the introduction of communication actions while the state space increases because a state
typically needs to store message (in explicit communication) or observation history (in implicit communication). The main impetus behind our work is that even if communication
in a particular domain were entirely free, it would still be necessary to limit communication
in order to keep the problem size tractable.
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The amount of increase depends on what is communicated and when. Obviously, the
more frequent the communication, the longer the message/observation histories will be.
What is communicated affects the number of possible histories. A richer communication
language (one with a larger vocabulary) results in a larger number of possible histories. For
example, when there is local full observability, the richest language is that of local states
where agents synchronize their local states, thus disclosing the global state and achieving
maximum coordination. This language is very expensive because in the worse case, the
number of histories of length T is O(|S|T ). An example at the other extreme is a very
limited language with Boolean vocabulary that just tells the recipient whether a certain
action was done or not.
In our work, we address both operational and computational costs. We use heuristics
to limit the availability of communication, thus reducing problem size and computational
cost without greatly harming solution quality. We then calculate the optimal action and
communication policy of the resulting problem so that operational cost of communication
is minimized while maximizing team reward.
4.2.1

Limiting communication

Like offline reasoning about domain actions, offline reasoning about communication
attempts to consider all the ramifications of all actions/communications before execution
starts. The result is a policy dictating what, if anything, should be communicated in each situation. However, reasoning about communication offline is notorious for being intractable.
The number of messages agents can send can grow as large as the set of all possible observation histories (or set of states in locally fully observable domains), since every history/state may represent a different belief that an agent may wish to convey. Offline reasoning would require the enumeration of all possible messages, as well as their intended
effect on the team belief.
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To make offline reasoning about communication tractable, we limit the number of communication possibilities. A communication possibility after an action means the solution
algorithm can choose whether to communicate after that action. It does not mean that
communication will actually take place at that point, only that it is possible. Full-fledged
communication considers all communication possibilities, and that is what makes it intractable. An important observation, however, is that very few of these possibilities are
useful.
Definition 11 A useful communication possibility is one at which the optimal action is to
actually communicate.
If we can find useful communication possibilities in advance and only add these to our
problem, we can get (near) optimal solutions with much smaller problem sizes and thereby
solve problems that are intractable if all communication possibilities are considered.
4.2.2

Problem size analysis

In this section, we motivate the effort to limit the number of communication possibilities
by analyzing the relation between the amount of communication available to agents and
the problem size. This analysis is for a particular state representation (one that stores
the sequence of actions taken and outcomes obtained, together with timestamped sent and
received message histories), and measures the problem size in terms of a particular metric;
the number of sequences in an agent’s MDP.
In this analysis, and in our work on settings with uni-directional interactions in Section 4.3, we use a limited communication language that only allows an agent to signal the
successful completion of an action, and we only allow this right after the action is finished.
Even though a message does not tell the recipient exactly where the sender is in its state
space, it does serve to refine the recipient’s belief over the sender’s state and, hopefully,
allow him to better respond to execution-time eventualities.
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We express problem size in terms of the number of actions available at every state, A,
the number of outcomes per action, O, the number of messages an agent can send and receive in a given time unit, M and R, respectively. Note that an agent actually sends/receives
only one of these messages in a given time unit. For this analysis, we make the simplifying
assumptions that these four quantities are the same for both agents (agent sub-problems are
of equal sizes) and are the same across time units. We also assume an action takes a single
time unit, so for horizon T , an agent goes through T act-send-receive iterations.
4.2.2.1 No communication
If no communication is allowed anywhere (no communication possibilities), the numP
ber of sequences in an agent’s MDP is Tk=1 Ak Ok−1 which is O(AT +1 OT ).
4.2.2.2 Full-fledged communication
With full-fledged communication, each of the T stages consists of choosing an action,
getting an outcome, choosing what message to send, and probabilistically receiving a message. At the beginning of the k th time unit, there are Ak−1 Ok−1 M k−1 Rk−1 states where any
of A actions can be taken, resulting in Ak Ok−1 M k−1 Rk−1 sequences. Each of these actions
has O outcomes, leading to Ak Ok M k−1 Rk−1 states where an agent send any of the M
messages, giving Ak Ok M k Rk−1 new sequences. Therefore the number of new sequences
generated during the k th time unit is:
Ak Ok−1 M k−1 Rk−1 + Ak Ok M k Rk−1

and the total number of sequences in an agent’s MDP is
T
X
Ak Ok−1 M k−1 Rk−1 + Ak Ok M k Rk−1 = O(AT +1 OT +1 M T +1 RT )

(4.1)

k=1

To get a feel for how large the problem is, we apply the above general formula to the
Mars rovers domain. If d is the number of sites that can be visited then A = d and O = 2
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for the fast and slow outcomes. R = d+1 because the other agent can signal the completion
of any of d sites or nothing. M = 2 because after a given action, the agent can signal it or
send nothing. The total number of sequences therefore approximately (because of using d
instead of (d + 1) for simplification) reduces to:
T
X

d2k−1 22k−2 + d2k−1 22k = O(d2T +1 22T )

k=1

4.2.2.3 Limited communication
We now see how restricting the amount of communication affects problem size. Specifically, we want to see the effect of the number of communication possibilities on the number
of sequences in an agent’s MDP. Of course, this depends on where the possibilities are; the
earlier they are in time, the larger their effect on the MDP size (because of earlier branching). As a worst-case analysis, we assume that if we have C communication possibilities,
they are located at the first C levels of the MDP. Note that we do not have a possibility after
each action in the first C levels; we have a possibility after a single action at each level. For
this reason, we cannot just take the general formula and apply it for the first C time units
then take the no-communication formula and apply it to the remaining time units. Also for
the sake of a worst-case analysis, we assume all C possibilities can be encountered; i.e.,
they are on the same path. To see why this is the worst-case, consider the other extreme
where each possibility is on a different path. In this latter case, the number of possible
message histories is only C + 1 whereas in the former case, there are 2C histories, since
each possibility can actually be used or not.
During each of the first C stages, and for only one action at a stage, an agent sends one
of M messages or nothing. The number of sequences resulting from domain actions during
the first C stages is
c−1
X

Ai Oi−1 M Ri (c − i) +

i=1

c
X
i=1
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Ai Oi−1 M Ri−1

Each of these stages has exactly one occasion where the agent can choose which of M messages to communicate, if any. So the number of sequences resulting from communication
actions is c(M + 1). The number of sequence from domain actions in the remaining T − c
P −c i i−1
stages is Q Ti=1
AO
where Q is the number of states at the end of the first C stages
and is O(Ac Oc Rc + Ac−1 Oc−1 M Rc ). The second factor in the product is O(AT −c+1 OT −c ).
The total number of sequences, from domain and communication actions, is therefore of
the order of
c−1
X
i=1

i

AO

i−1

i

M R (c − i) +

c
X

Ai Oi−1 M Ri−1 + c(M + 1)

i=1

(4.2)

+ (Ac Oc Rc + Ac−1 Oc−1 M Rc )(AT −c+1 OT −c )
which reduces to O(AT +1 OT Rc + AT OT −1 M Rc ).
The reduction in problem size from full to limited communication is therefore considerable. For the Mars rover example, full communication gives MDPs whose size is
O(d2T +1 22T ) whereas C communication possibilities give O(dT +c+1 2T ).

4.3

Heuristics For Uni-directional Interactions

In this section, we propose three heuristics, H1 through H3, for deciding where to
add communication possibilities. The heuristics assume that transition dependence and
communication are uni-directional; agent j affects and can send messages to agent i. H1
and H2 rely on analyzing the static structure of the MDPs while H3 is more sophisticated
and relies on an initial policy in addition to the static structure. In Section 4.5, we show
how we extended and improved H2 and H3 for the case with bi-directional interactions.
The general plan: For H2 and H3, we start with a base no-communication pair of
MDPs and set C, the number of communication possibilities we allow the heuristic to add.
A heuristic considers the set of communication possibilities and assigns a score to each
possibility based on its perceived usefulness (impact). This is done by first calculating a
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no-communication policy then using it as a context for evaluating the impact of potential
communication points. The top C communication possibilities are then added to the base
MDPs (in MDPj as communication actions and in MDPi as possible received messages)
and the resulting pair is solved using the techniques in Chapter 3. If a heuristic makes
good decisions regarding which points to add, a solution using C + 1 possibilities should
not be worse than one using C possibilities because all points in the latter are available to
the former. We can then use C to control the tradeoff between problem size and solution
quality.
4.3.1
4.3.1.1

Heuristics based on static structure
H1: Add after critical actions

The simplest heuristic is to add communication possibilities only after critical actions.
The intuition is that these are the actions that affect i, so they are the ones i cares about.
The problem with H1, though, is that it can make communication available when it is too
late for i to benefit from it, resulting in j never actually using the added possibilities and
following a zero-communication policy.
4.3.1.2 H2: Add after actions with very different outcomes
H2 tries to analyze MDPj to determine which actions have outcomes with very different effects on j’s probability of starting future critical actions early enough for i to benefit
from them. A communication possibility considered by H2 is characterized by a sequence
of finished actions and their outcomes, done, together with a potential next action anext . A
possibility’s usefulness score is proportional to the difference between the effects entailed
by anext ’s outcomes. The intuition is that if an action’s outcomes have very different consequences, the particular outcome obtained during execution will greatly influence i and thus
i will need to know about it.
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For an outcome oc of anext , the effect on future critical actions is obtained by inspecting
the sub-tree in MDPj rooted at the state where oc is obtained after the sequence done. The
impact of oc is given by
X
a∈criticals

w(a) ∗

X

(T − t) ∗ P (t)

t∈start(a)

where criticals is the set of j’s critical actions and start(a) is the set of possible times j can
start action a, (T - t) favors earlier start times and P (t) is the probability that in the subtree,
j starts a at t. w(a) is a way of giving more weight to more lucrative critical actions. If
a is part of a shared task, it is proportional to the common reward and, if a affects the
other agent, it is proportional to the reward of doing the affected action. According to this
formula, an outcome resulting in j being more likely to start future critical actions earlier is
going to be associated with a larger value, assuming that the earlier j satisfies a dependency,
the better. For a dependency where j’s action affects i negatively, we can use

1
T −t

to favor

later start times.
4.3.2 Heuristic based on an initial policy
The problem with basing our scores solely on an analysis of the structure of the agents’
MDPs is that we do not have any indication of which actions will actually be taken by the
optimal policy, therefore the communication possibilities we introduce may actually never
be encountered because they are in a part of the state space that is never visited by the
optimal policy. We therefore need some kind of guide as to which parts of the space will
be visited. One possible guide is the zero-communication optimal policy which consists
of the domain actions that would be optimal if communication were not possible. Even
though this is not necessarily the optimal policy when we do introduce communication, as
we will see in the experimental results section, this policy serves as a good approximation
and helps focus our attention on important parts of the space.
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4.3.2.1

H3: Add where it causes most belief change

H3 tries to assess i’s “surprise” after a given communication, with the intuition that the
most useful communications are those that inform the recipient of something thought very
unlikely. To do this, H3 reasons about i’s beliefs before and after a potential communication. To calculate the former beliefs, we need some kind of initial policy, since beliefs
induced solely from the agents MDPs are very loose. We therefore solve the (smaller)
no-communication problem to get a pair of initial policies. The score of communication
possibility k is proportional to the difference between i’s beliefs derived from j’s initial
policy πj and its beliefs if possibility k is added and used. i’s beliefs are over the times j
can finish future critical actions. We use the KL-divergence as a measure of the difference
in beliefs and express the score of a possibility as
X

KL(B(f inish(a)|πj ) || B(f inish(a)|πj , k))

a∈important

where B is the probability distribution specifying i’s belief over a’s finish time. The more
a communication possibility causes i’s beliefs to change from the base beliefs, the higher
its score will be.
H3 does not consider all future actions because even if a communication drastically
changes i’s belief over a given action a, this change has no consequences on i’s decisions
if none of its future actions are affected by a. We therefore want to find out which of
j’s critical actions affect i’s future. To reason about i’s future, we calculate a probability
distribution over i’s state at the time of communication given i’s initial policy. For each
possible state, we traverse all its descendants to determine which affected actions can be
done in the future and thus which of j’s critical actions matter.
4.3.3 Evaluating communication points in context
Because H3 is concerned with measuring the belief change induced by a communication point, the top C points should not be added at once because some points may provide
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no new information given other points in the added set. Rather, the top point is added and
subsequent points are evaluated in the context of previously added points. Note, however,
that we are not solving the problem for each added point. We merely assume that the added
point is indeed used and calculate the various beliefs accordingly. For in-context evaluation, the scoring formula is modified to measure the departure of B(f inish(a)|πj , k, e)
from B(f inish(a)|πj , e) where e is the set of previously added points. We may therefore
have two points that individually cause a large departure from the belief induced by πj , but
one of them may become completely useless given the other if it conveys no new information about what j will do in the future. By iteratively adding points, H3 avoids adding such
useless points.
Taking a closer look at the set of already-added points e, we see that we only need to
include in e points that are earlier in time than point k, since at the time of getting the
message associated with k, the receiver will not have received messages from later points.
Points in e can either be on the path leading to k or not. The points on the path are
referred to as e+ and, by our assumption that earlier points are indeed used, should be set
to True while evaluating k to reflect the assumption that the receiver already got messages
from these points when it gets a message from k. Points that are not on the path to k
could not have been encountered by the sender before getting to k, and so the messages
there could not have been received. The receiver, however, does get some information
merely from not getting these messages that it knows would have been sent if the sender
had encountered the associated points. We refer to these points as e− and set them to False
in evaluating k. The impact of k in the context of the set of points e is therefore
X

KL(B(f inish(a)|πj , e+= T, e−= F ) || B(f inish(a)|πj , e+= T, e−= F, k))

a∈important

Clearly, if there is a point in e+ that imparts the same information as k, k will have
no impact. Similarly, if the receiver knows that the sender will encounter either a certain
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point in e− or k, and there are no other possibilities, then again k has no impact because
the sender already learned what information it can from not getting messages from e− .
4.3.4 Automatically determining needed communication
As mentioned earlier, H2 and H3 accept a parameter that specifies the number of communication possibilities they should add. A different alternative is to allow these points to
determine how many possibilities they need to add.
We would like to determine the number of communication possibilities needed to achieve
optimal reward (what full communication would get) a priori rather than in retrospect after
actually solving the problem. We believe that the scores calculated by H3 can guide us in
this process. These scores measure the belief change induced by adding one more communication possibility in the context of previous ones. The hypothesis is that if, after adding
some possibilities, the remaining possibilities all have low scores, then adding more possibilities will not increase reward because they are not actually going to be used, since the
solution algorithm will not choose a communication that does not very much affect beliefs.
Therefore, if a heuristic sees a significant drop in impacts of potential points in the context
of n previously added points, it can conclude that only n communication points are needed
for this instance.
We believe the number of needed points is a measure of how tightly coupled the different sub-problems in a problem instance are. It says how much coordination is needed
among agents to achieve (near) optimal reward. Equally importantly, it tells us how large
(and thus usually how difficult) the instance will be when we reason about communication offline; since the state keeps track of sent and received messages, the more frequently
agents communicate, the larger the state space.
If a heuristic can indeed determine how much communication is needed to achieve
(near) optimal reward, we can use this as a measure of problem difficulty that not only
depends on the static structure of the problem (like the measure in [6]), but also takes
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into consideration what actions the agents will actually take. The more we refine the way
our heuristics calculate the impact of a potential communication, the more accurate our
measure will be. Given the large variation in difficulty among instances of the same model,
a measure of difficulty is an interesting area for future research.

4.4

Experimental Results: Uni-directional Heuristics

In this section, we compare the performance of our three heuristics in choosing useful
communication possibilities. For H2 and H3, we see the effect on allowing a larger problem
size on solution quality.
4.4.1 Experimental setup
Using the Mars rovers scenario introduced in Section 2.2.1.3, we conducted experiments to investigate how much our heuristics can reduce the size of the problem (given
by the total number of sequences in the agents’ MDPs), and the effect of this reduction
on solution quality (given by the sum of the agents’ rewards). The main parameters that
affect an instance’s size are the number of sites available to each rover, the time horizon
and the number of dependencies. One notable observation is the difficulty of obtaining random scenarios whose optimal policies actually contain communication. Apparently, purely
randomly generated scenarios are not tightly-coupled enough to warrant communication;
knowing each other’s initial policies often goes a long way in coordinating the agents.
We ran experiments on 21 instances whose composition is shown in Table 4.3. The
“small” group contains 12 instances for which full communication produced a problem
small enough to be solved. The “big” group contains 9 instances for which this is not possible. The “Average full size” column gives the average size (in terms of the number of terminal sequences) when full communication is allowed. All instances have uni-directional
dependence and communication from rover j to rover i. The instances we address are considerably larger than those attempted by Becker et. al using the EDI-DEC-MDP model
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Table 4.3. Instance composition
# instances
12
9

i sites
3-9
10-21

j sites
3-11
10-21

Time # deps
7-10
2-6
8-12 7-19

Average full size
3422
42955

where there are 5 sites per agents and the number of dependencies ranges between 2 and
4 [12]. Our instances are also much larger because our agents can visit the sites in any
order whereas Becker has a fixed order for visiting sites.
4.4.2 Performance of heuristics
For the two heuristics H2 and H3 where we can control the size of the MDPs (by
setting the number of communication points c), we investigate the effect of increasing
the size on solution quality. Figure 4.1 shows how H2 and H3 behave on the small and
big instances. The x-axis gives problem size as a fraction of the size obtained when full
communication is allowed. We move along this axis by increasing the value of c. The
y-axis gives solution quality as a fraction of the maximum quality we could obtain; for
small problems, this is the quality with full communication but for larger problems, this
is the best quality achieved by H2 or H3. Only 3 of the big instances could be solved
using H1, so the figure only shows the average size and reward obtained by H1 on the
small instances (which is a single data point, since H1 is not parameterizable by c). The
curves were obtained by averaging the curves of individual instances after doing linear
interpolation between an instance’s points. We extrapolated an instance’s curve towards the
lower left corner using data obtained from solving its no-communication version (which,
by definition, has minimum size and rewards) and towards the top right corner of the graph
using the point (1, 1) (which, by definition, holds for all instances, regardless of whether
they could actually be solved using full communication).
As the figure clearly shows, as we increase the number of communication points, H3’s
reward rises more sharply than H2 and H1 does much worse than H2 and H3 on small
instances and results in instances too large to solve on the larger instances. To see why,
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Figure 4.1. Effect of problem size on solution quality

remember that H3 adds points much more judiciously than H2; it 1) relies on an initial
policy 2) assesses the belief change caused by a message and 3) considers i’s policy from
the communication point onward. Besides failing to do these things, H2’s problem is that
even if an action’s outcomes have very similar effects, it may still be important for i to
know about it if the action itself is very unexpected, something that H2 does not account
for. Also, H2 makes a single decision for adding possibilities after all outcomes of an
action, but in fact, the usefulness of communicating the different outcomes may vary, so
deciding whether to add a communication possibility after each outcome should be done
separately. H1 adds communication possibilities after all critical actions, so it adds many
useless possibilities, but still fails to add possibilities that are early enough in time to be
useful.
The net result is that H3 adds useful communication points earlier while H2 may add
several useless points, the penalty of which is an increase in size with little or no increase
in reward. The figure shows that the difference between H2 and H3 is more pronounced in
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larger instances. The reason is that the increase in size itself (the penalty) depends on the
how big an MDP was before adding a point.
As for the number of communication possibilities added, H3 needed to add 1-2 possibilities to the small instances to obtain optimal reward (which we know, since these instances
could be solved with full communication). To achieve the same reward, H2 needed to add
an average of 3 points for instances that need 1 point and 6 for those that need 2. For the
large instances, H3 could add 3-4 points before the instances got too large to solve.
4.4.3 Effect on execution time
To demonstrate that H3’s limited problem sizes do translate to solution time speedups,
we averaged the time taken to solve the small instances with full communication compared
to using H3 (and achieving the same optimal reward). On average, H3 took only 19% of
the time taken by full communication. This means that even though H3 incurs an overhead
due to building and solving the initial no-communication pair of MDPs, the overall solution time is dramatically decreased. For larger instances, we cannot calculate the speedup
because a full communication solution is not possible.
In all our experiments, the time of determining the communication possibilities that
should be added is insignificant compared to the times of building and solving the nocommunication MDPs (in H3) and the final MDPs (in all heuristics). For the small instances, H3 took 43 msec on average to choose the possibilities to add. For the larger
instances, H3 took on average 188 msec. H2 takes even less time, since its scoring calculations are less sophisticated.
4.4.4 Automatically determining needed communication
We conducted experiments to investigate whether we can indeed use the scores calculated by H3 to determine the number of communication points needed by the (near) optimal
policy before actually solving the problem. We use the same test cases as in the previous
sections to get the following preliminary results.
102

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show H3 scores for the group of small and big instances. We divide
the small instances into those that required 1 (left) and 2 (right) communication possibilities
to achieve optimal reward (which we know because we could solve these instances with full
communication). We divide large instances into those that become too large to solve after
adding 3 (left) and 4 (right) possibilities. The y-axis shows H3 scores normalized by the
maximum score obtained by any point in the context of πj only (i.e., when no points have
been added yet), averaged over the relevant instances. The figure shows the top 2 scores
obtained in each successive context; first in the context of just πj then in the context of πj
and all previously added.
As can be seen, scores decrease as we add more points, since the most informative
points are added first. Also, for the small instances that require n (=1 or 2) points to achieve
optimal reward, we see a large drop in the top score after n points are added, indicating
that indeed adding further points is useless. For the larger instances, we do not know the
optimal reward, so we cannot be sure what the necessary number of points is. Nonetheless,
the figure does support the fact that the 3rd and 4th points proved useful for instances in the
left and right parts of the figure, respectively. In the left part, the top score obtained in the
context of the first 3 added points is low, but not much lower than the previous top score,
suggesting that reward may further improve if we could add a 4th point. In the right part,
however, the drop in the last top score seems significant, suggesting that a fifth point will
not be useful.

4.5

Heuristic For Bi-directional Interactions

So far, we have been dealing with uni-directional interactions. This section presents a
heuristic, H3B, whose main idea is like H3 in subsection 4.3.2, but which deals with bidirectional interactions and communication in ways that will be detailed in the following
sub-sections. In each iteration of H3B, each agent assesses its potential communication
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Figure 4.2. H3 Scores of successively added communication possibilities in small instances
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Figure 4.3. H3 Scores of successively added communication possibilities in large instances
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points and the one with the highest impact among all agents’ points is added to the problem.
The process repeats until the desired number of points are added.
Another main difference between H3 and H3B is that the latter considers reward when
deciding whether to include a communication possibility.
4.5.1 Incorporating reward
The heuristic H3 in subsection 4.3.2 measures the impact of a communication possibility as the amount of change it causes in the recipient’s beliefs. Suppose agent i’s action a1
affects the transition probability of agent j’s a2 , and that i is using H3B to assess a communication possibility k. In general, i may be interested in the change of receiver’s (j’s)
belief over any of the following:
1. Whether/when the sender will do its affecting action, i.e. i’s probability of doing a1
2. The receiver’s transition probability, i.e. j’s probability of transitioning to possible
next states after doing a2
3. The receiver’s future reward, i.e. j’s expected future reward from the point of receiving i’s message onward
If we choose the first option, it may be the case that even though the message associated with k implies that i’s probability of doing a1 changed from 0.9 to 0.1, a1 does not
significantly change the transition probability of a2 , so the large change in a1 ’s probability
does not translate to a large change in a2 ’s transitions, so agent j will not find the message
very useful. In other words, j will take the same actions whether or not the message is
received. As a result, measuring this kind of belief change does not give a good indication
of the impact a communication point has.
If we choose the second option, again, even if the message implies the transition probability of a2 does change a lot, it may be the case that the next states that a2 can transition
to (its outcomes) are more or less close in terms of the long-term consequences, so again j
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will not find the message very useful because the change implied by the message does not
really change its prospects.
We believe the third option, beliefs over future rewards, is indeed the kind of belief
that we should reason about when assessing the impact of a communication possibility. An
agent is ultimately only interested in maximizing reward, and as long as a change does not
affect its expectations about its reward, it will not be important for the agent. Furthermore,
we argue that if a message causes an agent’s expectations about its future rewards to increase, then again, the agent will not find it useful in that it will not be motivated to act
differently upon getting the message.
Based on the above intuitions, the bi-directional heuristic H3B calculates the impact of
a message sent at communication possibility k on recipient j as

max(E(rj |π) − E(rj |π, k), 0)

(4.3)

where π is the initial zero-communication policy and E(rj ) is j’s expected future reward.
In the uni-directional case, belief depends on the policy of the sender only. Here, belief
depends on the policies of both agents because interaction is bi-directional.
4.5.2 Using Bayesian networks to calculate beliefs
Now that we decided what beliefs a sender needs to calculate, we need to decide how
to calculate them. Basically, if agent i is assessing a communication possibility, i wants
to calculate j’s expected belief over j’s future reward. This calculation is complicated by
the fact that j’s belief over its rewards (collected at the leaves at time T ) depends on its
belief over transitions at time T − 1 which can be affected by the actions i did prior to
time T − 1. The latter can similarly depend on i’s previous transitions which depend on j’s
earlier actions. Clearly, bi-directional transition interactions make the calculation of belief
very complicated.
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One way around carrying these calculations ourselves is to formulate the calculation as
inference in a Bayesian Network (BN). By including random variables representing reward
in the BN, we can calculate the expectations in (4.3) as prior and posterior beliefs over
these variables.
The idea of building a BN from a given pair of policies was used by Jiang et. al [46]
who used the BN to formulated the problem of calculating the expected utility of a strategy
profile as an inference problem. The resulting network is called the induced BN. In our
case, the induced BN of a pair of policies < πi , πj > contains four kinds of nodes (in the
following, assume each action has m probabilistic outcomes):
• Action nodes: For each agent k, there is an action node representing doing that action
in a particular state. We do not, however, create nodes for actions done after the last
critical action, because these are not affected by another agent, so their expected
reward can just be folded into the reward nodes discussed below. For an agent k,
the parents of a node nsa associated with doing action a at state s are the previous
action node and its associated outcome node (unless s is k’s start state, in which case
the node has no parents in the BN). Each action node nsa has an associated binary
random variable that says whether the action is actually done, which will only be true
if outcomes of previous actions lead the agent to state s. The sum of probabilities
of all the nodes associated with action a being true is the probability that agent k
following policy πk takes action a at some point.
• Outcome nodes: Each action node nsa is the parent of an outcome node nso representing the probabilistic outcome of that action. The associated random variable has m
values. If action a is affected by another agent, nso will also have as parents all nodes
associated with the affecting action that are earlier than the current node.
• Reward nodes: To every leaf (action node-outcome node) pair in the BN, attach a
reward node whose parents are these 2 nodes only. The random variable of the reward
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node has m + 1 values. The first m values are the the future rewards of the agent
who owns the node for each of the m possible outcomes of the last critical action.
As mentioned above, given the outcome of the last critical action, these rewards are
independent of the other agent. The last value is 0, reflecting the fact that if the states
leading to this reward node are not reached, no reward should be collected.
• Complex reward nodes: for the k th reward interaction < (sk1 , ak1 ), ..(skn , akn ), rk >
in ρ in the EDI-CR definition of the problem, create a node representing the complex
reward for this interaction. The parents of the node are all action nodes associated
with actions ak1 ..akn . The node’s random variable has 2 values, rk and 0.
Note that a single BN is constructed for all agents, allowing the evidence provided by
one agent (in the form of a message) to affect posteriors over nodes belonging to another
agent. For 2 agents, the BN has 2 ‘root’ nodes, one for the action taken by each agent at its
start state. Figure 4.4 shows an example induced BN.
The way we construct our induced BN implies that the nodes have some kind of ‘memory’. The advantage of this is that it precludes having action and reward nodes depend on
every one of their ancestors, which would lead to very large conditional probability tables
(CPTs). The downside is that we have many nodes in the BN. However, because the BN is
for a given pair of policies, the number of nodes is still limited. In the experimental results
subsection (4.5.4), we investigate the time taken to do inference on the induced BN.
Now we turn to the issue of setting the CPTs for the nodes in the BN.
• Action nodes: The CPT of an action node nsa reflects the probability of taking action
a in state s according to the policy. Because there is always an optimal joint policy
that is deterministic, the CPT of an action node is deterministic. If s is the start state,
the node’s random variable is always True. Otherwise, the variable is only True if
the previous action’s variable is true and its outcome leads to state s.
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Figure 4.4. Induced Bayesian Network. Blue nodes belong to i and green ones to j.
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• Outcome nodes: The CPT of an outcome node depends on the agent’s local transition function and whether the action in question is affected by a transition interaction.
• Reward nodes: The CPT of a reward node is deterministic. If the parents of the
reward node are nsa and nso , the probability of the v th value of the associated random
variable, where v ≤ m, is 1 if nsa = T and nso = v. The probability of the last value
(which is 0) is 1 if nsa = F .
• Complex reward nodes: Again, the CPT here is deterministic. For the node representing the k th reward interaction, the probability of the associated random variable
taking on the value rk is 1 if the parent action nodes are all True. Otherwise, the
variable is 0 with probability 1.
Once the induced BN is constructed, we can calculate the impact of a communication
possibility. Suppose communication possibility k of agent i is associated with communicating after doing action a in state s and getting the v th outcome. The impact of k is
calculated by setting nsa = T and nso = v and using an inference engine to calculate the
posterior expected reward of j. For reward node nr , pact(nr ) is nr ’s parent action node
and poc(nr ) is its parent outcome node and r[v] is its v th reward value. Agent i calculates
agent j’s posterior expected reward given initial policy π and possibility k as the sum of
j’s individual rewards and a portion of the shared rewards from reward interactions.

E(rj |π, k) =

X

P (pact(nr )|π, k)

nr

+

1X
2

ncr

rew(ncr )

Y

m
X

P (poc(nr ) = v|pact(nr ), π, k) ∗ r[v]

v=1

(4.4)

P (pact(ncr )|π, k)

pact(ncr )

For a complex reward node ncr , rew(ncr ) is the extra reward/penalty associated with the
node and pact(ncr ) iterates over the parent action nodes, i.e. the actions involved in the
reward interaction represented by ncr .
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To calculate priors and posteriors, we used the inference engine in JavaBayes, a Bayesian
Networks package developed by Fabio Cozman [31].
4.5.3

Evaluating communication points in context

As in the uni-directional case, a communication possibility may be rendered useless by
the addition of another. In other words, communicating at the former gives the receiver
no new information beyond what conveyed by communication at the latter. However, because in the bi-directional case both agents can send messages, calculating the impact of a
communication possibility in the context of already-added ones is more complicated.
As before, a sender, for example agent i, needs to take into consideration the set of its
own earlier points chosen so far e = e+ ∪ e− . Additionally, it needs to consider communication points added so far that belong to the receiver j, again assuming that all previously
added points are actually used. The rationale is that when i is evaluating a point, i is trying
to measure how much j already knows, and taking into consideration where j can be in its
state space (as indicated by j’s earlier points) helps i refine its beliefs over j.
For the sender to evaluate communication point k in the context of e and the set of
points belonging to the receiver C, the sender partitions C into groups where points in each
group are on the same path (i.e. can all be encountered in a given run). If the set of groups
is G, we take the impact of a point k to be its maximum impact in the context of any group
g ∈ G:

maxg∈G E(rj |π, e+= T, e−= F, g = T, C \ g = F ) − E(rj |π, e+= T, e−= F, g = T, C \ g = F, k)

4.5.4 Experimental results
In this section, we give sample results of the heuristic for bi-directional interactions
given in Section 4.5. We compare H3B to a bi-directional (and slightly improved) version
of H2, which we call H2B. The improvement comes from performing the H2 scoring calcu111

(a) Case 1

(b) Case 1

(c) Case 2

(d) Case 2

(e) Case 3

(f) Case 3

Figure 4.5. Time vs. Quality (left column) and Size vs. Quality (right column) of H3B vs.
H2B
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(a) Case 4

(b) Case 4

(c) Case 5

(d) Case 5

(e) Case 6

(f) Case 6

Figure 4.6. Time vs. Quality (left column) and Size vs. Quality (right column) of H3B vs.
H2B (cont.)
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lations in the context of the initial no-communication policy; the probability that a critical
action starts at time t is calculated based on the initial policy rather than just the transition
function of the problem.
We use bi-directional scenarios from the Mars rovers domain (Section 2.2.1.3). We
present and discuss results of H3B and H2B on 5 sample cases that illustrate the different
ways these heuristics can behave. In our experiments, there are two issues that we want to
verify:
• H3B is better than H2B at picking communication points to add to the problem. As
a result, as H3B adds communication points, it achieves higher gains in solution
quality than H2B.
• The time taken by the inference process in H3B to calculate beliefs does not outweight the benefits. H2B is a far simpler heuristic whose scoring calculations take
almost 0 time. The question is whether the additional time taken by H3B is justified.
If the above hypotheses hold, H3B would result in steeper Time (or Size) vs. Quality
curves than H2B.
In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, each row shows results from a given test case. Quality is the
sum of the expected rewards of the agents under the optimal policy and Size is measured
in terms of the number of compound variables added in the MILP formulation of an instance (Section 3.3). We feel that this measure may be more reflective of the size of the
problem than the number of terminal histories that was used in our older results for the
uni-directional case.
Each of the 3 quantities Time, Quality and Size is reported as a fraction of the maximum value attained by this quantity using any heuristic and number of communication
points. It is important to note that the Time includes time taken by the heuristic to evaluate
communication points, so for H3B, it includes the time to construct the Bayesian Network
and run inference on it. Another thing to note about Time is that the values reported are the
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first times at which the solver found the solution it terminated with, not the time it took to
verify that the found solution is optimal. With bi-directional communication, problem size
grows much more significantly as we add communication points, making it impossible to
evaluate what full-fledged communication would result in and use that for normalization.
Successive points on the same curve are obtained by adding communication points,
one at a time. For scenarios where only 1 point is added, we just show a single data
point rather than a curve. In each figure, the Time, Quality and Size obtained without any
communication is labeled ‘0 pts’.
In all the figures, the steeper the curve, the better; for the same increase in Time or Size,
a heuristic with a steeper curve obtains more quality improvement than a heuristic with a
flatter curve.
Policies for the instances we used in our experiments were calculated by formulating
the problem as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) using the idea of binning as shown
in Chapter 3 and solving the MILP using IBM ILOG Cplex [2].
4.5.5 Discussion
For cases 1 and 2 (first two rows in Figure 4.5), only 1 communication point was needed
to get maximum quality. In both these cases, H3B decides to add only 1 point; all other
points evaluated in the context of this point have no impact on the other agent’s beliefs,
which strongly indicates that only this point is actually needed.
In case 1, we allowed H2B to add another point and got no improved quality. This
highlights that whereas H2B continues to give positive scores to successive communication
points, H3B knows when to stop adding points. Both heuristics added a point each that
resulted in maximum quality. Although they added different points, these points resulted
in instances with very similar sizes that were solved in very similar times.
In case 2, H3B adds a point that results in a slightly higher rewards than H2B, as well as
a smaller instance that is solved faster. Allowing H2B to add a second point (not shown in
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the graph) still does not lead it to choose the same point that H3B added, so H2B still does
not get the maximum quality. In fact, H2B does not get any quality improvement from this
second point.
In case 3, H3B does not realize that additional communication points are not useful. It
adds 3 points but obtains no improvement in quality beyond the first point. The question
now is: When is H3B more likely to realize that no more communication points are added?
In other words, when do additional points get zero score in the context of existing points?
Looking closely at H3B’s evaluations, we found that in cases 1 and 2, H3B added a point
after state {0=1} of the second agent, i.e., after it executes action 0 and gets outcome 1,
the agent has the option to communicate. In case 3, however, H3B adds a communication
point (call it P1 ) after state {6=0,1=1,2=1} of the second agent, i.e. after these 3 actions are
done and these outcomes are obtained. So the first point added in case 3 is late in the game.
When H3B is evaluating further points in the context of P1 , most of them are earlier than
P1 an therefore their impacts on the other agent’s beliefs are the same with and without P1 .
In contrast, in cases 1 and 2, most communication points are later than the first added point,
and are therefore unlikely to contribute much beyond what was communicated at the first
point. This results in these later points getting mostly zero scores and H3B deciding there
is no benefit in adding further points.
H3B currently does not retract points once they are added, and the above observation
does not suggest that H3B should retract P1 and add an earlier point instead. One important fact to keep in mind is that making communication available early results in a larger
increase in problem size than having a later communication point. Consider increasing the
branching factor right after the root of the decision tree rather than right before the leaves:
the latter will result in fewer states than the former.
The behavior of H2B in case 3 is also interesting. H2B starts by adding a communication point that is never used by the optimal policy, resulting in an increase in problem
size with no corresponding increase in solution quality. The second point added by H2B
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does increase quality, although not to the maximum. The third point causes no improvement beyond the second one. Adding a fourth point results in a much larger problem that
the MILP solver can find no optimal policy for within 300 seconds (which is 15x the time
required for H3B with 1 point). The reported quality is the quality obtained at that cutoff
time, which is no better than the no-communication policy, even though one of the added
points is actually used.
Case 3 therefore illustrates that in addition to resulting in larger problems that take
longer to solve, choosing the wrong communication points to add can actually have a negative impact on quality if so many points are added that the solver fails to find a good policy
for the resulting large problem.
In case 4, H2B chooses a better first point than H3B; the H3B point results in lower
quality than the H2B point. The size of the resulting problems is about the same, although
the time needed for the problem constructed by H3B is lower. The second point added
by H3B, however, is much more useful. It achieves the maximum quality that H2B can
only achieve after adding two more points. H3B decides no more points should be added.
Indeed, allowing H2B to add a fourth point (not shown) does not improve quality.
In case 5, H3B decides to add a point, which is indeed used in the optimal policy, but its
use causes an imperceptible improvement in reward. In this case, H3B decides that further
communication points are useless. H2B adds a first point (different from the one added by
H3B) which is never used. Allowing H2B to add another point results in a larger problem
for which again, the solver does not find a good solution, even though the second added
point is the same as the H3B point.
Case 5 illustrates a situation that we had to deal with frequently in running experiments:
communication does not always make a significant improvement in quality. We found it
rather hard to generate scenarios where communication makes a big difference, and where
multiple communication points are needed. We believe this is partially an artifact of our
random instance generator and the domain we use. It is possible that in a domain with
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non-unit action durations, we can have scenarios where an action that does not get enabled
takes longer to execute, possibly leaving insufficient time for remaining actions. In this
case, it may be more urgent to communicate if the enabling action is not done. Another
possible cause is that the time horizons we use are too short. Having bi-directional communication increases problem size, so we could not push the time horizons to the values
of the uni-directional instances used in Section 4.4. Shorter horizons prevent us from having significant long-term effects for an un-enabled action. Shorter horizons also mean less
uncertainty, again reducing the impact of communication.
To demonstrate that the particular rewards used make a big difference in the impact
of communication, we took the scenario from case 5 (where communication made almost
no difference in quality) and changed the rewards. We kept the problem structure intact,
in terms of interactions and action pre-requisites. The resulting scenario is shown in case
6. Adding a communication point now improves reward from 94% to 100%. As in most
previous cases, H3B decides not to add further points, and it takes H2B two communication
points to get close to full reward.

4.6

Summary

In this chapter, we addressed the problem of the explosion of problem size when we
try to reason about communication offline. We proposed the idea of restricting the points
where agents have the option to communicate and analyzed the effect of this restriction
on problem size, highlighting the significant reduction in size that can be obtained. We
presented three heuristics for strategically choosing the set of points where communication is available when interaction among agents is uni-directional. Experimental results
show that we can achieve a large fraction of the solution quality obtained from full-fledged
communication at a small fraction of the computational cost.
For the bi-directional case, we presented an extention to the uni-directional heuristics
that takes belief about reward into consideration and calculates belief estimates as inference
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in a Bayesian network. Again, we compared this heuristic to a simple heuristic which does
take the initial no-communication policy into consideration, but does not assess the impact
of communication on the other agent’s beliefs. As in the uni-directional case, our heuristics
obtains the benefit of communication (in scenarios where communication matters), at a
fraction of the problem size and computation time of the simpler heuristic.
We believe that our approach for limiting the computational cost of reasoning about
communication offline is an important step towards the goal of being able to reason about
domain and communication actions simultaneously. The particular scoring rules we gave
in this chapter are for the EDI-CR model, but similar scoring rules that assess the impact
of a communication point can be crafted for other models using their particular interaction structures. Applying the idea of introducing limited communication possibilities to
improve coordination in a model with structured interactions (e.g. DPCL [87]) can be an
interesting area of future work.
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CHAPTER 5
COMMUNICATION AMONG SELFISH AGENTS

In this chapter, we present work that we did prior to the idea of structured interaction.
This work still fits in the larger picture of the thesis in that like all the previous chapters, it
is concerned with multi-agent sequential decision-making, but with self-interested agents.
We study the problem of multiple self-interested agents deciding whether to communicate information when doing so is necessary to accomplish a collective task, but incurs
individual costs. As an example of such settings, we present the view maintenance problem
with self-interested database managers (Section 5.1) . In this problem, database managers
need to disclose information to keep a database view updated (and thus collect rewards),
but they incur individual costs for disclosing information.
We give a brief background about games of incomplete information and their solutions
in Section 5.2. We then formulate the view maintenance problem as a game of incomplete
information in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents our general anytime algorithm for solving
games of incomplete information. When used to solve games derived from instances of the
view maintenance problem, the algorithm tells each selfish agent what to communicate, and
when, in order to maximize its net reward (profit associated with problem solving, minus
communication costs) with respect to the strategies of other agents.
Our algorithm has three novel features: it collapses the game tree as a pre-processing
step, resulting in more tractable trees; it generates local measures that guide the search
by indicating which parts of a strategy profile are least stable; and it proposes a global
measure of the stability of a profile as a whole by calculating upper bounds on players’
regrets when playing this profile. To do the search, our algorithm uses hill-climbing to
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find strategy profiles with lower regrets and thus higher stability (an equilibrium profiles
has zero regret). Section 5.5 gives experimental results on both random game trees and
game trees derived from the view maintenance problem. We compare our algorithm to the
Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE) algorithm [86] that is part of the software package
Gambit [57]. Our algorithm can reduce the level of regret to 5% faster, and on a larger
fraction of test cases, than QRE.

5.1

The View Maintenance Problem

A database view is a dynamic, virtual table composed of the result set of a query executed over one or more data sources. The view maintenance problem [20, 25, 28, 40, 54]
concerns how a view is refreshed when its underlying data sources are updated. This problem has been studied in settings where view refreshing is expensive due to factors like the
communication cost of transferring large amounts of data.
We study the view maintenance problem when self-interested database managers from
different institutions are involved [63]. Ideally, whenever any of the underlying data sources
is modified, the change will be reflected in the view. However, because the database managers operate on behalf of different self-interested institutions, privacy is a concern, so a
database manager may not always be willing to disclose information about changes made
it its database. However, some level of cooperation among the managers is needed to ensure the view is somewhat maintained. Each piece of information has an associated cost
incurred by the manager disclosing it and a reward distributed equally among all managers.
The reward depends on the disclosed information as well as previously disclosed information, creating a reward interaction among the different database managers. A database
manager has to decide how much it contributes to refreshing the view, and consequently
how much privacy loss it suffers. Because a manager’s final payoff also depends on the
actions of other managers, each manager needs to reason about the nature and number of
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updates at other databases, what they can reveal in the future and the probability of their
revealing it.
In our setting, the database managers (DBMs) disclose some information about their
database updates in order to provide the view holder (VH) with a more up-to-date view.
In return, VH gives the coalition of DBMs a reward that depends on how much information about their updates they disclosed and how much is still hidden. The reward is
divided equally among the DBMs; VH does not care about the individual contributions of
the DBMs.
The updates made to the base relations are processed in batches; the process of refreshing the view happens at intervals rather than continuously as updates are made. These
intervals can be fixed in length or can depend on the number of updates made. At the end of
an interval, the updates made since the last refresh make up the input to the refresh process.
We assume that the VH gives the DBMs T time steps to (partially) update the view. There
are therefore T decision points for each DBM.
An episode of the view maintenance problem starts with each manager having a set of
changes (insertions, modifications and deletions) known only to itself. The managers are
given a fixed number of stages where at each stage, each manager decides what kind of
change to disclose, if anything.

5.2

Games Of Incomplete Information

In this section, we give some background material on a class of games called games of
incomplete information. We also discuss a characterization of a strategy as a point in space
and what an approximate equilibrium means.
5.2.1 Background
Games of incomplete information are used to model situations where each player has
private information, his type, that affects his own payoffs but is unknown to the other play-
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ers. However, the prior probability distribution over agents’ types is common knowledge.
Such game of incomplete information, where an agent is missing some information about
one or more aspects of the other agents, is transformed to a game of imperfect information
where the the agent knows some probability distribution over the missing information, but
does not have perfect knowledge of what it is exactly [42]. This transformation is effected
by adding random moves of Nature assigning a type for each player according to the prior
distribution. The rules of the game may stipulate that certain actions by other players are
not observable by this player. As a result, a player may not be able to distinguish among a
set of nodes in the game tree if all these nodes have the same observable history from this
player’s perspective. An information set is a set of nodes (members of the information set)
indistinguishable to a player. Consequently, a player makes its decision as a function of the
information set, rather than the particular node, it is at.
In incomplete information games, the first n levels of the game tree represent chance
nodes where at level i, Nature assigns player i’s type with probability specified by the
commonly known probability distribution over i’s type space. A strategy σ for player i
is a complete plan covering all possible contingencies for every possible type. For each
information set h ∈ Hi , a behavior strategy is σi (h) ∈ ∆(Ai (h)) where ∆(Ai (h)) is the
set of all probability distributions over actions available at information set h.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of a game with incomplete information Γ corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the normal form game derived from Γ. BNE is defined as
a strategy profile and beliefs specified for each player about the types of the other players.
Each player maximizes its expected payoff given its beliefs about the other players’ types
and the strategies they play. Note that in this solution concept, players do not update their
beliefs about each other as the game progresses.
For sequential games, BNE suffers from the same problems in imperfect information
settings as Nash equilibrium in perfect information settings. When using BNE or NE, the
players may reach an unrealistic equilibrium that does not make sense. The reason is a
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phenomenon known as incredible threats where a player i tries to avoid a threat made by
another player j but the threat is implausible in that j would not carry out the threat if it is
playing rationally.
To remedy the incredible threats problem of NEs and BNEs, we need to ensure that
players make a rational decision even at nodes off the equilibrium path. In other words,
players should play rationally in every subgame; a part of the game tree that does not cut
across any information set. In games of complete information, every node is the root of a
subgame and this equilibrium refinement is called subgame perfect equilibrium. In games
of incomplete information, however, a game generally has only one subgame, which is the
game itself. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a refinement that specifies a belief-strategy
pair that satisfies the following condition: the beliefs are consistent with the strategy and
the strategy is rational given the beliefs. Equilibrium refinements are beyond the scope of
this thesis.
5.2.2 A strategy as a point in multi-dimensional space
As mentioned earlier, at each h ∈ Hi , σ specifies a probability distribution over actions available at information set h. It is therefore straightforward to think of a strategy profile as a point in multi-dimensional space. The dimensionality of the space is
Pn P
i=1
h∈Hi (|Ai (h)| − 1), where each dimension extends from 0 to 1. For each player
i, and each of his information sets h, there is a dimension for each action available to i at
h, except the last action which is assigned the probability left over from the other actions.
Because probabilities of actions at an information set must add up to 1, not all points in
the space correspond to valid strategy profiles. The search for a BNE is a search in this
multi-dimensional space for a point that satisfies the equilibrium condition: given the other
player’s part of the profile represented by the point, no player would like to deviate from
its strategy.
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5.2.3 Approximate equilibria
A point in the above multi-dimensional space is a BNE if it satisfies certain constraints
which guarantee that at each information set of each player, the player’s strategy is rational.
In other words, if there is a single action with maximum expected value, that action is
played with probability 1. If there are several such actions, the probability mass is divided
among them such that the same rationality holds for the other player. Thus no player
is tempted to deviate from the prescribed strategy. Stated more formally, the following
condition should hold at each information set h:
X

σi (h, a) ∗ E(Payoffi (a)) = maxa (E(Payoffi (a)))

(5.1)

a∈Ai (h)

where σi (h, a) is the probability that strategy σ assigns to taking action a at h and E is the
expected value, to player i, of taking action a. This expected value is calculated in terms of
the payoffs of the leaf nodes that i can end up in when taking action a and the probabilities
of actions along the branches from the root to these leaves passing through a.
Now, consider a situation where some of these constraints are violated. For example, at
an information set h, the above equation does not hold; the right-hand side is greater than
the left-hand side by 0.5. This means that, holding the other player’s strategy fixed, this
player gains 0.5 if he switches to the action that maximizes the right-hand side. We refer to
the amount by which a constraint c is violated as δc , known in the literature as regret.
A search for an exact equilibrium corresponds to a Constraint Satisfaction Problem. The
search for an approximate equilibrium where some δs are non-zero can be thought of as a
Constraint Optimization Problem (COP). In both cases, the variables are the probabilities
assigned to actions by strategies and the constraints are as described above. In this work,
we try to find an approximate equilibrium by solving a COP.
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5.3

View Maintenance As A Game

In this section we detail how the view maintenance problem is formulated as a sequential game of incomplete information. We start by presenting the abstraction we will be
using, then give a formal definition of the view maintenance game.
5.3.1 Problem abstraction
Consider 2 base relations; Authors and Books with DBMs DBMA and DBMB . Consider a view whose query is "SELECT Title, Author FROM Books, Authors
WHERE Books.Pages > 600 AND Authors.City = Manhattan" displaying
the titles of all books with more than 600 pages whose authors live in Manhattan. Denoting
j
insertion by i and deletion by d, the elements of the vector vall
=< ijall , djall > represent the

number of i and d updates made to relation Rj since the last maintenance process. While
j
j
vall
shows the counts of all the changes made, vpr
=< ijpr , djpr > shows counts for only

those tuples that are judged by DBMj to be potentially relevant (PR) to the view, i.e. tuples
that meet the selection filter specified by the view query for Rj . In our example, a tuple in
the books relation is potentially relevant if the book has more than 600 pages. Depending
on whether the tuple(s) from other relation(s) that a tuple joins with (which we henceforth
refer to as complementary tuples) meet their respective filters, the update may or may not
actually be relevant to the view.
j
We believe elements of the vector vpr
represent strategic information that DBMj would

not like to reveal. The importance of this information is if DBMj has many PR tuples, it
may want to withhold this fact and wait for some DBMi to disclose tuples rather than
go ahead and disclose tuples itself. In this case, DBMi , not knowing exactly how many
PR tuples DBMj has, may worry that not enough reward is being accumulated and thus
choose to disclose its own tuples. This situation is clearly to DBMj ’s advantage.
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5.3.2 The view maintenance game
Our view maintenance problem can be formulated as a sequential game of incomplete
information. Let n be the number of relations and assume each DBM is responsible for
exactly 1 relation. Let c ∈ {i, d} denote a change made to a relation, which can be insertion
or deletion. Let pkc be the probability that a relation has k changes of type c ∈ {i, d}. For
simplicity, we assume this probability is independent of the particular relation in question.
The view maintenance game therefore has the following components 1 :
• I = {DBM1 , ..., DBMn }
• Aj (h) is the set of pieces of information that player j possesses but has not revealed
on the path from the root to members of the information set h
j
j
j
• The type space of player j is Tj = {vpr
| 0 ≤ vpr
[c] ≤ vall
[c] ∀c ∈ {i, d}}; each

type corresponds to a pair of possible counts of PR tuples for the 2 kinds of change.
If there are m tuples as a whole affected by a given kind of change, the number
of PR tuples is anywhere in [0,m]. The size of the type space is therefore |T | =
j
Πc∈{i,d} (vall
[c] + 1) 2

• The transition probability of the chance move assigning player j’s type is p ∈ ∆(Tj )
where ∆(Tj ) is the set of all probability distributions over Tj . Assuming the numbers
v j [c]

j
of i and d changes are independent, the probability of a type is p(vpr
) = Πc∈{i,d} pc pr

• The payoff u(z) at a terminal node z is determined by the sequence of actions taken
on the path from the root to z. We need to specify, for each action, the cost to the
1

We assume that moves are sequential rather than simultaneous; a player taking an action can observe all
earlier actions.
2

i
To see how vpr
affects the reward function, we follow the argument in [64] whereby information affecting
the set of actions available to a player can be thought of as affecting the player’s reward function. We can think
of all the actions being available all the time, with the resulting payoffs depending on the private information.

127

player disclosing the information and the common reward that all players get when
this information is disclosed
• T specifies the number of stages in the game
j
We assume that initially, each DBMj discloses its vall
. Alternatively, this informa-

tion can be obtained from statistics about how many changes of each type are made to
j
the database, on average. The probability of a given vpr
can be estimated from historical

statistics.
As for the reward, we base the reward for a piece of information on 3 factors: 1) the type
of change (i or d); 2) the base relation affected by the change and 3) whether the information
represents a main tuple or the complementary of an already disclosed tuple. The rationale
is that user preferences can be such that one type of change is more important than the other
and some relations need to be more up-to-date than others. The third factor allows the VH
to express different preferences for knowing different kinds of information. As in the case
of rewards, disclosing different pieces of information incurs different amounts of privacy,
communication and other kinds of costs. The incurred cost can also depend on what has
been revealed so far (e.g. privacy costs can be sub- or super-additive).

5.4 Anytime Algorithm for Computing Approximate BNE
The algorithm we propose operates on the tree of an Extensive Form Game. For example, it can operate on the game tree representing an instance of the view maintenance
problem. The algorithm first collapses the game tree by making “obvious” decisions and
backing up values wherever possible. This backing up eliminates parts of the tree that will
obviously never be reached, resulting in a collapsed tree of smaller size. The algorithm
then tries to satisfy constraints derived from the collapsed game tree (of the form given in
Equation 5.1) as much as possible in a hill-climbing manner. It generates a initial random
strategy profile and iteratively improves it until either the profile becomes “stable”, or no
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further improvement is possible. In the latter case, the profile is randomly perturbed and
the process repeats. We discuss a range of stability measures that we can use in assessing a
profile. The following paragraphs elaborate on these steps.
5.4.1 Collapsing the game tree
Our experiments in building game trees from instances of the view maintenance problem show that the size of the raw game tree (the tree before any collapsing) tends to be
very large. Examining raw trees shows that there are some nodes at which decision making
is not complicated by the incompleteness of information. These are nodes where a player
would choose to reveal the same piece of information regardless of the type of the other
player. We therefore collapse the raw tree using the following simple algorithm. Initially,
all nodes are assumed to be roots of collapsible subtrees. We work from the leaves of the
tree upward, determining which nodes are indeed roots of collapsible subtrees. For each
such node, we collapse its subtree using simple backups, excising the collapsed subtree.
The node becomes a terminal node whose payoffs reflect backed up values. Algorithm
5.4.1 shows how this is done.
for all level such that 0 ≤ level ≤ 2T do
collapsible[level] = non-terminal nodes at depth level
end for
for all level such that 0 ≤ level ≤ 2T do
for all node in collapsible[level] do
i = Player(node)
if best action is the same across h(node) ∨ (|h(node)| == 1) ∨ (|Ai (h(node))|==1)
then
children = node.children
node.payoffi = maxc∈children c.payoffi
delete node.children
else
remove all ancestors of node from their respective collapsible[level] arrays
end if
end for
end for
Algorithm 1: Simple algorithm for collapsing trees
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The algorithm starts by assuming all nodes are collapsible. For each node, it checks
if at least one of three conditions holds: 1) incompleteness of information does not affect
the player’s decision, so the best action is the same regardless of which particular node the
player is at; 2) h(node), the node’s information set, contains only this node, so the best
action is just chosen; 3) a node belongs to an information set with a single available action.
Figure 5.1 shows these three situations. Action nodes are in circles enclosing the index
of the acting player. Terminal nodes are shown in black circles with a pair of numbers
specifying the associated payoff for each player. A dotted box encloses nodes in the same
information set. Because we work from the leaves upward, a node eligible for collapsing
always has terminal children. This simple collapsing algorithm is very effective for game
trees derived from the view maintenance problem. In Section 5.5.1, we give supporting
experimental results and discuss why collapsing is effective.
5.4.2

Iteratively improving a point

To iteratively improve a point (strategy profile), the following 3 issues need to be addressed:
1. Which component(s) of the point should we improve? Should we focus on improving
individual constraints or the profile as a whole?
2. How should we explore the space? How do we generate neighboring points to which
we can move?
3. How do we assess a point? What measure of a point indicates the algorithm is moving
in the right direction in the multi-dimensional space?
What should we improve?

As mentioned in earlier, an equilibrium point/profile must

satisfy certain constraints. Improving individual constraints or the profile as a whole
amounts to making local or global changes to a profile, respectively. A local change tries
to improve a constraint associated with some information set h ∈ Hi to reduce the regret of
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Figure 5.1. Collapsible subtrees: (a) action b is the best across the information set (b)
singleton information set (c) single available action
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player i at h. A global change completely overhauls one or both players’ strategies to get to
a more “stable” point; one at which the players’ motivations to deviate is lower. Owing to
the complexity of overhauling a profile, we improve individual constraints with the hope of
effecting a global improvement through local changes. Because it is not easy to determine
which local changes produce the largest global improvement, we use the local regret, δ,
as a heuristic to decide which parts of a strategy profile are more important to improve.
Constraints with high δs are associated with information sets with high regrets.We greedily
attempt to improve first. Empirical observations indicate that this heuristic is indeed useful;
improving constraints with high δs results in more stable points. We quantify the notion of
stability later in the text.
Generating potential next points

For each variable (action probability) v involved in

the constraint c with the maximum δc , we calculate the required change in v to bring δc
down to 0, assuming all other variables are unchanged. We assess the impact of changing
v on the δs of other constraints by evaluating the partial derivatives of affected constraints
w.r.t. v. If changing v results in a point with greater than or equal stability than the current
point, the new point is added to the list of Potential Next Points (PNPs).
The approach described above is one of two ways of decreasing a given δc . Instead
of changing the probabilities of actions involved in c as done above, we can switch the
player’s preference for two actions a and b by switching their probabilities. We generate
points from such reversals and, as with the first approach, we assess the broader impact of
the change and decide whether to admit the points to PNP.
Assessing a point

Now that we have a set of PNPs, we need to move to the most sta-

ble PNP. Even though δs determine which part of the profile to improve first, these local
measures do not provide good basis for comparing the stability of different points. The
problem is that each δ specifies the additional reward a player gets if it deviates at a single
information set. This says nothing about the player’s potential gains if it deviates at multi-
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ple information sets, nor about the change in the regret of the other agent resulting from the
deviation. We therefore need a global measure that specifies a player’s overall motivation
to deviate from (or completely overhaul) its strategy.
Following the notion of ²-BNE, we consider a profile stable if no player stands to make
more than ²% more reward by changing its prescribed strategy. We define a global measure
called Maximum Overall Motivation (MOM) to deviate. MOM(σ) is the maximum, over all
players, upper bound on motivation to deviate from σ, assuming strategies of other players
are held constant. MOM is therefore an upper bound on ². The lower the MOM, the more
stable σ is. Approximating an equilibrium this way makes sense because practically, a
player will not want to take on the difficult task of calculating its best response strategy if
it knows that it stands to increase its payoff by no more than ²%.
We propose a simple way of calculating MOM. To calculate the upper bound on the
motivation of player i under the strategy profile σ, we build a modified game Γrevealed from
the original game Γ. Γrevealed is a single-player perfect information game where i plays
with Nature. We construct it as follows. Each node n ∈ h where h ∈ Hj6=i is changed
to a chance node where the probability of Nature playing action a is σj (h, a). In addition,
the information sets in the original game tree are revealed, i.e. i is granted full access to
the history of play including the moves of Nature that determined players’ types, thereby
removing i’s uncertainty about where it is within a given information set. Γrevealed , being a
perfect information game, can be solved by doing simple backups. i’s payoff in Γrevealed is
an upper bound on the payoff of its best response strategy in Γ, since i can do no better than
having perfect information. Because of the simplicity of doing backups, we can quickly
evaluate MOMs for a large number of PNPs.
To summarize, we use a local measure (δ) to generate PNPs and a global measure
(MOM) to assess and compare points. The global measure indicates how stable a point is,
but does not give indication of how it should be improved. The local measure indicates
where it may be effective to try to improve.
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A range of approximations: Examining the MOM landscape in some of the experiments we conducted showed that sometimes the upper bound provided by MOM is very
loose; e.g., the MOM landscape is everywhere higher than 20%. The reason is that Γrevealed
is too easy compared to Γ. We can obtain a tighter upper bound if we calculate payoffs in
a game that is harder than Γrevealed but still easier than Γ. In fact, there is a whole spectrum
of such games with varying levels of difficulty. At one end of the spectrum is Γrevealed
where all information sets are disclosed. These games are very easy to solve but provide
very loose upper bounds. At the other end is Γ where no information sets are disclosed.
To illustrate the kind of bound we get from a slightly harder game than Γrevealed , consider the game ΓLI which differs from Γrevealed only in that all information sets except the
highest-level sets are revealed. Clearly, the payoff in this game is at least as high as that obtained in Γ but no higher than in Γrevealed . Solving this game is still easy; do regular backups
from the bottom of the game tree upwards, and, on reaching the highest-level information
sets, choose the action that maximizes reward in expectation over the turn player’s beliefs
about where it is within this information set. We call the maximum motivation to deviate
from σ in this game MOM-LessInformation(MOM-LI).
To illustrate the different possible payoffs with an example, Table 5.1 shows the payoffs
achieved by player i’s different strategies when its opponent plays its part of the strategy
profile σ in different variants of an example game. Payoff(σ) is i’s payoff from playing σi
in the original game Γ. PBR is i’s payoff from its best response to σj in Γ. It is not easy
to compute and requires calculating i’s payoff in a transformed game where j’s nodes are
changed to chance nodes with action probabilities as dictated by σj . PPI is i’s payoff from
its best response to σj in the easy perfect information game Γrevealed . PLI is i’s payoff from
its best response to σj in the slightly harder game ΓLI with less-than-perfect information.
Since P ayof f (σ) ≤ P BR ≤ P LI ≤ P P I, the overall motivations calculated using P LI
and P P I (MOM-LI and MOM, respectively) are upper bounds on a player’s actual regret.

134

Table 5.1. Calculating MOM With Different Amounts of Information
Quantity
Payoff(σ)
Payoff of B.R.in Γ (PBR) (unknown)
Payoff in Γrevealed (PPI)
Payoff in ΓLI (PLI)
Overall Motivation
(PPI-Payoff(σ))/PPI * 100%
MOM
Overall Motivation LessInfo
(PLI-Payoff(σ))/PLI * 100%
MOM-LI

Player 1
8.97
10.39
12
11
25.25%

Player 2
7.88
8.48
9.09
9
15.26%

25.25%
18.45%
12.4%
18.45%

In Table 5.1, we get a much tighter bound on regret when using P LI rather than P P I
(18.45% vs 25.25%) at the cost of a slightly more involved computation.

5.5

Experimental Results

In this section, we present results of our efforts to solve games of incomplete information, whether they are general games or games derived from instances of the view
maintenance problem introduced in Chapter 5.1. We start by analyzing the efficacy of
our pre-processing step which tries to losslessly collapse the game tree. We then compare
the performance of our anytime hill-climbing algorithm to that of the Quantal Response
Equilibria (QRE) algorithm [86].
5.5.1 The effect of collapsing
The first set of experiments we conducted investigates the efficacy of our collapsing
algorithm for trees from random instances of the view maintenance problem (henceforth
called VM trees) as well as general trees. Table 5.2 shows the result of collapsing VM
trees. Both players have the same type space (vall ). Unless indicated otherwise in brackets,
we generated 10 random instances per configuration, for a total of 65 instances. As can be
seen, the size of the collapsed tree is roughly an order of magnitude smaller than the raw
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Table 5.2. Collapsing VM trees
T

2

3

vall
< 1, 1 >
< 1, 2 >
< 2, 1 >
< 2, 2 >
< 1, 1 >
< 2, 1 >
< 3, 1 >(5)

Raw
Size
716
2253
2253
6847
3608
15423
36232

Avg %
Reduction
84.3
89.5
88.8
84.7
91.2
88.9
92.9

tree. This pre-processing step is therefore very useful for providing our anytime algorithm
with tractable input.
To see how much general game trees collapse, we generated trees where both players
have the same number of types and the same number of actions is available at each information set. We generated 10 random trees for each configuration < T ,numTypes,numActions>
where 1 ≤ T ≤ 4 and both numT ypes and numActions are 2 or 3. Payoffs were generated randomly in the range [0,15]. Table 5.3 shows the raw tree size and average percentage
reduction for these configurations. N/A entries were too large to generate. Collapsing general trees yields a reduction in the number of nodes in a tree that ranges from 4 to 27%.
Clearly, trees derived from the view maintenance problem are much more susceptible
to collapsing. To understand why this is the case, we need to remember the source of
uncertainty faced by a player in a VM tree. With imperfect information about player j’s
type, player i is uncertain about the number and nature of tuples yet undisclosed by j.
However, there is no uncertainty regarding the payoffs of actions. This results in the lowest
level of the tree always collapsing, making it more likely that levels higher up in the tree
collapse as well (a node is eligible for collapsing only if its children are terminals).
5.5.2 Performance of the search algorithm
We compared our anytime algorithm to the Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE) algorithm [86] as implemented in Gambit [57]. QRE has the advantage of being an anytime
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Table 5.3. Collapsing general trees with 2 (top) and 3 (bottom) types per player
T
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4

#Actions=2
Raw
Avg %
Size Reduction
34
23.5
130
25.5
514
27.3
2050
24.9
70
11.1
286
11.7
1150
13.5
4606
12.6

#Actions=3
Raw
Avg %
Size Reduction
58
15.5
490
21.9
4378
22.3
N/A
N/A
124
4.4
1096
7.5
9844
7.9
N/A
N/A

algorithm, so we can calculate regret values for its intermediate results and compare them
to intermediate results from our algorithm.
We ran the two algorithms (anytime search and QRE), on 2 tree types (VM and general
trees) using MOM and MOM-LI for a total of 8 sets of experiments. In all our results, we
are interested in the average time, in seconds, needed to reduce regret (MOM or MOM-LI)
to 5%. We bin results by tree size and show the percentage of trees in each size bin for
which the algorithm could reach the desired regret within the indicated time range. Note
that the reported tree size is the size of the collapsed, rather than the original, tree. We
omit from our tables time or size bins that were found to be empty. Because results using
MOM-LI are always better than using MOM, we only present the former.
Table 5.4 compares the percentage of VM trees in a given size range that were solved
within the indicated time by our algorithm and QRE when using MOM-LI. We randomly
generated costs and rewards, which sometimes result in a tree that collapses to an empty
game. This happens if, for example, it is always lucrative to disclose all information regardless of any uncertainty. Out of the 65 VM trees reported in Table 5.2, 52 collapse to
non-empty games. For each of these 52 trees, we ran our search algorithm 3 times starting
from different random points. As can be seen in Table 5.4, for most of the trees in any given
tree size bin, our algorithm reaches the required level of regret within 100 seconds. Our
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Table 5.4. Percentage of VM trees solved by our algorithm (top) vs. QRE (bottom)
Tree
Size
0-200
200-400
400-1000
1000-2000

≤ 20
sec
100
88.9
96.1
94.1
66.7
50
28.5

21-100
sec

101-500
sec

> 1000
sec
11.1

3.9
5.9
20.8
25
47.6

8.3
12.5
14.3
14.3
48.1
22.2

44.4

2000-3600

501-1000
sec

4.8
28.6
3.7

4.2
12.5
4.8
57.1
3.7
77.8

Table 5.5. Percentage of general trees solved by our algorithm (top) vs. QRE (bottom)
Tree
Size
0-200
200-400
400-600

≤ 20
sec
96.2
97.1
85.3
40
44.4

800-1100

21-100
sec
2.9

101-500
sec

12
56
55.6
100
20

2.7

501-1000
sec

> 1400
sec
0.9
2.9
4

40
80

20
10

20
10

anytime search algorithm performs better than QRE on smaller trees and much better than
it on larger trees. QRE fails to finish within the allocated time on a much higher fraction of
larger trees than our algorithm.
Table 5.5 compares the performance of our algorithm on general trees to QRE. We
generated 73 random trees, none of which collapsed to an empty tree Again, on each tree
we ran our search algorithm 3 times starting from different random points. General trees
proved to be more challenging than VM trees. Our algorithm performs better than QRE on
smaller trees and is comparable to it on larger ones.
Some remarks about our results are in order. First, it should be noted that there are
many possibilities for fine-tuning the search algorithm (e.g. random restarts and changing
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the magnitudes of random perturbations as the search proceeds), but we leave this for future
work. Second, it is important to remember that a strategy profile provides players with a
plan of action for every type with non-zero probability in the game definition. Therefore
we only need to run the search algorithm when the players’ type spaces, or the probability
distributions over them, change. In the view maintenance problem, database managers
can continue using a strategy as long as the number of potentially relevant tuples and the
probability distributions over them are unchanged. So the time taken to calculate a strategy
profile is amortized over all the view maintenance episodes for which the profile is valid.

5.6

Summary

In this chapter, we studied communication among self-interested decision makers whose
goal is to maximize their individual payoffs. As an example of such settings, we presented
the view maintenance problem with self-interested database managers. We formulated
this problem as a game of incomplete information and presented a general anytime hillclimbing algorithm for solving this class of games, i.e. for finding (approximate) equilibrium profiles. To aid the hill-climbing search, we developed local and global profile
stability measures.
We experimentally investigated two aspects of our work. First, we verified the effectiveness of a pre-processing step that we developed to losslessly collapse game trees whenever
possible. This step proved very effective when applied to games derived from the view
maintenance problem, and somewhat effective on general trees. Second, we compared the
time taken by our algorithm to reduce regret (and thus increase stability) compared to an
existing algorithm. Our algorithm reduces regret to 5% faster, and on a larger fraction of
test cases, than the Quantal Response Equilibria algorithm in Gambit.
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CHAPTER 6
GAME-THEORETIC MODELS AND OPTIMIZATION

In previous chapters, we were concerned with structured interaction among cooperative agents. Now we turn our attention to self-interested agents whose goal is to maximize
their individual rewards, rather than team rewards. Interaction among self-interested agents
takes place in the context of a game. Our model Event-Driven Interactions with Complex
Rewards (EDI-CR) can be used to represent loosely coupled stochastic games, which have
the same characteristics as their cooperative counterpart in Section 2.2.2. As in the cooperative case, generically representing this kind of games in extensive form without regard to
their special structure results in very large problems.
In this chapter, we discuss the use of optimization techniques to find equilibrium policies for our class of games. We give a brief background on games and equilibria in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2 we re-state an existing formulation of finding an equilibrium profile
as a bilinear program and compare this approach to representing our games in extensive
form and solving them using a game-theoretic software package. We provide analytical
and experimental results to show the representational and computational savings we obtain
compared to extensive form in settings with different amounts of interaction. Noting that
self-interest does not preclude communication, we use communication to vary the amount
of interaction among agents. So to create settings with different amounts of interaction, we
experiment with different communication schemes.
In Section 6.3, we discuss a different approach where finding an equilibrium is formulated as a problem of solving a system of non-linear equations. The system of equations can
be solved using continuation methods which are discussed in this section, with references
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to related work. Although this work is in its early stages, the resulting formulation has the
advantage of allowing for more than two agents.

6.1

Background

The field of game theory focuses on situations where self-interested players make decisions that affect each other and/or affect a common environment. Each agent tries to
respond to the decision-making strategies of the others in a way that maximizes his own
reward.
Games can be categorized along several axes. Perfect recall (vs. imperfect recall)
games involve players who never forget actions, whether theirs or others’, once they observe them. In games of incomplete information (vs. perfect information), a player does not
know what moves have already been played by other players, resulting in uncertainty about
the current state of the world and multiple game situations being indistinguishable to that
player. Games can also be classified by the number of stages (decision-making points) they
contain; 1-stage games involve only one stage of decision making. A sequential stochastic
game describes a situation where agents interact over a number of stages. Each stage begins
with the game at some state. Agents take actions simultaneously and, in general, receive
rewards based on the actions taken by all agents and the particular state the game was in.
The game then probabilistically transitions to a new state based on the previous state and
joint actions. In a general game, the agents are tightly coupled; each action of each agent
affects the rewards and next games of all others.
A strategy profile is a set of strategies σ = (σ1 , ..., σn ), one per player. σ−i denotes the
set of strategies of all players except i. The goal in competitive settings is typically to find
an equilibrium strategy profile from which no player has motivation to deviate. In games of
perfect information, the Nash equilibrium is a commonly used solution concept. A strategy
profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if, for every player i, ui (σi , σ−i ) ≥ ui (σi0 , σ−i ) for all σi0 ,
where ui is i’s utility.
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6.2

EDI-CR With Varying Communication As A Bilinear Program

In this section, we review an existing formulation of a stochastic game as a bilinear
program (BLP) derived by Petrik and Zilberstein [69]. We then introduce varying levels of
communication and investigate the effect this has on the representational and computational
savings obtained using EDI-CR and BLP versus representing and solving the problem as
an extensive form game (EFG, see Section 2.1.2).
The formulation of extensive form games as BLP is as follows:

Maximize xTi ri + xTi (Ci + Cj )xj + xTj rj − λTi bi − λTj bj
subject to

Ai xi = bi Aj xj = bj
ri + Ci xj − ATi λi ≤ 0

(6.1)

rj + xTi Cj − ATj λj ≤ 0
xi , x j ≥ 0
As in Chapter 3, agents’ policies are represented using sequence form [50]. xi and xj
are vectors of realization weights of agent i and j’s action sequences, respectively. ri (resp.
rj ) is a vector representing the individual rewards of agent i (resp. j); those rewards that
do not depend on what the other agent does. Ci and Cj represent rewards of i and j whose
attainment depends on what both agents did. Ai , Aj , bi and bj form the policy constraints.
λi and λj are the variables of each agent’s dual optimization problem. Their presence in
the objective function reflects our interest, not in a solution that maximizes the sum of
rewards, but in one that is an equilibrium. The above bilinear program is solved using the
Multi-agent Planning Bilinear Program algorithm [69] to find a Nash equilibrium.
We believe the idea of binning can be used to linearize the above bilinear program, as
we did in the cooperative case in Section 3.3. The first part of the objective function in
(6.1) is the same as in the cooperative case, and can be linearized in the same way. An
advantage of our binning technique for linearization is that it saves us from dealing with
the large reward matrices by representing only distinct entries in these matrices. But in
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(6.1), unlike in the cooperative case, the reward matrices also appear in the constraints. We
need to find a way to collapse them in the constraints. We leave the details of using binning
in the self-interested case for future work.
6.2.1 Analytical and experimental setup
We now investigate how the degree of coupling affects the relative savings of using EFG
and EDI-CR. One simple way to change the degree of coupling is by introducing different
amounts of communication among agents. Communication is a special kind of transition
interaction; sending a message makes the recipient transition to a state where the message
is observed, thereby affecting its transition probability. As such, communication can be
handled by any solution method used in the no-communication case.
We present experimental results from 8 instances of a self-interested variant of the Mars
rovers domain (Section 2.2.1.3) where the rovers belong to different countries and each
one has its own reward function. As in the cooperative case, a rover’s action can affect the
reward and/or transition of another rover. Although self-interested, a rover can benefit from
communicating its progress to another rover. For example, consider 2 rovers i and j where
i’s visiting site 1 accomplishes some initial work that makes it useful for j to visit site 2,
which would otherwise not be worthwhile. Suppose that j can only visit site 3 after visiting
site 2, and that j’s visit to site 3 also sets the stage for i’s visit to site 4. In this case, even
if communication has a cost, i may choose to tell j that it visited site 1 to tempt j to visit
site 2 and then 3, eventually setting the stage for i’s visit to site 4. The decision whether to
communication can be reasoned about in a decision-theoretic manner similar to reasoning
about domain actions.
Communication among self-interested agents raises many issues that are of no concern
in the cooperative case, like truthfulness, issues of trust and privacy concerns. In this
chapter, we assume truthful communication.
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We present three communication schemes; no, mandatory and optional communication.
For each, we analyze the effect on the size of an instance when represented using EDI-CR
and EFG. For EFG and EDI-CR, we measure size as the number of states in the joint game
tree and in each agent’s decision process, respectively. We express these quantities in terms
of A actions, O outcomes per action, T time steps, k reward interactions and m transition
interactions, with k + m ≤ A. The variables k and m allow us to investigate how the
number of interactions and their nature affect the size of a representation. We stress that
our analysis is not specific to the Mars rover example. It applies to any loosely coupled
game that fits the characterization we give in Section 2.2.2. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that an action takes one time unit and that actions can repeat.
We also look at the effect of communication on the time to find the first Nash equilibrium1 . EFGs are solved using the logit solver in the game theoretic package Gambit [57]
and reported as “Gambit” (more details about this algorithm in Section 6.3.4). EDI-CR is
solved as a bilinear program reported as “BLP”. We time out a solver after 30 minutes and
report “N/A”.
In our Mars rovers instances, T ∈ [6, 8] and the number of actions is 5 or 6 (unlike the
analytical model, an action here can take more than one time unit). To avoid generating
very large games that would not fit in memory regardless of the representation, we specify
restrictions over actions by having earliest start times before which they cannot proceed.
6.2.2

No communication

We first look at the case where communication is not allowed. An agent makes decisions based only on its local state, which keeps track of what actions have been done
so far and the outcomes obtained for them. With EFG, each stage consists of actions and
outcomes for both agents. The number of nodes is therefore O(A2T O2T ).
1

Because it is hard to compare solution qualities in selfish settings, we are concerned with finding any
equilibrium
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Table 6.1. Size and performance comparison for the no-communication case (times in
seconds)
EFG
infosets
49
68
100
151
173
296
333
841

EFG
size
1301
1618
3195
7987
11.2k
25.1k
44.4k
473k

EDI-CR
size
132
140
216
303
348
610
695
2079

%
reduction
89.85%
91.35%
93.24%
96.21%
96.89%
97.57%
98.43%
99.56%

Gambit
time
9
18
63
306
1080
N/A
N/A
N/A

BLP
time
2
9
2.4
2.5
3
2.5
2.6
8

In EDI-CR, each stage in an agent’s decision process consists of an action and outcome
for this agent only, resulting in O(AT OT ) states per agent. Because there are transition
interactions, an agent needs to remember the outcome of affected actions, but our state
representation remembers all outcomes, so states space size is independent of m.
While theoretically the sizes of EFG and EDI-CR are both exponential in the time
horizon T , Table 6.1 shows that in practice, doubling the exponent results in game trees
that are too large to build and/or solve.
6.2.3

Mandatory communication

We now model situations where communication is inherently part of the setting, rather
than a conscious decision on the part of the agents. An agent i doing its part of a reward or
transition interaction involuntarily leaves a trace that it has done this action. Consequently,
the other agent j will see this trace upon doing its part of the action. An agent does not
suffer a cost for this implicit communication, but cannot avoid it either. To allow an agent
to make decisions based on the traces it sees, an agent’s state keeps track of a flag denoting
whether a trace was seen upon doing each reward or transition interaction.
In EFG, even though the state now stores the actions, outcomes and k + m flags of
each agent, the number of states is not O(A2T O2T 22k+2m ). The reason is that the values
of an agent’s flags are fully determined by earlier actions of the other agent, so when an
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agent does an ineteraction, there is no branching over whether it will see a trace there. In
fact, there is no more branching in this communication scheme than in the case without
communication, and the number of nodes in the EFG tree is still O(A2T O2T ).
Even though they are of the same size, the EFG representation of the no communication case and the mandatory case are not the same. To see why, note that because of the
additional flags, an agent has more information available to make its decisions when there
is communication. This translates into the game tree having more information sets per
agent; nodes that were indistinguishable in the absence of communication can now be told
apart. Comparing Tables 6.1 and 6.2 shows how much the number of information sets in
an EFG increased. Since a policy specifies a distribution over actions for each information
set, mandatory communication increases the size of the policy space and makes finding a
Nash equilibrium more difficult. Table 6.2 indeed shows that even though the size of EFG
did not change, the solution time generally increased.
As for EDI-CR with mandatory communication, there is probabilistic branching in an
agent’s decision process over whether or not it sees a trace upon doing an interaction, since
that depends on what the other agent has done. The size of each agent’s process is therefore
O(AT OT 2k+m ).
It is interesting to note the effect of mandatory communication on the size gap between
EFG and EDI-CR. Compared to no-communication, mandatory communication results in
EDI-CR achieving less reduction in size. The increased coupling introduced by communication makes EFG less inadequate, compared to EDI-CR, although the savings obtained
by EDI-CR are still quite significant. If we increase the frequency and language of communication so that the agents communicate their entire states at every state, the decision
processes will be so tightly coupled that EDI-CR’s advantage of representing them separately will be lost.
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Table 6.2. Size and performance comparison for the mandatory communication case (times
in seconds)
EFG
infosets
82
83
135
204
201
574
630
1438

EFG
size
1301
1618
3195
7987
11.2k
25.1k
44.4k
473k

EDI-CR
size
1107
377
600
1481
2600
3475
3000
7823

%
reduction
14.91%
76.70%
81.22%
81.46%
76.80%
86.17%
93.24%
98.35%

Gambit
time
21
29
120
460
900
N/A
N/A
N/A

BLP
time
2.7
6
6.5
3
4
5
14.3
5.6

6.2.4 Optional communication
We now look at optional communication where an agent can choose whether to leave a
trace upon doing its part of an interaction. Even though communication here does have a
cost, an agent may still decide to communicate if it knows that communication will cause
the other agent to do something beneficial to it. For example, in the Mars rovers scenario,
if rover j knows from i’s policy that if i visits site si , then i will visit sj , and if sj has a
much higher value if visited by both rovers, then rover i will choose to leave a trace at si as
an inducement for j to go there too.
To represent optional communication in EFG, in addition to actions and outcomes for
each agent, there is an action node with two branches (leave trace or not) after every decision to do part of an interaction. A state keeps track of the actions and outcomes of both
agents, as well as at most k + m binary communication decisions per agent, for a total of
O(A2T O2T 22(k+m) ) states. Note that even though in this scheme an agent can potentially
have the same information to make its decisions as in the mandatory case, the number
of decisions itself is much larger, because of the communication decisions, resulting in a
larger number of information sets.
In EDI-CR, again, there are communication decision nodes, in addition to branching
over whether an agent will see a marker upon visiting a site. The number of states is
O(AT OT 22(k+m) ).
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Table 6.3. Size and performance comparison for the optional communication case (times
in seconds)
EFG
infosets
547
136
190
602
589
2668
2004
N/A

EFG
size
21.1k
3777
7511
51.6k
68.3k
295k
316k
2200k

EDI-CR
size
6213
671
1093
5651
5766
13.9k
10.2k
21.8k

%
reduction
70.58%
82.23%
85.45%
89.06%
91.57%
95.29%
96.76%
99.01%

Gambit
time
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

BLP
time
8.6
3
2.8
214
11
35
32
195

Table 6.3 shows that having communication decisions results in huge EFG trees, making it impossible for Gambit to solve them within a reasonable amount of time. However,
the 4th instance shows that solution time and size are not always correlated, which can be
explained by the fact that we are searching for the first equilibrium we can find, and the
time this takes depends on both the size of the problem and the structure of the search
space.
The results in this section show that even as we increase the amount of interaction
among agents by introducing communication, EDI-CR is still much more compact, and
allows the use of faster solution algorithms, than a general representation like extensive
form games. In fact, many of the instances we obtained after introducing communication
are too large to represent using EFG, let alone solve.

6.3

Finding Equilibria As A System Of Non-linear Equations

In Section 3.4, we formulated the problem of finding the optimal policy for cooperative
agents as a problem of solving a system of non-linear equations. The same can be done for
the problem of finding an equilibrium strategy profile for a group of self-interested agents.
This system can then be solved using continuation methods or using a general-purpose
solver.
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The formulations as a system of equations discussed in this section have the key advantage of allowing for more than two agents, unlike the bilinear program formulation from
the previous section. For this reason, we believe it is important to include them in this
thesis, even though this line of work is still in its early stages. We start an investigation into
how existing formulations as a system of equations can be adapted to exploit structured interactions in EDI-CR, in which case we will have a formulation that can both be efficiently
solved and admit more than two agents. The initial investigation in this section raises many
interesting questions for future research.
We start with a background on the use of continuation methods for normal and extensive
form games (NFG, EFG) in the work of Govindan and Wilson [39] which was reviewed in
the work of Blum et. al [51]. We then go into some detail for the case of EFG and discuss
the possibility of adapting the EFG formulation to EDI-CR problems. In Section 6.3.4, we
give a brief survey of related work that demonstrates that continuation, and later homotopy,
methods have a long history of application in game theory.
6.3.1

Continuation for NFG

As with homotopy methods, in continuation methods we formulate the problem at hand
as a system of non-linear equations F (x, λ) = 0 characterized by a parameter λ. As
opposed to homotopy methods, λ moves from 1 to 0 and is interpreted as the magnitude
of the perturbation. At λ = 1, the initial system is maximally perturbed and this perturbed
system has an easy solution. Continuation methods trace the solution as λ moves to 0. If we
have a solution (x, λ), to arrive at a nearby solution with a slightly lower λ, the differential
changes in x and λ must cancel out so that F remains 0. We therefore need to solve the
following equation:




 dx 
[∇x F ∇λ F ] 
=0
dλ
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(6.2)

When applied to games, the perturbation is a vector of bonus rewards that transforms
the original game into one that is easy to solve. Each agent is given a fixed bonus, scaled
by λ, for each of its actions, irrespective of what the other agents play. If the bonuses are
large enough, the best response of each agent is easy to find and is independent of other
agents, giving a unique pure strategy equilibrium to the perturbed game.
For normal form games (NFGs), the perturbation bonus vector b contains an element for
each action of each agent. Following the convention in [51], we denote a game G perturbed
by payoff vector b as G ⊕ b. In this game, for each action a of agent n, a ∈ An , and set of
actions t of all other agents, t ∈ A−n , the payoff to agent n is (G⊕b)n (a, t) = Gn (a, t)+ba .
If b is large enough, the game has a unique equilbiruim where each agent plays the action
for which ba is maximum.
To formulate the problem of finding an equilibrium as a system of equations, Govindan
and Wilson introduced a vector function, called deviation function, which Blum et. al call
V G . For a game with m actions, V G maps a strategy profile σ, of length m, to a vector,
also of length m. For an action a of agent n, VaG (σ) is the payoff to n of playing a while
all other agents follow σ. In other words, it is n’s payoff for deviating from σ to play the
pure strategy a.

VaG (σ) =

X

Gn (a, t)

t∈A−n

Y

σtk

(6.3)

k∈N \{n}

where N is the set of all agents.
The literature also defines a retraction operator R that retracts a point in Rm to the space
of legal profiles Σ. Govindan and Wilson use the following lemma by Gul et. al [36].
Lemma 2 If σ is a strategy profile of G, then σ = R(V G (σ) + σ) iff σ is an equilibrium.
Using this lemma, an equilibrium can be defined as the solution to the following system
of equations
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F (x, λ) = x − R(x) − V G (R(x)) − λb

(6.4)

V G + λb is the deviation function of the perturbed game G ⊕ λb, so F (x, λ) = 0 if and
only if x is an equilibrium of G ⊕ λb.
The expensive step is the calculation of the Jacobian ∇x F for equation (6.2). This
involves calculating the m × m Jacobian ∇V G . For actions a ∈ An and a0 ∈ An0 ,
X

G
∇Va,a
0 (σ) =

Y

Gn (a, a0 , t)

σtk

k∈N \{n,n0 }

t∈A−n,n0

The entry for (a, a0 ) is the expected payoff to agent n when it deviates to a and n0 deviates to
a0 while all other agents follow σ. As can be seen, the summation in the above computation
involves a number of terms that is exponential in the number of agents.
6.3.2 Continuation for EFG
In extensive form games, the bonus vector, and the deviation function, have one entry
per history of actions, rather than per action. Another difference from the NFG formulation
is that the payoff function is defined over leaves. Therefore, in the perturbed game, for each
leaf z ∈ Z, (G ⊕ b)n (z) = Gn (z) + bHn (Z) , where Hn (z) is the action history of agent n
that leads to leaf z.
The deviation function in EFG is defined as follows:

VhG (σ) =

X

Gn (z)

z∈Zh

Y

σk (z)

k∈N \{n}

where Zh is the set of leaves reachable by playing actions in h. VhG (σ) is the portion of
agent n’s payoffs for playing history h, unscaled by n’s probability of playing h. The
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Jacobian is along the lines of that of the NFG case. For histories h of n and h0 of agent n0 ,
we have

G
∇Vh,h
0 (σ) =

X

Gn (z)

z∈Zn,n0

Y

σk (z)

(6.5)

k∈N \{n,n0 }

where Zh,h0 is the set of leaves reachable by playing actions in h and h0 . The sum is over
the leaves of the tree, which may be exponential in the number of agents.
6.3.3 Continuation for EDI-CR
For NFGs, Blum et. al provide an informal proof of Gul’s lemma (Lemma 2) for
the special case where the strategy profile is perfectly mixed, i.e. each pure strategy has
a non-zero probability. Let VnG (σ) be agent n’s portion of the vector V G (σ), and let Σn
be the simplex of legal profiles of n. Σn is defined by 10 x = 1. For a perfectly mixed
profile, VnG (σ) must be a scalar multiple, c, of the all ones vector, since at equilibrium,
no pure strategy can have a higher payoff than others in the support. We believe there is
a mis-statement in the informal proof given by Blum et. al whereby VnG (σ) is said to be
orthogonal to Σn 2 . It is clear that for any vector x ∈ Σn , VnG (σ).x = c. To understand the
origins of the proof, and to see how it extends to EFG, we went back to the original paper
of Gul et. al [36] referenced by Govindan and Wilson, as well as Blum et. al. Gul dicusses
the more general case where the support of a mixed strategy is allowed to be smaller than
the set of all pure strategies. For this more general case, the following lemma is given:
Lemma 3 σ is an equilibrium profile σ1 , ..., σ|N | with value v = (v1 , ..., v|N | ) iff for each
player n there exists xn ∈ Rmn such that

VnG (σ) + xn = vn 1, xn ≥ 0, and σn .xn = 0
2

The first author, Ben Blum, could not be reached for verification.
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where mn is the dimensionality of agent n’s strategy space.
To see why the above conditions are necessary and sufficient, consider an agent n with
3 actions. Suppose that for a strategy profile σ, VnG (σ) = (3, 3, 1)T . One vector xn that
satisfies the lemma is xn = (0, 0, 2)T , with vn = 3. If similar vectors can be found for all
other agents in the game, then σ is an equilibrium. For agent n, the lemma simply says
that all pure strategies in the support should have equal payoffs, and any strategy that has a
lower payoff, hence a non-zero entry in xn , cannot be in the support, which is guaranteed
by the requirement that the dot product of xn and σn be 0, i.e. the corresponding entry for
the inferior strategy in σn must be 0. We see that if σ is an equilibrium, xn is orthogonal to
σn , rather than VnG (σ) being orthogonal to the space Σn .
For the case of sequential games like games in extensive form or EDI-CR, we cannot
require that for a given agent, every history with non-zero realization weight have the same
payoff. We should instead require that competing histories have the same payoff. Two
histories are competing if they cannot both be part of the support of a pure policy. As we
saw in Section 3.1, because of chance outcomes, even a pure policy will have multiple
histories with non-zero weight in its support. So the requirement is that if h and h0 are both
in agent n’s support, and they dictate different actions in a given information set, then they
should have the same expected reward. Therefore, in the sequential case, instead of having
one scalar value vn associated with each agent n as in Lemma 3, we need multiple scalars
per agent. In their work on using continuation methods to solve MAIDs [21], Blum et. al
use the NFG characterization of equilibria (Lemma (2)), so we assume that they were able
to devise a variant of Lemma (3) for the sequential case.
The main deciding issue in whether continuation methods are efficient for a given problem is whether there is an efficient way of computing the Jacobian in equation (6.5). Note
that this calculation is done in the context of a given strategy profile. In the case of MAIDs,
fixing the strategy profile results in a Bayesian network (the induced BN), and the calculations required for the Jacobian amount to doing inference on this BN. Blum et. al use the
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special structure of the induced BN (e.g., a given decision node only depends on a subset
of earlier decision nodes) to avoid duplicate calculations of certain probability distributions
that are part of the Jacobian calculations.
In previous work, we cast EDI-CR instances as MAID [61]. However, the MAID representation of our problems has some drawbacks. The structure in our loosely coupled games
(the independence of most actions’ rewards and transitions) is obscured because a MAID
decision node does not branch over the possible decisions, so we cannot isolate a single
action and represent its dependence on another. Second, MAIDs do not naturally capture
dependencies that are temporally nonlocalized, forcing us to resort to constructs that “remember” actions done in the past and allow them to affect future actions without having
the latter depend on all previous decisions. A MAID representation is essentially stateless,
and trying to capture a game in which agents have local state that is affected by previous
actions and affects the choice of future actions is problematic.
Because of the above problems with MAID, we believe that it is much better to work on
improving the Jacobian calculation while operating directly on the EDI-CR representation.
Looking at equation (6.5) and how each entry is for a tuple of histories, it is clear that
structured interaction implies many duplicate entries in the Jacobian, and using the idea
of binning, we can avoid duplicating these calculations. Moreover, in calculating a single
entry, we suspect that structured interaction can again allow us to reduce the amount of
computation required.
6.3.4 Related Work
6.3.4.1 Tracing procedure
The linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten [43] adjusts arbitrary prior beliefs
into equilibrium beliefs. First, the players play best responses against identical prior beliefs
concerning the play of the other players. Next, they observe that their beliefs are not met
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and subsequently update their beliefs and play the best response to the new beliefs. This
continues until equilibrium beliefs for the game have been found.
This general tracing procedure was implemented using homotopy methods to solve nperson games in normal form by Herings and van den Elzen [44] where the homotopy
transforms the problem of playing a best response to the initial prior beliefs to the problem
of playing a best response to opponents’ actual play to form an equilibrium. Each point
on the path is an equilibrium of a restricted game where the prior is played with some
probability that is initially one and decreases to zero.
This work was extended by von Stengel [84] et. al to solve extensive form 2-player
games. They generate a piece-wise linear path in strategy space, representing using the
sequence form. The starting point again represents a prior and players adjust their behaviors
based on information about the strategies that are actually being played.
6.3.4.2 Logit equilibria
The tracing procedure discussed above is similar to another procedure for finding a
game’s equilibrium strategy profile. McKelvey and Palfrey [58, 59] define a kind of equilibrium called Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). QRE is the fixed point of the process
of players choosing among strategies based on expected utility, but make choices based on
a quantal choice model. This choice model accounts for variations in the choice of a player
by assuming the player maximizes his utility, but the observed utility is distorted by a random additive error. McKelvey and Palfrey interpret mixed strategy profiles as the observed
distribution of strategy choices when players’ choices are modeled using the quantal choice
model. If the errors are drawn independently from an extreme value distribution with parameter λ (larger λ mean smaller error), the form of the rule determining quantal response
equilibrium choice probabilities is logistic. McKelvey and Palfrey refer to QREs arising
from this kind of error distribution as logit equilibria.
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The set of logit equilibria can be viewed as a correspondence from λ to the set of mixed
strategy profiles. At λ = 0 maps to the mixed strategy giving equal probabilities to all
pure strategies. As λ approaches infinity, the correspondence is structured to converge to a
unique Nash equilibrium. McKelvey and Palfrey use homotopy to reach the logit solution.
6.3.4.3

Easy initial game

Govindan and Wilson [39] modify the payoffs of the original game sufficiently so that
the perturbed game has a unique equilibrium, then trace back to the original game. They
establishes the conditions for application of the homotopy method for reversing the deformation of the original game to one with a unique equilibrium. They show how homotopy
can be implemented with the global Newton method.
Turcoy [86] presents a homotopy approach to tracing a branch of the logit equilibrium
correspondence, with application to the problem of computing a single Nash equilibrium.
The logit equilibria are expressed as the zeroes of a system of equations parameterized by
λ. Turcoy’s algorithm is implemented in the logit solver in the game-theoretic software
package Gambit [57].
Blum et. al solve games represented as Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams (MAIDs) [51],
discussed in Section 2.3.2.1, using continuation methods. A large perturbation is applied to
the rewards in the form of a bonus vector that rewards an agent for its actions regardless of
anything else that happens in the game. If large enough, these bonuses dominate the original game rewards and simply determine what the optimal strategies are. The continuation
method traces a path from the solution of the deformed game to that of the original. Blum
et. al exploit the special structure in MAIDs to improve the efficiency of a key step in the
algorithm, that of calculating the Jacobian of a certain function.
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6.4

Summary

In this chapter, we addressed the decision-making of self-interested agents whose goal
is to maximize their individual rewards, rather than team rewards. We used our model,
Event-Driven Interactions with Complex Rewards (EDI-CR), to represent the loosely coupled stochastic games that arise due to structured interactions among selfish agents. As in
the cooperative case, generically representing this kind of games in extensive form without
regard to their special structure results in very large problems.
We discussed the use of optimization techniques to find equilibrium policies for EDICR games. We used an existing formulation of finding an equilibrium profile as a bilinear program and compared this approach to representing our games in extensive form and
solving them using a game-theoretic software package. Analytical and experimental results
show the representational and computational savings we achieved in settings with different amounts of interaction, which we obtained by introducing different communication
schemes to the problem.
Finally, we discussed a second optimization-based approach where finding an equilibrium is formulated as a problem of solving a system of non-linear equations. The system
of equations can be solved using continuation methods and has the advantages of allowing
more than two agents. This line of work is in its early stages and raises many interesting
questions for future research.

157

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we conclude the thesis with a summary of the contributions presented
therein, followed by a discussion of possible directions for future work.

7.1 Thesis contributions
The contributions of this thesis are in the area of multi-agent decision making in settings where agents are largely independent except for some structured interactions among
their decision processes. These interactions arise due to some actions of an agent having
non-local effects on rewards and transitions of other agents. I consider both cooperative and
self-interested decision makers. I studied the problem of representing situations with structured interactions, formulating and solving the decision making problem as an optimization
problem, and reasoning about communication. The following is a list of my contributions:

Representation for cooperative and self-interested agents: I developed Event-Driven Interaction with Complex Rewards (EDI-CR), a decision-theoretic model for representing
structured transition and reward interactions. This model advances the state of the art by
filling a gap in both decision- and game-theoretic models; most existing models address
different kinds of structured interactions. Those that address non-local action effects either cannot capture both reward and transition interactions, or represent independence at a
coarse level where agents either fully interact or not at all. Using EDI-CR, we can represent
instances that are too large to represent using existing models. EDI-CR’s representational
savings do not come at the expense of expressiveness; EDI-CR has the same expressive
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power as DEC-MDP with factored state and local observability. Depending on the amount
of interaction, experimental results show 1-2 order of magnitude reduction in problem size
when using EDI-CR compared to general unstructured models.

Solving cooperative EDI-CR using optimization techniques: I exploited structured interaction to develop compact Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) formulations of EDICR instances. The key insight I used is that because agent interactions are structured, most
action sequences of a group of agents have the same effect on a given agent. This allows
us to bin these sequences and thus use fewer variables in the formulation. For the case
of 2 agents, my formulation solves the exact problem while for 3 or more agents, the formulation represents a relaxation of the original problem. Experimental results comparing
our EDI-CR MILP formulation to a formulation that ignores structure shows a significant
reduction in the number of variables introduced, which translates to faster solution times.
We are able to find the optimal solution, and verify its optimality, in a larger fraction of
instances using our formulation. My second contribution in this area is formulating the
problem of policy calculation as a continuum of problems with varying levels of difficulty
and studying the use of homotopy methods to solve this continuum.

Solving self-interested EDI-CR using optimization techniques: For an existing formulation of calculating an equilibrium as a bilinear program, I studied the effect of changing
the amount of interaction among agents on the size of the formulation and the speed of solving it. I experimentally compared this to representing the same instances as extensive form
games (EFGs) and solving them using the game theoretic package Gambit. The amount of
interaction is varied by varying the amount of communication the agents can have. Starting
from an existing formulation of calculating an equilibrium in general sequential games as
a system of nonlinear equations, I developed a formulation for EDI-CR that addresses the
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structured interactions among agents.

Communication among cooperative agents: I exploited the structure explicitly represented
by EDI-CR to make offline reasoning about communication tractable. Starting with a nocommunication version of the problem, I devised heuristics that strategically choose communication decision points to add to the problem. This results in a new decision problem
far smaller than what would be obtained if full-fledged communication were available,
while including enough communication that allows agents to coordinate their actions and
get higher rewards. My main heuristics decide whether to add a communication point
based on the impact of communication at that point on the other agent. For the case of
bi-directional interactions, my heuristic calculates beliefs by formulating the problem as a
Bayesian Network and relegating belief calculations to an inference engine. Experimental results show that in the case with uni-directional interactions, our most sophisticated
heuristic can almost achieve the full benefit of communication at a fraction of the problem size (thus solution time) of full-fledged communication. In the bi-directional case,
the full-fledged communication problem is too large to solve, so we do not know what
the maximum reward is, but we see that this heuristic again achieves higher reward at an
overall lower computational cost than a simpler heuristic. Experiments also show that in
many cases, our heuristic can determine how many communication points that are actually
needed.
In spite of several attempts to get around the complexity of offline reasoning, ours is
the first work to focus on making it more tractable by restricting the problem size in a way
that has little or no effect on solution quality, thereby making it possible to reason about
long-term consequences of communication without incurring the prohibitive costs typically
associated with doing so. Also, by controlling the amount of communication introduced,
our approach allows a modeler to control the tradeoff between solution quality and problem
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size.

Communication among self-interested agents: I studied the problem of multiple agents
deciding whether to communicate information when doing so is necessary to accomplish
a collective task, but incurs individual costs. I modeled this situation as a sequential game
of incomplete information and developed an anytime hill-climbing algorithm that finds an
approximate Nash equilibrium. Our algorithm has three novel features: it collapses the
game tree as a pre-processing step, resulting in more tractable trees; it generates local
measures that guide the search by indicating which parts of a strategy profile are least
stable; and it proposes a global measure of the stability of a profile as a whole by calculating
upper bounds on players’ regrets when playing this profile. Experimental results show that
the pre-processing step is very effective in reducing the tree size. They also show that our
search has a better anytime performance than a state-of-the-art game-theoretic package.

7.2

Future Directions

In the following paragraphs, we discuss some of the possible future directions of our
work.
7.2.1 Decomposition-based optimization
A large part of the work done in this thesis uses optimization methods and available
packages to solve mathematical formulations of EDI-CR instances. The optimization techniques we used try to find policies of all agents simultaneously. However, given that EDICR caters to problems where interactions among agents are relatively few, the idea of separately optimizing policies of different agents then somehow piecing them together is very
attractive. We referred to some existing works that employ this idea, but noted that current
approaches do not solve the sub-problems of the different agents in a principled manner,
and are therefore prone to getting stuck in local optima.
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Decomposition methods have been used very successfully in mathematical optimization [16]. The general idea is that to overcome the super-linear growth in problem complexity, a problem is broken down into a set of subproblems that can either be solved
sequentially or in parallel. We identify a set of complicating variables; ones which, if fixed,
render the subproblems independent. There are several ways of handling interactions (in
the form of complicating variables) among the subproblems. In primal decomposition, an
iterative solution algorithm optimizes each of the subproblems then adjusts the values of
the complicating variables until convergence. In dual decomposition, we give each subproblem its local version of the complicating variables and enforce equality of the local
versions.
The advantages of applying decomposition to EDI-CR are obvious. If each subproblem
corresponds to an agent, we will be solving a series of MDPs rather than a single EDICR. So in essence, decomposing a monolithic decision process will not only be done in
the representation (which EDI-CR already does), but also in the computation. Another
important advantages is that all the approaches we discuss in this thesis involve centralized
planning. Decomposition-based approaches allow each agent to work on its subproblem,
with some supervision to direct future subproblem and integrate their solutions.
7.2.2 Homotopy-inspired optimization
The idea behind homotopy methods is to move along a continuum between solving an
easy variant of the given problem and solving the given problem itself. These methods
find a solution to the easy variant then calculate the change that needs to be made to the
previous solution to make it solve a new problem that is a little closer to the original problem. As we reported in Section 3.4, homotopy methods did not work out-of-the-box for
solving EDI-CR instances. However, we believe that there is a lot of potential to the idea
of gradually transitioning from an easy to a hard problem, especially for EDI-CR where
these problems have physical significance (the easy problem is a set of MDPs ignoring all
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interactions and the hard problem considers all interactions). The open question is what
form this gradual transition from easy to hard should take. The formulation we gave gradually increases the emphasis on interactions, but there are other possibilities, one of which
is gradually increasing the number of interactions taken into consideration while planning.
Note that although this is homotopy-inspired, it is not allowed under homotopy because of
discontinuities it introduces (at one point a given interaction is not considered, at the next
it is). Another possibility is alternate between adding a new interaction and smoothly increasing the weight on this interaction. The first step can use heuristics to pick interactions
in the order of importance and the second step can use the usual curve-tracing methods
from homotopy. We suspect that the heuristics we developed for assessing potential communication points in terms of their impact on the receiver (Section 4.5) can be useful in
assessing the impact of a given interaction.
7.2.3

Optimization for self-interested EDI-CR

Our work presented in Chapter 6 raises many interesting questions regarding the use
of optimization techniques to find equilibria in self-interested EDI-CR. First, it would be
interesting to see how the idea of binning that we used for solving cooperative problems can
be applied to formulations of problems involving self-interested agents. Chapter 3 showed
the very good results we obtained from binning in the cooperative case, and we feel that
similar advantages can be obtained in the selfish case.
Second, our discussion of formulations of finding equilibria as a system of non-linear
equations is just the beginning of a line of research that can potentially yield a formulation
that is both open to having more than two agents and amenable to efficient calculation
using the special structure in EDI-CR. Again, the indifference of an agent to many of the
details of another agent’s actions can make much of the calculations in a key step of the
continuation method (computing the Jacobian) redundant.
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7.2.4 Measuring problem difficulty
In Section 4.4, we presented experimental results suggesting that it may be possible to
automatically determine the number of communication points needed to achieve optimal
reward. After adding a sufficient number of communication points, a good scoring heuristic
will give a low score to remaining points, indicating that adding these points will not have
a strong impact on reward.
One direction of future research is to investigate the use of the number of points added
by a heuristic as a measure of how much coordination is needed in a given instance. If it is
true that problems requiring tighter coordination are more difficult to solve, the number of
added points can serve as an indicator of the degree of difficulty of a probelm.
7.2.5 State representation
The work in this thesis employs a state representation that stores the actions taken by
an agent (in the order they were taken) and their outcomes. Where there is communication,
it keeps track of sent and received messages and their timestamps as well. A received
message’s content and time provides information about where the other agent is and what
it will do in the future. Likewise, the time at which an affected action resulted in a given
outcome provides information about the probability that the affecting action was done by
another agent at a given point in the past.
This verbose state representation is important in a tightly coupled DEC-MDP where an
agent cares about all the future actions of another agent. However, in the case of EDI-CR,
an agent only cares about the critical actions in another agent’s future. And because of
structured interactions, two different states are more likely to induce the same belief over
the other agent’s future critical actions (in which case the optimal action is the same at
these states) than in a general DEC-MDP.
This observation suggests that we can obtain more a compact state representation if we
discard the exact action and message history and instead keep track of an agent’s belief
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over the other agent’s execution of future critical actions. In this alternative representation,
the size of the state space will change depending on the number of interactions, unlike our
current representation. More interactions result in a wider range of beliefs about the other
agents.
Expressing policies as mappings from beliefs, rather than entire observation histories,
to actions has been considered in the literature. In the single-agent setting, many POMDP
algorithms reason over belief states. In the multi-agent setting, this approach is less common. The work of Zettlemoyer et. al [98] presents a way of calculating infinitely-nested
beliefs (beliefs over what the other agents belief...etc.) about the global state at a given
time. Their main concern, however, is efficient belief update given a new action and observation. They do not address planning; they assume policies for both agents are given up
front.
Oliehoek et al. [68] use policies that map observation histories to actions, but they
cluster observation histories that induce the same belief over the other agent’s histories and
over states, either in a lossy or lossless manner. This results in a smaller number of distinct
(with respect to induced beliefs) observation histories and thus a smaller policy space. And
because they do not directly deal with beliefs, they do not worry about belief updates.
Incomplete representations: So far, we have only been discussing representations
that retain all information necessary for making optimal decisions; when we suggested
forgetting certain information, it was because it doesn’t not affect the optimal decision. A
different approach would be to deliberately omit necessary pieces of information, resulting
in sub-optimal solutions in return for a smaller state space. The question then would be
which pieces of information have the least impact on solution quality. Intuitively, if, for
agent j, a certain dependency does not affect agent i that much (e.g., does not dramatically
change its transition function), then j need not remember exactly when the affecting action
was started and both agents can just ignore this interaction. We would like to investigate
whether some of the analysis approaches used in our communication heuristics can discover

165

such weak interactions. The result of this investigation would be another way to control
the tradeoff between problem size and solution quality in addition to the one provided by
limiting communication possibilities.
...
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